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Abstract 
 
Adults with autism are likely to face many more challenges in terms of 
education, paid employment, independent living and social relationships relative 
to people from the general population. Despite these challenges, no research to 
date has measured the Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) among people with autism. 
Given that improving wellbeing is an important treatment outcome of many 
psychological and social services, it is evident that understanding the SWB of 
people with autism is needed to assist the identification and planning of 
individualised support needs. However, the appropriate use of SWB measures 
requires a critical understanding of theory related to SWB. Thus, this thesis tests a 
number of theoretical predictions based on SWB Homeostasis Theory.  
 
SWB Homeostasis Theory proposes that SWB is actively maintained and 
defended within a narrow, positive range of values around a ‘set-point’ for each 
person. Theoretically, the average set-point is 80 points, measured on a 0-100 
point scale. The perceived level of SWB is relatively resistant to challenges (e.g., 
impairments in health, socioeconomic challenges) due to the presence of a 
homeostatic system, thus, SWB is unlikely to fall below 70 points. The 
homeostatic system uses cognitive buffers (e.g., self-esteem, optimism, and 
perceived control) and external buffers (e.g., supportive relationships, finances) to 
maintain an individual’s SWB around their set-point. However, when a challenge 
becomes too strong, or chronic, homeostasis will fail, causing SWB to fall. 
According to homeostasis theory, SWB below 70 points is likely to indicate that 
the homeostatic system is under challenge, and SWB below 50 points is likely to 
indicate a homeostasis under defeat, thus making the person vulnerable to 
depression.  
 
This thesis presents the first SWB results among Australian adults with 
autism and compares them to the general Australian population. Importantly, the 
scales measuring SWB, Homeostatically Protected Mood (HPMood), self-esteem, 
optimism and perceived control, along with the personality variables of emotional 
stability and extraversion, and autism symptomology, are found to be 
psychometrically sound within both the autism and general sample.  
 
This thesis also examined the psychometric equivalence of the Personal 
Wellbeing Index (PWI) and the short version of the depression subscale of the 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS21-D), using multiple-group 
confirmatory factor analysis. For the PWI, the results demonstrate partial 
invariance. In other words, the PWI can be used to measure overall SWB for 
people with and without autism. However, when comparing the two groups on 
individual domains of the PWI, only direct comparison can be made on the 
domains of Standard of Living, Achieving and Relationships among people with 
autism and the general population. For depression, the DASS7-D could not 
demonstrate partial invariance, suggesting that direct comparisons on each item 
could not be reliably made between people with and without autism.  
 
Overall, people with autism reported significantly lower SWB, HPMood, 
self-esteem, optimism and perceived control compared to the general population. 
In other respects, people with autism followed similar trends to the general 
sample. For example, as income increases, SWB increases. However, their 
generally low SWB indicates that their homeostasis system is under challenge.  
 
This thesis also examined the maintenance of homeostatic control, which 
involved the relationship between HPMood, and the cognitive buffers of self-
esteem, optimism and perceived control. It is found that the maintenance of 
homeostatic control works differently between people with autism and the general 
population. It is concluded that these different approaches to the maintenance of 
SWB are due to the different kinds of challenges each group faces.  
 
It is also found that, for both the autism and general Australian sample, 
depression may be conceptualised as a loss of normal levels of SWB subsequent 
to the failure of homeostasis. Moreover, SWB demonstrates an inverse curvilinear 
relationship with depression, as predicted by homeostasis theory.  
 
In summary, this thesis reports that the PWI is a valid and reliable 
measure of SWB and can be used among people with autism. As it is desirable for 
all Australians to experience normal levels of SWB, the PWI can be used to 
measure the degree that this is being achieved. Further, this thesis found that 
adults with autism are likely to face a number of difficulties in their lives, and 
these difficulties strongly challenge the maintenance of SWB. Future clinical 
trials are needed to test the effectiveness of the PWI, so that it can be used by 
service providers or clinicians to assist in treatment planning and measuring 
treatment outcomes.  
 
  
Introduction 
 
Background of Thesis  
 
Research to date has highlighted that adolescents and adults with an 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD, henceforth referred to as autism) are likely to 
face many challenges in terms of paid employment, independent living, and social 
relationships (Billstedt et al., 2005; Eaves and Ho, 2008; Howlin et al., 2004). 
Thus, it is not surprising to see research over the last seven years finding that 
people with autism have a poorer Quality of Life (QOL) compared to people from 
the general population (Burgess & Turkstra, 2010; Cottenceau et al., 2012; Kamp-
Baker et al., 2011; Kuhlthau et al., 2010; Sheldrick et al., 2012; Shipman et al., 
2011;; Hong, Bishop-Fitzpatrick, Smith, Greenberg & Mailick, 2016). 
 
It is important to note that QOL is conceptualised as a multidimensional 
construct (Cummins, 2005; Petry, Maes, & Vlaskamp, 2007) with various 
components of a person’s life contributing to their overall QOL. It is also widely 
accepted that QOL includes both a combination of objective and subjective 
dimensions that are critical in determining overall QOL (Summers, Poston, 
Turnbull et al., 2005; Caron et al., 2005; Hannson, 2002). However, when basic 
human needs are met, Cummins (2003) states that there is a poor correspondence 
between objective and subjective measures of quality of life (i.e., objective 
measures do not equate to happiness). Thus, QOL should be measured from the 
perspective of the person (Cummins, 2003) and should, therefore, be measured 
from the perspective of the person with autism.  
 
Thus, this thesis is focused on exploring the Subjective Quality of Life of 
people with autism. Over the past forty years, scientific research has emerged that 
subjective QOL or subjective wellbeing (SWB) is a major theoretical construct in 
the general literature of QOL research. Subjective evaluations can mostly be 
made by asking the question, “How satisfied are you with your life?” or “How 
happy are you?” This can be asked from the point of view of “life-as-a-whole”, 
and/or how it is related to specific life domains (e.g., health, achieving, standard 
of living) (International Wellbeing Group, 2013). While research into SWB has 
been conducted on a wide range of groups within society (Capic et al., 2016; 
Diener & Lucas, 1999; Headey & Wearing, 1992), including people with 
intellectual disability (Martindale, 2010), research examining the SWB of people 
with autism is scarce. The reason for the slow adoption of SWB research in the 
field of autism may be due to difficulties in administering and obtaining self-
reports for this population. For instance, there may be complications recruiting 
(e.g., willingness to participate in research). Further, difficulties in 
communicating, reading and comprehension may impact some people with autism 
and their ability to participate in research. That is, for people with autism, there 
may be some difficulty in comprehending some of the abstract information 
inherent in SWB research. However, these difficulties can be partially overcome 
with the adoption of a pre-testing protocol to establish the respondent ability of 
the participant (see Personal Wellbeing Index – Intellectual Disability; Cummins 
& Lau, 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to measure and understand more fully the 
SWB of people with autism for a number of reasons. It offers the potential to be a 
useful index in understanding the experiences of, and difficulties faced, by people 
with autism. Such measures have the potential to assist in the identification and 
planning of individualised support needs. Furthermore, it can also be used to 
measure outcomes of intervention and treatments. However, using subjective 
QOL measures among people with autism depends on critically understanding the 
QOL construct and on the instruments used to make the necessary instruments.  
 
 
Purpose of Thesis 
 
 In a series of research papers, Cummins (1995, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2010) 
outlines a model for the homeostatic maintenance of SWB. A review of a number 
of large-scale studies by Cummins (1995) indicated that data obtained through a 
variation of the question, “How satisfied are you with your life as a whole?” or by 
satisfaction averaged across a number of domains, shows levels of satisfaction 
that are fairly similar. That is, when responses are standardised onto a scale with a 
range of 0 to 100 points, then Western populations have a mean of 75 points with 
a standard deviation of 2.5 points. Thus, when two standard deviations are used to 
define the normative range, it can be predicted that the mean SWB of western 
population samples occurs within a narrow range 70 to 80 points (Cummins, 
2003).  
 
These findings led Cummins to propose that life satisfaction, and more 
generally, SWB is not free to vary over the possible 0 to 100 point range, in 
response to changing external conditions. It has been proposed that each person 
has an SWB set-point and that within general population samples, these set-points 
are normally distributed (between 71 and 90 points on a 100 point scale; 
Cummins et al., 2014). SWB also tends to be relatively resistant to challenges 
(e.g., impairments to health, socioeconomic challenges) due to the presence of the 
homeostatic system calling on internal buffers (e.g., self-esteem, optimism, 
perceived control) and external buffers (e.g., supportive relationships, finances; 
Cummins, 2010). However, if a challenge becomes too strong, the homeostatic 
system will become overwhelmed, and SWB will decrease as a result of being 
dominated by threat(s).  
 
Scores between 50 and 70 points are thought to indicate homeostatically 
challenged SWB, while scores below 50 points are thought to represent 
homeostatically defeated SWB (Cummins & Wooden, 2014). Individuals who 
face chronic stress/challenges may experience a level of SWB below their set-
point range and may be more vulnerable to negative thoughts and depression 
(Cummins, 2010). Research supports the notion that depression and SWB are 
inversely related (Cummins et al., 2009) and that the relationship between SWB 
and depression may be conceptualised as suppressed HPMood, subsequent of the 
failure of homeostasis (Cummins et al., 2009). Consequently, from the 
perspective of homeostasis theory, people are able to achieve a normative range 
of life satisfaction and SWB under what could be described as stressful personal 
circumstances, provided those circumstances are not so severe that homeostasis is 
defeated (i.e., when the strength of an extrinsic influence exceeds the adaptive 
capacity of the homeostatic system).  
 
The theory of SWB and homeostatic control has yet to have extensive 
empirical testing among people with autism, despite their enhanced risk of 
homeostatic defeat. For instance, people with autism are more likely to experience 
under- and unemployment, difficulties with independent living and social 
relationships (Billstedt et al., 2005 Eaves and Ho, 2008, Howlin et al., 2004) as 
well as more loneliness than the general population (Whitehouse et al., 2009). 
Such experiences can severely test the limits of the homeostatic maintenance of 
SWB (Cummins, 2001). As a consequence, developing an understanding of the 
maintenance of SWB is an important issue for the autism field in general.  
 
Since it is desirable for all Australians, including people with autism to 
experience normal levels of QOL, then SWB is an indicator that can be used to 
measure the degrees that this is being achieved. Furthermore, measuring SWB 
among Australians with autism is important as it will tell us at a population level 
approximately how many people have normal levels of SWB, are at risk of 
homeostatic defeat, or are likely experiencing homeostatic defeat. Additionally, it 
may be useful in identifying any sub-groups of people with autism who need 
additional resources. Moreover, at an individual level, SWB can be used by 
service providers or clinicians to assist in treatment planning and measuring 
treatment outcomes.  
 
 Thus, this thesis builds on previous research to date and explores a number 
of the propositions of SWB Homeostasis Theory among cognitively abled 
Australian adults with autism compared to general sample. More specifically, the 
aims of this thesis are as follows. 
 
1. To investigate the psychometric properties of the Personal Wellbeing 
Index. 
 2. To provide comparative data, between people with autism and people 
without autism on their self-reported levels of SWB.  
 
3. To extend the theory of homeostasis of SWB to a population of Australian 
adults with autism and to provide empirical evidence for, and to explain 
more fully, the variables that contribute to SWB, as well as the internal 
buffers (self-esteem, optimism and perceived control) among adults 
experiencing homeostatic challenge.  
 
4. To examine the notion that depression and SWB are inversely related and 
the relationship between SWB and depression may be conceptualised as 
suppressed HPMood.  
 
Structure of this Thesis 
 
 This thesis begins with an overview of autism, including the clinical 
presentation, and current cognitive theories of autism. This leads into Chapter two 
which provides an overview of common challenges faced by people with autism 
that are likely to impact upon their QOL. Chapter three reviews the literature 
regarding SWB. A description of the development of the homeostatic theory of 
SWB as well as the processes underlying SWB is presented. This includes the 
cognitive mechanisms of self-esteem, optimism, and perceived control, examined 
with a particular focus on their relationship to SWB. Chapter three also provides a 
conceptual framework for the thesis. Chapter four provides an overview of a 
number of considerations needed to measure valid and reliable self-reports of 
SWB. These considerations include proxy-reporting and respondent ability and 
were taken into account in the design of the methodology presented in chapter 
five. Chapter six provides the psychometric properties of the scales used. Chapter 
seven provides a descriptive analysis of the SWB variables. Chapter eight 
presents the theoretical investigation regarding SWB and autism, whilst chapter 
nine introduces measurement invariance and tests the psychometric equivalence 
of the Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI) and the depression subscale from the 
DASS-21. Chapter ten examines the relationship between SWB and depression. 
Lastly, chapter 11 provides an overview of the thesis, summarising and 
integrating results of SWB.  
  
Chapter One: Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 
Overview 
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (henceforth referred to autism) is a lifelong, 
complex neurodevelopmental condition that is associated with impairments in 
social interaction and communication and with restricted and repetitive 
behaviours (DSM-V; APA, 2013). Autism presents in the early developmental 
periods (although may not fully manifest until social demands exceed limited 
capacities) and limits and impairs daily functioning (APA, 2013). Manifestations 
of autism vary greatly depending on the severity of the symptomology, 
developmental level, and chronological age (APA, 2013). The severity of autism 
is specified by three levels in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, fifth edition (APA, 2013), Level 1 – requiring support, Level 2 – 
requiring substantial support, and Level 3 – requiring very substantial support (p. 
52). Language deficits also vary from no intelligible speech to speech with 
language impairment (APA, 2013). The diagnostic criteria for autism are 
presented in Table 1. 
There has been a documented increase in the diagnosis of autism, 
(Hartley-McAndrew, 2014). Current estimates indicate that over 1 in 100 people 
are diagnosed with autism (Centre for Disease and Control, 2014). More recently, 
there has been a greater increase of ‘cognitively abled’ children being diagnosed, 
compared to children with both autism and intellectual disability (Van Naarden et 
al., 2015). The higher prevalence estimates come about through a combination of 
factors: there is increased awareness of autism by parents and professionals, a 
widened definition of characteristics of the disorder, improved diagnostic tools, 
more professionals able to  
Table 1 
Diagnostic Criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder (DSM-5, 2013)(299.00) 
 
A. Persistent deficits in social communication and social interaction across multiple 
contexts, as manifested by the following, currently, or by history: 
 1. Deficits in social-emotional reciprocity, ranging, for example, from  
abnormal social approach and failure of normal back-and-forth conversation; to 
reduced sharing of interests, emotions or affect; to failure to initiate or respond to 
social interactions. 
 2. Deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviour used for social interaction,  
ranging, for example, from poorly integrated verbal and nonverbal  
communication; to abnormalities in eye contact and body language or deficits in 
understanding and use of gestures; to a total lack of facial expressions and 
nonverbal communication.  
3.Deficits in developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships, ranging, 
for example, from difficulties adjusting behaviour to suit various social contexts; 
to difficulties in sharing imaginative play or in making friends; to absence of 
interest in peers.  
Specify current severity 
§ Severity is based on social communication impairments and restricted, repetitive 
patterns of behaviour. 
 
B. Restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests or activities, as manifested by at 
least two of the following, currently or by history: 
1. Stereotyped or repetitive motor movements, use of objects, or speech (e.g., 
simple motor stereotypies, lining up toys or flipping objects, echolalia, 
idiosyncratic phrases).  
2. Insistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines, or ritualized patterns 
of verbal or nonverbal behaviour (e.g., extreme distress at small changes, 
difficulties with transition, rigid thinking patterns, greeting rituals, need to take 
same route or eat same food every day).  
3. Highly restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal in intensity or focus (e.g., 
strong attachment to or preoccupation with unusual objects, excessively 
circumscribed or perseverative interests).  
4. Hyper- or hypo activity to sensory input or unusual interests in sensory aspects 
of the environment (e.g., apparent indifference to pain/temperature, adverse 
response to specific sounds or textures, excessive smelling or touching of objects, 
visual fascination with lights or movement).  
Specify current severity 
§ Severity is based on social communication impairments and restricted, repetitive 
patterns of behaviour. 
 
C. Symptoms must be present in the early developmental period (but may not become 
fully manifest until social demands exceed limited capacities, or may be masked by 
learned strategies in later life).  
D. Symptoms cause clinically significant impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important area of functioning.  
 
These disturbances are not better explained by intellectual disability (intellectual 
development disorder) or global developmental delay. Intellectual disability and autism 
spectrum disorder frequently co-occur; to make comorbid diagnosis of autism spectrum 
disorder and intellectual disability, social communication should be below that expected 
for general developmental level.  
  
make the diagnosis, and the availability of services for the disorder (Ouellette-
Kuntz et al., 2014).  
Current estimates indicate that males are more likely to be diagnosed at a 
ratio of 3 to 1 females (Loomes, Hull, & Mandy, 2017). It has been suggested that 
females, in general, have a greater genetic protective factor than males 
(Jacquemont et al., 2014) or that they could also be underdiagnosed, potentially 
due to less severe externalizing behavioural deficits (May et al., 2014; Kirkovski, 
Enticott, & Fitzgerald, 2013). However, it is not clear in the scientific literature 
whether females have a greater genetic protective factor or if they are 
underdiagnosed. 
Aetiology  
 
The aetiology of autism is undetermined. Nonetheless, evidence suggests 
that the causes are related to biological, genetic and environmental factors (Centre 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010). A recent UK study by Colvert et al. 
(2015), using the gold standards in diagnostic assessment of autism (Autism 
Diagnostic Interview-Revised and Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule), 
found that the genetic heritability estimates for autism were 78% with a shared 
environmental component of 22%, indicating that autism is likely to have a 
genetic component. Twin studies also speak to the genetic component of autism, 
for instance, monozygotic twins have a 70% to 76% chance of being diagnosed 
with autism (Bailey et al., 1995; Frazier et al., 2014). Whereas dizygotic twins or 
same-sex twins is 34% and 18% for boy-girl pairs (Frazier et al.). This likely 
suggests that autism symptomology is likely to have a genetic origin.  
There have been numerous attempts to identify the genes of autism with 
the cause being unknown (Frietag et al., 2010; Lichenstein et al., 2010). Unlike 
single-gene disorders, in which a mutation of one gene leads to a pathologic 
heritable phenotype, autism is known to be a multiple gene disorder of uncertain 
mode of inheritance, with several interacting genes of moderate effect on different 
chromosomes (Sebat et al., 2007; Szatmari, 2009; Schellenberg et al., 2006). 
Future research is ongoing to determine the genetic aetiology of autism.  
Clinical Presentation 
 
The clinical presentation of autism is remarkably heterogeneous usually 
associated with a combination of some delayed behaviours together with the 
emergence of some unusual behaviours (Thapar et al., 2015). Some of the earliest 
symptoms of autism include difficulties with joint attention, eye contact, lack of 
social intention to communicate with others, lack of social or imaginative play, 
and a fascination with sensory stimuli (Thapar et al., 2015). Symptoms change 
over time, in some cases, the behavioural presentation becomes obvious (i.e., 
motor stereotypies, lining up objects, lack of interest in other children and 
inability to play cooperatively with other children. In other cases, children’s 
autism presentation can be more subtle, (i.e., difficulties in conversation with 
others, the emergence of intense circumscribed interests, rigid thinking styles, and 
difficulties with reciprocal friendships). Some symptoms of autism are delays in 
typical development (i.e., lack of speech, limited play skills) whereas other 
symptoms are distinct to autism (i.e., delayed echolalia and neologisms).  
Children with autism in the preschool years can often present with little or 
no speech and poor nonverbal communication. They can also engage in repetitive 
play with sensory stimuli and become upset by some stimuli in their environment 
(i.e, some everyday noises or foods). Whereas with some older children, speech 
and language are present, grammar and vocabulary could be age appropriate, but 
there remain pragmatic difficulties in the social use of communication.  
 
 
Cognitive Theories of Autism 
 
There have been a number of highly influential cognitive theories of 
autism which have sought to explain autism symptomology as relating to a 
cognitive deficit. These cognitive theories provide an important bridge between 
biological abnormalities and behavioural symptoms. The three main theories are 
Theory of Mind (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happé, 1994) Executive Function (Ozonoff, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1991), and Weak Central Coherence (Happé, 1996). Most 
people with autism will show deficits in all of these three areas as they map onto 
the DSM-5 criteria. However, it is important to note that they do not provide a 
mutually exclusive account for the neuropsychological profile of autism. These 
three cognitive theories will now be discussed. 
 
Theory of Mind 
Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to infer different mental states 
(e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions, imagination, emotions, etc) and to reflect on the 
contents of one’s own and others minds (Baron-Cohen, 2001). ToM is the ability 
to ‘mind-read’ and subsequently predict behaviour that is essential for human 
social interaction (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 
2010). In a landmark study, Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Firth (1985) proposed that 
individuals with autism have an impaired ToM and argued that this could be the 
main cause of social and communication impairments. Specifically, if a person 
lacks an understanding of another’s knowledge and beliefs, then that person 
would be more likely to be socially impaired and communicatively egocentric in 
their perspectives. Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) described these cognitive 
impairments in individuals with autism as a lack of capacity for meta-
representation. Meta-representations are the ability to represent in one’s own 
mind another individual’s false belief as separate from their own belief. Or 
alternatively, the ability to understand someone else’s unawareness if a particular 
fact or incident is separate from their own understanding (Leslie & Roth, 1993).  
 
This hypothesis was explored by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) in false-belief 
tests, such as the Sally-Ann task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Baron-Cohen 
compared 27 typically developing children and 14 children with Down’s 
syndrome against 20 children with autism. In the scenario, two dolls are posed as 
actors of the real world; Sally and Ann. Sally places a marble in a basket then 
leaves the room, at which point Ann removes the marble from the basket, and 
conceals it in an adjunct box. When children were asked about where Sally would 
look for her marble, the typically developing children and children with Down’s 
syndrome pointed to the old unchanged position of the marble, the basket (as 
Sally would have no way of knowing that anyone had changed its position and act 
on her false belief), the children with autism all pointed to the newly changed 
position of the marble, the box.  
 
While research findings indicate that young children with autism fail at 
false-belief tasks, research for older children with autism is not as clear. For 
instance, Scheeren, Ronsay, Koot and Begeer (2012) found that among 194 
cognitively abled school-aged children and adolescents with autism, they were 
able to perform at the same level as their typically developing peers (N = 60) on 
advanced mental reasoning. However, it was reported by their parents that they 
were still likely to fail to apply the theoretical reasoning that was employed to 
solve the tasks, in real life everyday situations. Moreover, Senju (2012) suggested 
that the failure of children with autism in the standard false-belief tasks may be 
due to cognitive demands of the task and difficulties with pragmatic 
understanding, rather than an incapacity to ‘mind-read’.  
 
Nevertheless, ToM can explain a number of social and communication 
impairments found among individuals with autism. For instance, research by 
Bauminger, Shulman, and Agam (2003) found among cognitively abled (i.e., IQ > 
70) adolescents with autism who initiated social interaction with their peers, their 
interactions were found to be awkward and sometimes intrusive or offensive. 
Thus, these awkward, intrusive or offensive interactions may be due to deficits 
with ToM.  
 Moreover, while the ToM provides some understanding for the cognitive 
and social impairments in autism, it does not shed light on features of restricted 
and repetitive behaviours. Furthermore, while ToM is not observed with younger 
typically developing children under the age of four, many of the social 
impairments typical to the child with autism, such as lack of eye gaze and/or joint 
attention are observed in children with autism from early infancy (Frith, 1989). 
Therefore, there could well be other fundamental processes at work. Other 
psychological theories attempt to address some of the gaps in the aetiology of 
autism. One such theory is the theory of Executive Function in autism. 
 
Executive Functioning 
 Some of the difficulties present in autism, such as difficulties switching 
attention and deficits in inhibitory control are similar to those found among 
people with an acquired frontal lobe brain injury (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988). 
Researchers drew parallels between these areas to propose the executive 
functioning theory of autism (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). This theory attempts 
to link biological impairments in the frontostriatal circuits, including the 
prefrontal areas of the brain, to cognitive impairments which produce behavioural 
symptoms of autism. Executive Functions is an umbrella term that refers to a 
range of skills that include working memory, planning, impulse control, set 
shifting and the initiation and mentoring of one’s actions. The term “executive 
dysfunction” is used when any of these functions are impaired. 
Deficits in switching attention and cognitive flexibility or response set 
shifting (i.e., the ability to shift attention based on changing environmental 
demands) (Ames & Fletcher-Watson, 2010; Reed & McCarthy, 2012) may be 
responsible for autism deficits in social attention and social communication. For 
instance, research has highlighted that it is common for individuals with autism to 
display one-sided conversations, in which individuals with autism may only talk 
on specific topics of personal interest (usually restricted interests), and find it 
difficult to change topics (Elder, Caterino, Chao, Shacknai, & De Simone, 2006). 
This impairment can affect their ability to carry out bi-directional conversations 
and take turns in conversation (Carters, Davis, Klin & Volkmar, 2005; Church, 
Alisanski, & Amanullah, 2000). Thus, it can be difficult for individuals with 
autism to be involved in conversations with social partners and find shared 
interests (Laugeson et al., 2010). A consequence of the impairment of identifying 
common themes with peers is that it becomes difficult to form friendships, 
particularly since friendships are often based upon common interests (Laugeson et 
al.). Thus, these social difficulties may be linked to executive dysfunctions. 
However, there is some skepticism over the universality of EF 
impairments and its specificity to autism. For instance, EF deficits may not be 
specific to autism, as it is seen in other neurodevelopmental disorders such as 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Grodzinsky & Diamond, 1992), 
and Tourette syndrome (Baron-Cohen, Cross, Crowson & Robertson, 1994). 
Therefore, EF tasks provide good sensitivity but provide poor specificity. They 
have been criticised for their poor discriminant validity (Burack, Charman, 
Yirmiya, & Zelazo, 2001). There is some argument in the scientific literature over 
whether the EF theory is of primary aetiological significance in autism or whether 
it is merely a secondary consequence of autism that manifests along the 
developmental trajectory of the child (Yers, Hepburn, Pennington, & Rodgers, 
2007). For instance, reported impairments in EF among individuals with autism 
may be a consequence of ability rather than autism (Sanders et al., 2008; Geurts et 
al., 2009). Nevertheless, executive dysfunction is common among people with an 
autism spectrum condition. The last of the cognitive theories to be discussed is the 
theory of Weak Central Coherence.  
 
Weak Central Coherence 
Weak Central Coherence (WCC) is a perceptual-conceptual ability that 
enables a person to ‘see the bigger picture’ and extract the “gist” in information 
processing (Happe & Firth, 2006). According to WCC theory, individuals with 
autism are likely to place an emphasis on local/detail-focused processing over a 
more holistic processing (Happe & Firth, 2006). This local/detailed focusing can 
be ‘overridden’ with specific situational demands to encourage processing at a 
global level (Happe and Firth). Thus, individuals with autism would demonstrate 
reduced performance on tasks requiring global processing, (e.g., Pellicano et al., 
2005) and perform rather well on tasks requiring a local processing skill (e.g., 
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997). This theory can also help explain some aspects of 
social deficits in autism. For instance, difficulties in terms of social interaction 
with understanding nonliteral language such as understanding metaphors, 
sarcasm, and figurative use of language (Kerbel & Grunwell, 1998; Starr et al., 
2003). This is because individuals with autism may focus on specific parts of a 
conversation and miss the global aspect of the conversation.  
 
Summary 
 
 In summary, autism is a lifelong neurodevelopmental condition that is 
associated with impairments in social interaction, social communication and 
restricted and repetitive behaviours. It is a lifelong condition that presents in the 
early formative years. Current estimates indicate that over 1 in 100 people are 
likely to have autism. It is important to note that the clinical presentation of 
autism is diverse, and depends on autism symptomology, developmental level, 
and chronological age. The exact aetiology is unknown but genetic heritability is 
believed to be the strongest predictor of autism. While a great deal of research has 
investigated the clinical profile and deficits regarding autism, research is lacking 
regarding how individuals with autism perceive their own wellbeing. The next 
chapter examines the quality of life among people with autism.  
  
Chapter Two: Quality of Life and Autism 
 
Overview  
 
This section provides an overview of Quality of Life (QOL). This includes 
a brief discussion of the definitions of QOL, as well as the importance of 
measuring QOL among people with autism. Following this, the literature 
examines the self-reported quality of life among people with autism and considers 
future directions measuring QOL among people with autism  
 
Quality of Life 
 
 While there is no standard definition of QOL, it is generally accepted that 
QOL is a multidimensional concept (Cummins, 2005; Petry, Maes, & Vlaskamp, 
2007) that requires the integration of several domains, such as emotional and 
physical wellbeing (Meyer, Oberhoffer, Hock, Giegerich, & Muller, 2016). It is 
also widely accepted that QOL includes a combination of objective and subjective 
dimensions that are critical in determining overall QOL (Summers, Poston, 
Turnbull et al., 2005; Caron et al., 2005; Hannson, 2002). Nevertheless, there are 
many definitions of QOL that have appeared in the scientific literature over the 
years.   
 
 One of the first conceptualisations of QOL came from Maslow’s (1943) 
hierarchy of needs which included safety, belonging, happiness, and a sense of 
community and economic security. Since Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, there 
have been many more conceptualisations of QOL. For example, in 1993, Leidy 
and colleagues described QOL as an ‘individual’s subjective perception of the 
impact of health status, including disease and treatment, on physical, 
psychological, and social functioning’ (Leidy, Revicki, & Geneste, 1999). 
Similarly, the World Health Organisation (WHO) defines QOL as ‘the 
individual’s perception of their position in life, in the context of culture and 
values systems in which they live, and in relation to their goals, expectations, 
standards, and concerns’(WHO; 1993). Whereas, in 2001, Eiser and Morse 
defined QOL as involving five domains, which include philosophical, economic, 
sociological, psychological/cognitive and medical/physical. Along with a number 
of definitions of QOL, come a number of QOL instruments. 
 
 The Australian Centre on Quality of Life (ACQOL) provides well over 
100 QOL measures (ACQOL; 2017). These instruments range from generic to 
disorder-specific measures with single or multidimensional concepts. Generic 
measures are designed to be more comprehensive in nature, but as a consequence 
are less sensitive to certain health conditions and treatment-related change 
(Jonsson et al., 2017). Disorder-specific measures focus on areas of particular 
concern but do not readily allow comparison across health conditions. While it is 
generally accepted that QOL is a multidimensional concept and that the core 
domains of QOL tap into physical, psychological, cognitive and social aspects of 
functioning (Cummins, 2005; Petry et al., 2007), QOL measures define these 
domains in different ways. As a consequence, there is a considerable degree of 
instrument non-overlap and one cannot assume equal coverage by different QOL 
measures (Jonsson et al.). The variety of instruments contributes to the variability 
of operationalisations and limits comparability between studies.  
 
 This variability is also evident among research using self- or proxy-
reporting among children, or individuals with a cognitive impairment. As 
subjectivity is an important aspect of subjective QOL, it is always preferable to 
obtain the individuals’ own report of QOL (Jonsson et al., 2017). In some cases 
parental or caregiver involvement is inevitable. However, it has been found that 
parents tend to underreport children’s QOL (Coghill and Hodgkins, 2016), even 
when their children have a chronic health condition (White-Koning et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, underreporting of QOL has been found among caregivers who have 
a child with an intellectual disability (Cummins, 2002; Perkins, 2007; Schalock et 
al., 2002). Thus, where possible, it is important to obtain the self-report of 
individuals’ QOL. Despite the above limitation of proxy-reports, studies on QOL 
among children and adolescents with autism frequently rely on parental ratings 
(Bennet et al., 2005; Limbers et al., 2009; Shipman et al., 2011). The reasons for 
this may be difficulties with communication, reading, and comprehension which 
may impact on their ability to participate in research. Nevertheless, it is important 
to gain an understanding of the QOL from the perspective of the person with 
autism.  
 
 The importance of gaining an understanding of the QOL among people 
with autism cannot be understated. First, utilising valid assessments of subjective 
QOL are needed to understand the true impact of autism and enable comparisons 
to the general population. This can assist as a complementary way to calculate 
health-related service costs and allocation of resources (Dolan, 2000), as it 
reflects the individual's experiences of autism as a whole and the related need for 
improvement. Second, using a QOL framework can assist clinicians in service 
delivery, as it can help with treatment planning, developing a hierarchy of 
intervention actions, which are based on the priorities and perceptions of the 
individual. Furthermore, using a valid QOL measure can also assist in measuring 
intervention outcomes as well as understanding the developmental trajectory of 
autism and QOL.  
 
 In summary, there still remains no clear definition of QOL. However, it is 
generally accepted as a multidimensional construct that includes both objective 
and subjective measures. With over 100 QOL measures, with different 
definitions, comparing studies with one another can be difficult. Nevertheless, 
understanding the subjective perspective of people with autism will assist in 
understanding the developmental trajectory as well as informing the resources 
needed to assist in achieving QOL outcomes. A critique of the self-reported QOL 
research among people with autism will now be discussed. 
 
Autism and Quality of Life 
 
It is self-evident that individuals with autism are likely to face many 
challenges in terms of education, paid employment, independent living, and social 
relationships (Billstedt et al., 2005; Eaves and Ho, 2008; Howlin et al., 2004). 
Thus, it is not surprising that they are also likely to have poorer outcomes 
compared to the general population (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS]; 2015; 
Gotham et al., 2015; Howlin et al., 2004; 2013). 
 
In terms of education, individuals with autism are less likely to attain year 
12 or vocational qualifications (ABS, 2015). According to the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, people with other disabilities are approximately two and half times 
more likely to have a bachelor degree or higher, while the general Australian 
population is approximately four and half times more likely to have a bachelor 
degree or higher than Australians with autism (ABS, 2015). Longitudinal 
outcome studies indicate that although some adults with autism have completed 
high school, and in some cases completed undergraduate degrees, their outcomes 
in terms of full-time paid employment remained low (see Barnard et al., 2001; 
Farrely, 2001; Seltzer & Krauss, 2002). This is despite individuals with autism 
having traits that the employers find desirable (i.e., trustworthiness, punctuality, 
honesty, attention to detail) (Mahwood and Howlin, 1999). In Australia, the ABS 
suggests that 32% of adults with autism are in paid employment compared to 83% 
of the Australian population (ABS, 2015). These results are concerning as it is 
known that having meaningful paid employment is a source of pride for people 
with and without autism, and assists a person to live independently. 
 
Independent living may be another challenge for adults with autism. 
Research conducted in the US via an online survey completed by parents/carers of 
143 adults with autism (mean age was 25 years), (Gotham et al., 2015) found that 
only 22% of the adults with autism were employed and 7% lived independently. 
Whereas other research among adults who are more cognitively able (i.e., IQ > 
70) and were able to self-report, tell a more positive picture. For instance, in a 
Swedish study, Helles et al. (2016) surveyed 50 adults with Asperger’s syndrome 
(mean age 30 years) and found that 62% of the sample were living independently. 
Nevertheless, the researchers highlighted that some individuals experience 
difficulties in adulthood, while others show very few difficulties with independent 
living.  
 While a person with autism may have employment and live independently, 
social relationships are likely to be another challenge. Previous research that has 
focused on objective outcomes has found that individuals with autism are more 
likely to experience social isolation, peer rejection, and poorer quality friendships, 
(Bauminger & Kasari, 2000; Humphrey & Symes, 2010; Locke, Ishijima, Kasari, 
London, 2010). For individuals with autism, friendships lacking intimacy, 
reciprocity and emotional enrichment are likely to lead to more intense and 
frequent loneliness compared to their typically developing peers, despite the 
common belief that individuals with autism prefer to be alone (Bauminger & 
Kasari, 2000).  
 
While research has found that individuals with autism may face challenges 
in terms of education, employment, relationships and independent living, this 
does not tell us about their own perspectives regarding their QOL. As it is 
desirable for all citizens to experience normal levels of life quality, measuring 
self-reported QOL of people with autism will tell us the degree to which this is 
being achieved. It offers the potential to be a useful index in understanding the 
experiences of, and difficulties faced by people with autism, and to assist in the 
identification and planning of individualized support needs. Given that QOL for 
individuals with autism is often an important treatment outcome (Gerber et al., 
2011) and improving the QOL is the main objective of many interventions and 
social services, it is important to accurately assess the self-reported QOL of 
people with autism and to identify factors associated with improving their lives. 
 
Currently, there is a paucity of research that investigates the self-report 
quality of life of individuals with autism. Though, within the past decade, there 
has been an increase in the scientific literature examining QOL among people 
with autism. This may be due to the belief that QOL is a relevant outcome 
measure for social policies and practices. However, to date, there remains no 
specific QOL of measure that has been designed for people with autism. Thus, 
research that has examined self-reported QOL among people with autism has used 
different instruments, which use different conceptualisations of QOL. Thus, these 
definitions make comparisons between studies difficult. Nevertheless, there 
appears to be a common trend with studies suggesting that people with autism 
report a lower QOL compared to people from the general population (Jennes-
Coussens et al., 2006; Renty & Toyers, 2006; van Hejist & Guerts, 2015). 
 
One of the first studies to examine self-reported QOL, more specifically, 
Health Related Quality of Life (HRQOL) among people with autism was by 
Jennes-Coussens, Magil-Evans and Koning (2006). It is important to note that 
HRQOL is a multi-domain concept that represents the person’s overall perception 
of the impact of an illness and its treatment. A HRQOL measure captures, at a 
minimum, “physical, psychological (including emotional and cognitive), and 
social functioning” (Food & Drug Administration, 2006, p. 31). In their study, 
Jennes-Coussens et al. found among 12 adults with a confirmed diagnosis of 
Asperger’s that they reported their overall HRQOL to be lower than a matched 
control group from the general population. More specifically, participants with 
Asperger’s reported significantly lower physical and social HRQOL than the 
general sample. Participants with Asperger’s also reported more pain and 
discomfort, higher dependence on medical treatment and greater fatigue than the 
general sample. Furthermore, participants with Asperger’s reported lower scores 
on the social domain, indicating that participants with Asperger’s may be more 
aware of their social skills deficits and the perceived impact it has on their QOL.  
 
Other researchers have investigated possible links for the lower QOL of 
scores among adults with autism compared to the general population. Renty and 
Toeyers (2006) examined the QOL (using the Quality of Life Questionnaire, a 
measure designed for people with an intellectual disability) (Schalock & Keith, 
1993), cognitive abilities and autism symptomology among 58 Belgian adults 
(mean age was 28 years) who were cognitively abled (i.e., IQ > 70). Overall, 
cognitive abilities and autism symptomology were not significantly associated 
with QOL scores. These results have been further replicated among adolescents 
and older adults with autism (Cottenceau et al., 2012; van Hejist & Geurts, 2015).  
 
Investigating the self-reported QOL of adolescents with autism, 
Cottenceau et al. (2012) found among their sample of 25 adolescents (mean age 
was 15 years), using a regression analysis, that age, IQ and autism symptomology 
were not related to overall QOL scores. Even among older adults (i.e., 50 years 
and above), cognitive abilities and autism symptomology have not been found to 
be related to QOL. In their study, van Hejist and Geurts (2015) measured the 
QOL (using the RAND-36; Van der Zee and Sanderman, 1993) of 24 Dutch 
adults with autism (mean age was 64 years) and compared their QOL to a control 
group of 24 participants (mean age was 64 years). Once again, using a regression 
analysis, they found age, IQ (measured by a verbal intelligence test – DART; 
Schmand et al., 1992) and autism symptomology (measured by the SRS-A; Noens 
et al., 2012) did not predict overall QOL. Thus, this indicates that there are likely 
to be other internal and external factors contributing to a person with autism and 
their overall QOL.  
 
In the only longitudinal study to date to examine internal and external 
factors associated with QOL, Helles, Gillberg, Gillberg and Billstedt (2016) 
examined the objective quality of life (i.e., work, academic success, living 
situation, relationships, support system) and subjective quality of life (measured 
by the Sense of Coherence and Short-Form Health Survey-36) among adult males 
(mean age = 30 years) who were diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome in 
childhood, and followed prospectively over two decades. Among their sample, 11 
participants no longer met the diagnostic criteria for autism (i.e., no autism 
group), 15 met the diagnosis for autism (i.e., autism only group) and 24 met the 
diagnosis for autism and had an additional psychiatric condition (i.e., autism plus 
group). Overall, Helles et al, found that the no autism group, reported higher 
objective QOL (i.e., better jobs, independent living and more friends) than those 
in the autism-only group. However, there was no difference between the no 
autism and autism only groups on the subjective measure of QOL. On the other 
hand, the autism plus group did not differ from the autism-only group on 
objective QOL, but scored significantly worse on subjective QOL. Thus, Helles et 
al. concluded that autism symptomology predicts how well an individual 
functions every day, but the degree to how a person feels about their life is likely 
to be predicted by other psychological factors.  
 
 This result is not surprising, as Cummins (2003) states that there is a poor 
correspondence between objective and subjective measures of QOL (i.e., 
objective measures do not equate to happiness) when basic human needs are met. 
This is because, under normal living conditions, most people in a population 
sample will be actively maintaining their Subjective QOL, better known as 
Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) by means of an internal homeostatic system 
(Cummins, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2010).  
 
Summary 
 
 In summary, objective research to date has indicated that individuals with 
autism are likely to face challenges with education, employment, independent 
living and social relationships. Furthermore, people with autism generally report 
lower levels of QOL than people from the general population. Research has 
examined whether IQ, age and autism symptomology are associated with QOL 
among people with autism, with the results being non-significant. Thus, this 
indicates that other factors are contributing to a person with autism and their 
QOL. Longitudinal research has suggested that autism symptomology is 
associated with independent living, however, autism symptomology is not 
associated with subjective QOL. Thus, this suggests that subjective QOL is likely 
to be predicted by other psychological factors. Cummins (2003) suggests that 
there is generally a poor correspondence between objective and subjective 
measures of QOL, because, under normal living conditions, people will be 
actively maintaining their subjective QOL, better known as subjective wellbeing 
(SWB) by means of an internal homeostatic system. This will now be discussed.  
 
Chapter Three: Subjective Wellbeing 
 
Subjective Wellbeing 
 
Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) is the feeling about one’s self that is 
normally positive and stable. It is an overarching term that includes a positive 
state of mind that involves the whole life experience (Cummins, 2005). As such, 
SWB is a broad construct that comprises global judgments of General Life 
Satisfaction (GLS), a term applied to the response to the question, ‘How satisfied 
are you with your life as a whole?” (Andrew & Withey, 1976). It also refers to 
domain-based satisfactions, (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999) which are 
identifiable aspects of a person’s life, such as satisfaction with standard of living.  
 
Within the last decade, SWB has been found to largely comprise affect. 
However, this has not always been the case. Early research in the field of SWB 
found that personality, in particular, the traits of extraversion and neuroticism 
(emotional stability) to be one of the strongest and most consistent predictors of 
SWB (e.g., Emmons & Diener, 1985; Headey & Wearing, 1989, 1992). A meta-
analysis conducted by DeNeeve and Cooper (1998) which included 148 studies 
examining the relationship of 137 personality traits and different measures of 
SWB (e.g., Deiner’s Satisfaction with Life Scale; Diener, et al., 1985) also 
supported the claims that extraversion and neuroticism were a consistent and 
reliable predictor of SWB. 
 
Contributing to this line of thinking, a study by Vitterso (2001) of 264 
Norwegian high school students found the personality traits of neuroticism and 
extraversion (as measured by the Big Five Inventory; Engvik, 1993) accounted 
for 38% and 7% of the variance in SWB, (i.e., satisfaction with life), respectively. 
Thus, Vitterso concluded personality, especially neuroticism is an important 
factor in explaining SWB.  
 
However, more recent research by Blore et al. (2010) and Davern et al. 
(2007) found that personality does not contribute to the explanation of SWB in 
the presence of suitable affective variables.  
 
Affect 
 
 SWB comprises both affective and cognitive components (Andrew & 
Withey, 1976; Cambell, Converse & Rodgers, 1976; Russel, 2003). The affect 
experienced at any time is likely to be a combination of positive and negative 
feelings (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). Positive affect refers to pleasant 
feelings such as excitement and feeling alert, whereas negative affect relates to 
the unpleasant feelings of anxiety and worry (Diener, 2006). In these affective 
terms, SWB is considered to be a reflection of predominately positive affective 
states with low levels of negative affect (Diener, Lucas, Oishi, & Suh, 2002).  
 
 In addition, SWB also involves a cognitive component (Russel, 2003) 
such as emotions. For instance, people feel happy because something made them 
feel happy; or people feel sad because something made them feel sad. In order to 
clarify the difference between pure affect and affect with a cognitive association, 
Russell (2003) defined a construct called core affect. This new definition was 
devised to remove the cognitive undertone from a measure of pure affect. For 
instance, an emotion is typically directed at an object and invokes a reaction, 
whereas core affect, much more like a ‘mood’, is a prolonged state which is 
‘object free’. Thus, core affect is defined as “an ‘object-free’, prolonged 
neurophysiological state that is the simplest raw (non-reflective) feelings evident 
in mood and emotions” (Russell, 2003, p. 148). 
 
 Based on the definition that Russell (2003) provided of Core Affect, 
research by Davern, Cummins, and Stokes (2007) found that Core Affect 
comprises three affects, ‘happy’, ‘content’, and ‘excited’. They report that Core 
Affect is the predominant component of SWB. In her study, which involved 854 
participants from the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index (August, 2003), Davern et 
al. tested the relative contributions of Core Affect, together with cognition (seven 
items derived from Michalos’ (1985) Multiple Discrepancies Theory, MDT) and 
personality (60 items from the NEO-PI-R, Costa & McCrae, 1992), which were 
factored into the five traits of Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
Neuroticism and Openness. SWB was measured using the Personal Wellbeing 
Index (International Wellbeing Group, 2013). Davern et al. found, using structural 
equation modeling, that Core Affect accounted for 64% of the variance, cognition 
contributed a further 2%, whereas personality failed to make a significant 
contribution. Thus, it was concluded that SWB is mainly made up of three 
positive affects, with slight cognition attached, rather than the personality traits of 
extraversion and neuroticism.   
These results have been supported by a further study by Blore, Stokes, 
Mellor, Firth and Cummins (2010). They found among a sample of 387 
participants from the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index longitudinal study (April 
2005) that Core Affect was the only predictor of SWB and accounted for 66% of 
the variance. Furthermore, Blore et al. examined the contribution of the 
personality traits of extraversion and emotional stability (neuroticism) to SWB. 
Blore et al. confirmed that these personality traits failed to make a contribution to 
SWB when controlled for by Core Affect. Thus, Blore et al. concluded that SWB 
is a construct driven by Core Affect, rather than by personality.  
In summary, previous research examining the contribution of personality 
to SWB should be treated with caution. This is because of more recent research 
by Davern et al. and Blore et al. found that the personality traits of extraversion 
and neuroticism failed to make a contribution to SWB when Core Affect, made 
up of three adjectives, ‘Happy’, ‘Content’ and ‘Alert’ was accounted for. 
Furthermore, Core Affect accounted for over 60% of the variance of SWB with 
personality making a negligible contribution. Based on these findings, future 
research examining variables that contribute to SWB should include Core Affect, 
as it appears Core Affect is the underlying neurophysiological state behind SWB.  
The studies by Davern et al and Blore et al used a definition of Core 
Affect that was described as a free-floating mood that is object-free (Russell, 
2003). However, in a more recent paper, Russell (2009) proposed a different 
meaning of Core Affect. That is, Russel (2009) suggests that Core Affect might 
be directed at something and therefore could be a form of emotional reaction that 
could be influenced by cognitions. Accordingly, given that the meaning of Core 
Affect changed, an alternative term was required to capture the original meaning.  
Homeostatically Protected Mood 
 
The term, Homeostatically Protected Mood (HPMood) was coined by 
Cummins (2010), to describe the mood that predicts SWB. HPMood is defined as 
a “biologically determined positive mood that comprises the most basic 
experienced feelings” (Cummins, 2010, p. 12). In other words, it the simplest and 
most basic form of positive mood that provides motivations for behaviours. A 
homeostatic system is proposed to defend and maintain HPMood within a set-
point range. This inbuilt system is known as SWB homeostasis (Cummins, 2010).   
 
Subjective Wellbeing Set-Points 
 
SWB Homeostasis Theory (Cummins 1995, 1998, 2010) offers a 
comprehensive description of the SWB phenomenon. SWB Homeostasis Theory 
proposes that each person has a biologically determined level of SWB that is 
actively maintained and controlled within a narrow, positive range of values 
around a ‘set-point,' which averages at 80 points (Cummins et al., 2015). The goal 
of homeostasis is to defend the affective core of SWB, termed Homeostatically 
Protected Mood (HPMood), because a positive sense of personal wellbeing is 
adaptive and provides the motivation for living (Cummins et al., 2014).  
 
The first supporting evidence for the proposition that people have a ‘set-
point-for SWB came from an empirical review. In this review, Cummins (1995) 
investigated 16 studies examining life satisfaction in western countries. When 
scores on the response scales were standardised on a 0-100 scale, it was found 
that the SWB values lay in the range of 70-80 points, with the average being 75 
points. The remarkable consistency across the studies suggested that there is an 
underlying homeostatic mechanism that acts to maintain SWB within a normal 
healthy range (Cummins, Gullone, & Lau, 2002).  
 
Further support for a homeostatic model was established in a review of 
life satisfaction studies which extended to include non-western countries 
(Cummins, 1998). In this review, Cummins found the normative range 
(standardised on a 0-100 scale) for SWB across 45 different countries, fell 
between 60-80 points. Once again, suggesting that it is normal for people to feel 
good about themselves, likely controlled by a homeostatic system. 
 
Perhaps even more convincing of a homeostatic system are findings from 
32 representative studies measuring SWB using the Australian Unity Wellbeing 
Index, from 2001 to 2015, is that the wellbeing of Australians can be predicted, 
with 95% certainty, to lie within 73.2 and 76.3 points (Capic et al., 2015).  
 
Further evidence suggesting that there is an underlying mechanism that 
maintains SWB is from a 10-year Australian longitudinal study measuring SWB. 
Cummins, Li, Wooden and Stokes (2013) showed again that the SWB of 
Australians is rather stable, positive and confined within a narrow range that is 
negatively skewed. Further to this, they provided evidence for SWB set-points 
and showed that set-points lie between 71-90 points, with an average set-point 
range of 18-20 points for each person (Cummins, Li, Wooden, & Stokes, 2013).  
 
In summary, research suggests that there is an underlying mechanism that 
defends the core of SWB, termed Homeostatically Protected Mood (HPMood). 
The purpose of HPMood is to actively maintain and control an individual’s SWB 
set-point so that people experience positive mood. Research has provided 
evidence that Australians have a set-point that lies between 71 – 90 points, 
(averaging at 80 points) while using population means scores as data, this can be 
predicted, with 95% certainty to fall between 73.2 and 76.3 points.  
 
Subjective Wellbeing Homeostasis Theory  
 
It is proposed that, under a condition of zero-threat, SWB will be kept 
close to its predetermined set-point (Cummins, 2010), which averages at 80 points 
(Cummins et al., 2015). If an individual experiences a mild form of positive or 
negative events, the level of SWB will fluctuate within in its set-point range, 
which translates into approximately nine percentage points on either side of an 
individual’s set point. Therefore, in an environment in which positive events 
frequently occur, individual’s SWB will average in the top segment of the set-
point range. Conversely, in an environment in which recurrent negative events 
occur, SWB will average within the bottom segment.  
 
As threats to the homeostatic system become stronger so do its defences 
(described later) to maintain stable levels of SWB. The system will endeavour to 
prevent SWB from falling below its lower normal average limit of approximately 
70 points (Cummins et al., 2003). Over time and in the absence of overwhelming 
negative stimuli the homeostatic system will function to re-establish levels of 
SWB to its predetermined set-point (Cummins, 2010), through the processes of 
cognitive buffers, including self-esteem, optimism, and perceived control (see 
Cummins, 2010). (These processes are described in more detail below.) 
 
However, all homeostatic systems have a threshold where at which they 
are no longer able to function sufficiently. Once a negative threat or a challenge 
becomes too strong for the defences, the homeostatic system will be 
overwhelmed, and SWB will fall (Cummins, 2010). Life experiences that are 
likely to threaten homeostasis include unemployment, chronic illness, 
disconnection from family and friends or the death of a close family member 
(Cummins, 2010). When the threat to a person’s SWB exceeds their resources to 
cope, the result is a drop in personal wellbeing below the set-point range, and this 
may be experienced as depression (Cummins, 2010). 
 
 Under such challenging circumstances, positive resources such as money 
and supportive relationships can strengthen a person’s adaptive resources, 
allowing them to regain control of their wellbeing. However, when these 
challenges are persistent and noxious and if protective resources are not available 
or insufficient, homeostasis can be defeated. When this occurs, negative thoughts 
associated with the cause of challenge (e.g., sadness, anger and hopelessness) may 
assume control over the sense of wellbeing. Thus, in the presence of low SWB, 
the person becomes vulnerable to depression.  
 
Unfortunately, not all homeostatic systems operate at the same protective 
capacity (Cummins et al., 2014). Homeostatic fragility places some people at 
greater risk of depression than others. For example, by virtue of genetics, some 
people have an inherent weakness in their homeostatic system’s ability to 
maintain their SWB. It is believed that people with a low set-point for happiness 
(e.g., 71 points) comprise those people who are most at-risk for depression in the 
face of challenging life circumstances – a risk that is exacerbated for people low 
on financial and interpersonal resources.    
In summary, humans have evolved a complex mechanism that serves to 
maintain and protect personal wellbeing around a biologically determined set-
point. It is for this reason that SWB for most people is normally positive, stable 
and predictable within a narrow range of values (70 – 90 points). Homeostatic 
systems are, by definition, robust and during challenging times, work hard to 
ensure the stability of whatever variable they are protecting. However, when the 
demands placed on a person exceed their capacity to cope, homeostasis is 
defeated and depression may result. In time, provided a person has resources 
available to them, homeostasis will regain control and SWB will return within the 
normal set-point range. 
 
 
Figure 1: Changing levels of SWB as homeostasis is challenged (reproduced from 
Cummins and Wooden, 2014) 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the theoretical nature of homeostasis. That is, in a 
normal resting state, where a person is experiencing no challenge, their SWB is 
maintained at 80 points (as depicted in point a). As the system is challenged by 
mild threats, the level of SWB will vary within its set-point range. The 
homeostatic system is able to comfortably accommodate any mild threats in the 
environment and these changes exert little influence over a person’s SWB. The 
upper and lower thresholds (as indicated by the vertical arrows) refer to the upper 
(90 points) and lower (70 points) margins of that set-point range. As the strength 
of the challenge increases, SWB moves closer to the lower threshold. As this 
happens internal homeostatic defences are produced to prevent SWB falling 
below 70 points. These defences are known as cognitive buffers. These buffers, 
self-esteem, perceived control and optimism, defend HPMood against negative 
threats (Cummins & Nistico, 2002). The result of using these defences, is a 
prolonged phase (b), in which homeostasis manages to hold the line and prevents 
SWB from decreasing below its lower threshold value of 70 points, even though 
the strength of the challenge may increase. However, at some point, the 
challenging agent may become too strong and at this point, homeostasis will be 
overwhelmed.   
 
Once the challenging agent becomes too strong, homeostasis will enter 
phase (c). This is where SWB falls below the set-point range, and the dominant 
source of control has shifted from homeostatic process to the challenging agent. 
When the homeostatic system is in control, SWB Homeostasis Theory postulates 
that stabilising forces of positive affect and a system of internal and external 
buffers maintains SWB at normal psychological functioning levels.  
 Homeostatic Processes 
 
As stated by Cummins (2016), the affect produced by HPMood delivers a 
stable background to consciousness, which influences general feelings about the 
self. This background normally approximates the individual’s set-point, therefore 
providing the target level for homeostatic management. When average levels of a 
person’s affect deviate from their set-point, homeostatic processes are activated 
for the purpose of restoring the level of felt affect to set-point. It is proposed that 
the mechanism of homeostasis comprises two kinds of buffers, known as External 
and Internal buffers.  
 
External Buffers 
 
The resources that are external to a person, which can be used to facilitate 
homeostasis are referred to as the external buffers. The external buffers generally 
defend against homeostatic failure, but they can also assist in homeostatic 
recovery. There are three main external buffers, known as money, relationships 
and achieving (Cummins, 2016).  
 
Money 
 There is a close relationship between personal income and SWB 
(Cummins, 2010).  However, there are serious misconceptions about what money 
can and cannot do for SWB. For instance, money cannot shift a person’s set-point 
to create a happier person. This is because SWB is proposed to be under genetic 
control (Cummins et al., 2003). No matter how wealthy a person becomes, their 
average level of SWB cannot be sustained higher than their set-point range. This 
is because people adapt readily to their living arrangements, thus, genetics will 
maintain SWB after a certain level of income has been achieved (Cummins, 
2010).  
 
 Wealth protects SWB through its capacity to be used a resource to assist 
homeostasis (Cummins, 2010). It does this by preventing certain negative events 
from occurring in people’s daily lives. For instance, people on high incomes can 
afford to buy high-quality food and access quality health care when needed. 
Wealthy people can also pay others to perform tasks that they do not wish to 
perform. Whereas, people on lower incomes, lack the financial resources and 
must fend for themselves to a much greater extent. Thus, poorer people’s SWB is 
more susceptible to the challenges in the environment. Given that, SWB rises 
with income, but only to a certain point. In Australia, SWB rises with gross 
household income, but only up to about $91,000 - $120,000, with higher incomes 
showing no further systematic rise in SWB (Cummins et al., 2009).  
 
 In summary, wealth protects SWB through its capacity as a flexible 
resource to assist homeostasis. It does this by allowing people to minimise 
unwanted challenges they experience in daily life. However, SWB will only rise 
to approximately $91,000 - $120,000 after which, wealth will not further raise 
SWB. 
 
Relationships 
 A second external buffer is a relationship with another person that 
involves the mutual sharing of interests, intimacies, and support (Cummins, 
2010). The positive effects of social relationships as a form of protection from 
stress and negative life events have been well documented (Cohen & Wills, 1985; 
Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990). Further evidence comes from cumulative data 
from the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index (Cummins et al., 2009) which 
indicates that people living with a partner or partner and children have higher 
levels of SWB than single parents or people living on their own.  
 
 As seen in Figure 2, it has been documented the lowest household income 
group (<$15,000), people who are living with a partner, on average, have a SWB 
score of 75.4 points (inside the Australian normative range). Even while 
household income increases (i.e. greater than $150,000), SWB only rises by 3.7 
points across the household income range.  
 
 However, partners who are living with one or more children, at the lowest 
household income group, on average, have an SWB score of 70.3 points (below 
the normative range). This indicates that the demands made by children could be 
exceeding the resources available to some parents. However, for partners living 
with children, when household income reaches between $31,000 - $60,000, SWB 
falls within the normative range, of 75.9 points. This indicates that the financial 
and relationship resources become sufficient. Thereafter, rises in income do not 
statistically differ between the couples with or without children. 
 
 The situation for single parents is more concerning. Since they lack the 
resource of an adult partnership, they require an income of $61,000 - $90,000 to 
regain homeostatic control. It has also been observed that partners with children 
on low incomes (i.e., $15,000 - $30,000) have higher SWB (mean 76.5 points) 
than that of a single parent and child (mean 69.6 points) (Cummins, 2010). See 
figure 2 for more information. 
 
In summary, at the lowest level of income, having a partner appears to be 
a protective factor against homeostasis failure. Furthermore, both money and 
relationships are effective external buffers for SWB homeostasis. 
 
 
Figure 2. The interaction between income and household composition. From 
“Subjective Wellbeing, Homeostasis Protected Mood and Depression: A 
Synthesis” by Cummins 2010, Journal of Happiness Studies, 11, 7.1 
 
Achieving 
 The third external buffer is achieving, which is the process of active 
engagement that provides a purpose in life. In their review, McKnight and 
Kashdan (2009) define a purpose in life as ‘cognitive processes that defines life 
                                                
1 The author has provided permission for Figure 2 to be used in this thesis. 
goals and provides personal meaning’ (p. 242). There is a large amount of 
literature that attests to this fact. For example, when people are deprived of this 
buffer, such as losing an active role in their family group or becoming 
unemployed, their SWB is severely threatened (Clark, Diener, Georgellis & 
Lucas, 2008).  
 
 
Internal Buffers 
 
 When external buffers are unable to defend against homeostatic failure, a 
set of internal psychological resources are employed (Cummins & Nistico, 2002). 
At the simplest level, these involve the automatic processes of adaptation and 
habituation. These act over time to make us less aware of daily challenges that 
threaten the normally positive view of the self. Cummins et al., 2014 also suggest 
that these processes are assisted by ‘internal/cognitive buffers’, to assist in the 
maintenance of SWB. The buffers use cognition to restructure reality in ways that 
aim to protect SWB from the world of consciousness and maladaptive thought 
processes and serve to minimise the impact of unavoidable negative experiences.  
The internal buffers correspond with the same three constructs used by 
Taylor and Brown (1999) and include self-esteem (i.e., feelings of self-worth) 
(Cummins & Nitisco, 2002); optimism (i.e., the belief that one’s future will be 
bright despite their current objective life circumstances) (Peterson, 2000) and 
control (i.e., perception that one can achieve desired outcomes through their own 
actions (Thomson et al., 1998).  
 
 As self-referential constructs, all three internal buffers are strongly 
associated with HPMood (Lai & Cummins, 2013). Therefore, under normal 
conditions, people feel worthy, optimistic and in control, all at the level of their 
set-point. However, in the face of negative challenges, the internal buffers use a 
defence mechanism to restructure reality in a way that aims to protect SWB. 
These internal buffers will now be discussed in more depth. 
		
 
Self-esteem 
 Self-esteem is strongly linked with SWB (Cummins & Nistico, 2002) and 
has been argued to act as one of the internal buffers in Cummins’ homeostatic 
model of SWB, helping people to overcome negative situations (Cummins, 
Gullone & Lau, 2002). The key role of self-esteem acting as a buffer involves the 
idea that a person with high self-esteem has the ability to separate themselves 
from the negative event that has occurred. For example, Corning (2002) showed 
that perceived discrimination among female participants was linked with less 
distress among those with high self-esteem compared to woman with low self-
esteem. The participants with high self-esteem were able to separate themselves 
personally from the discrimination targeted towards the group of which they were 
apart. Those in the low self-esteem group were more likely to internalise the 
discrimination as relating to them. These authors concluded that having high self-
esteem moderates the impact of negative events. 
 
In summary, self-esteem shows a strong relationship with SWB. There is 
also some evidence to suggest that self-esteem can act as a buffer that helps 
maintain normal levels of SWB in the face of stressful or negative events. 
However, self-esteem is not the only cognitive buffer.  
  
Optimism 
Optimism is also proposed to act as one of the internal buffers to protect 
SWB (Cummins & Nistico, 2002). In the same way that a person can limit the 
impact of the negative event through self-esteem, an optimistic outlook helps 
people see that the negative events that are happening now, will, in fact, diminish 
with time. For example, optimists have reported a higher quality of life following 
surgery than pessimists (Scheier et al., 1989), and optimists report better mood 
(Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998). A common explanation for these 
findings is that optimism is a coping mechanism, whereby optimistic people use 
more effective coping strategies in the face of negative events than do pessimists 
(Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). A strong sense of optimism can reduce the 
impact of unpleasant events by emphasising the temporary nature of a negative 
consequence.  
 
In summary, optimism along with self-esteem is a cognitive buffer in the 
Homeostatic model of SWB. Together, these ‘buffers’ act to reduce or limit 
everyday challenges to SWB. A third buffer is also proposed and involves the 
concept of control. 
Control  
Perceived control is the third buffer proposed in Cummins Homeostatic 
Model. Perceived control is a person’s belief that they are in control, regardless of 
the actual control they have over a situation. For instance, a person may attempt 
to change the world to fit their own needs. Examples include trying to influence 
other’s opinions or trying to change the surrounding environment. However, 
when a person cannot directly control a situation, they use a backup control 
system, known as secondary control (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; 
Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995). Secondary control involves changing oneself to fit 
in with the changing environment (Skinner, 1996). Secondary control strategies 
can be predictive, vicarious, illusionary, or interpretative (Rothbaum, Wesiz, & 
Snyder, 1982; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984).  
 
Predictive secondary control involves attempts to predict future outcomes 
so that the impact of these outcomes on the self can be controlled. For example, 
an elite athlete who has trained hard for a race may predict that, despite their 
efforts, they may only come in fourth place, rather than first. By doing so, they 
have pre-accepted their potential for a poor performance and can avoid any 
disappointment that would have otherwise accompanied a fourth place.  Secondly, 
vicarious secondary control involves attempts to associate or align oneself with 
powerful others so as to share in their successes. Thirdly, illusionary secondary 
control involves attempts to align oneself with the forces of chance or luck so that 
one can feel a sense of control over an otherwise uncontrollable outcome. Lastly, 
interpretive secondary control involves attempting to find reason in events that 
cannot be changed (Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984).   
 
Evidence for the role of control as a buffering system comes from studies 
that link perceived control to higher wellbeing. For example, Thompson and 
Spaceman (1991) showed that having a strong sense of control results in better 
coping for people who have experienced major life stressors, such as cancer 
patients, and heart attack patients compared to patients who had a weak sense of 
control. Furthermore, a study of non-clinical adolescents and adults found that 
participants who reported a higher sense of subjective control also reported higher 
levels of happiness, compared to participants who had a lower sense of subjective 
control (Larson, 1989). Overall, the cognitive ‘buffer’ of perceived control is used 
to minimise negative events so that their effect on wellbeing can be restricted 
(Cummins, Gullone, & Lau, 2002). 
 
In summary, the proposed role of self-esteem, optimism, and control in the 
homeostatic model of wellbeing is to act and reduce everyday stressors that may 
cause SWB to drop within one’s set-point range. By doing so, they help to 
maintain a generally positive outlook even when negative situations are 
encountered.  
 
The Importance of Subjective Wellbeing 
 
Population Level 
At a population level, the theoretical level of SWB should be have a mean 
of 80 points, and a range between 70 – 90 points (Cummins, 2016), to correspond 
with the HPMood set-point range. However, the Australian normative range is 
approximately 75 points, five points below the theoretical mean. The reason for 
this is the distribution of resources, especially financial resources, to support 
homeostasis. If people are living under chronic conditions that are adversely 
going to defeat their homeostasis, then their SWB will be maintained at levels 
below the SWB set-point. Under such conditions of homeostatic defeat, these 
people will be highly susceptible to depression. In Australia, this applies to 
approximately 5% of the population (Cummins & Nistico, 2002). It is these 
people in homeostatic defeat who cause the population mean to be below 80 
points. However, in sub-groups of the Australian population who are wealthy, 
married and employed, the mean SWB is around 80-82 points (Cummins, Walter, 
& Woerner, 2007).  
 
In summary, if it is important for all Australians to experience normal 
levels of quality of life, including people with autism, then measuring SWB is an 
excellent indicator to the degree that this is being achieved. 
Population sub-groups 
Within the Australian population, there are sub-groups who need more 
resources to achieve the level of SWB that is normal for Australians. Such groups 
will display a mean level of SWB that is below the normative range of 73.83 to 
76.71. An established sub-group is informal carers, that is, people who are 
providing support to a disabled person at their home. Whilst in Australia, such 
people can receive benefits from the government, including financial and respite, 
these resources are inadequate to counter the stress on personal resources, for 
instance, loss of paid employment, broken marriages, and social isolation. A 
recent study conducted in Australia by Hammond, Weinberg, and Cummins 
(2014) of 4,000 informal careers, found that the mean SWB (using the Personal 
Wellbeing Index [PWI]; International Wellbeing Group, 2013) was 58 points, 
indicating substantial levels of homeostatic defeat and distress.  
 
Individual 
 In order for the SWB to be interpreted at the individual level, population 
norms need to be calculated using the scores from individual participants. While 
there is no SWB data for people with autism, results from approximately 60,000 
respondents in Australia (see Cummins et al., 2013) show a mean of 75.29 points, 
standard deviation of 12.47, yielding a normal range of 50.35 to 100.22 points. 
Thus, individuals with a SWB score below 50 points are below the normal range 
and are in need of additional resources.  
 
 The importance of SWB norms has been demonstrated by Tomyn, 
Weinberg, and Cummins (2015). Their study involved evaluating pre and post 
SWB scores from an individualised intervention provided by the Australian 
government called the Youth Connections Program. A total of 4,243 adolescents 
who were deemed ‘at-risk’ of not attaining year 12 or equivalent, or had already 
disengaged from their family or communities, were included in the study. Tomyn 
et al. found that their results were consistent with SWB Homeostasis Theory. That 
is, for the participants who were at ‘risk’ of homeostatic defeat (SWB score 
between 50 and 70 points), their mean SWB score pre-intervention was 61.36 
points and increased to 73.78 points post-intervention. For participants who were 
likely to be experiencing homeostatic defeat (i.e., SWB < 50 points), at pre-
intervention, the mean SWB was 36.96 points. After receiving an intervention, 
their SWB increased by 29.81 points (to a mean SWB of 66.77 points). In 
contrast, participants who were operating within their set-point range pre-
intervention (i.e., SWB 70 +), the participants’ SWB increased only by 1.48 
points. This is consistent with Homeostasis Theory. Firstly, people who are 
experiencing homeostatic failure receive appropriate additional resources. These 
resources will assist homeostasis to increase their SWB towards their normal 
range. Secondly, if people are already within their normal range for SWB, the 
additional resources are unlikely to increase SWB, since homeostasis will defeat 
any attempt to raise SWB above its normal set-point range.  Thus, using SWB to 
measure treatment or intervention outcomes will assist clinicians to determine 
how effective their treatment is in improving subjective QOL. 
 
Future Directions 
 
The theory of SWB and homeostatic control has yet to have extensive 
empirical testing among people with autism, despite their enhanced risk of 
homeostatic defeat. For instance, people with autism are more likely to experience 
under- and unemployment, difficulties with independent living and social 
relationships (Billstedt et al., 2005 Eaves and Ho, 2008, Howlin et al., 2004) as 
well as more loneliness than the general population (Whitehouse et al., 2009). 
Such experiences can severely test the limits of the homeostatic maintenance of 
SWB (Cummins, 2001). As a consequence, developing an understanding of the 
maintenance of SWB is an important issue for the autism field in general.  
 
Since it is desirable for all Australians, including people with autism to 
experience normal levels of QOL, then SWB is an indicator that can be used to 
measure the degrees that this is being achieved. Furthermore, measuring SWB 
among Australians is important as it will tell us at a population level 
approximately how many people with autism have normal levels of SWB, are at 
risk of homeostatic defeat, or are likely experiencing homeostatic defeat. 
Additionally, it may be useful in identifying any sub-groups of people with autism 
who need additional resources. Moreover, at an individual level, SWB can be 
used by service providers or clinicians to assist in treatment planning and 
measuring treatment outcomes.  
 
 Thus, this thesis builds on previous research to date and explores a number 
of the propositions of SWB Homeostasis Theory among cognitively abled 
Australian adults with autism compared to the general sample. More specifically, 
the aims of this thesis are as follows. 
 
1. To investigate the psychometric properties of the Personal Wellbeing 
Index. 
 
2. To provide comparative data, between people with autism and people 
without autism on their self-reported levels of SWB.  
 
3. To extend the theory of homeostasis of SWB to a population of Australian 
adults with autism and to provide empirical evidence for, and to explain 
more fully, the variables that contribute to SWB, as well the internal 
buffers (self-esteem, optimism and perceived control) among adults 
experiencing homeostatic challenge.  
 
4. To examine the notion that depression and SWB are inversely related and 
the relationship between SWB and depression may be conceptualised as 
suppressed HPMood.  
Chapter Four: Threats to Scale Validity for Subjective Wellbeing Research 
 
Introduction 
 
Self-reports are one of the most common forms of measurement in 
psychology. They allow researchers to quantify subjective perspectives, including 
subjective wellbeing. For people with a cognitive impairment (such as an 
intellectual disability or autism), self-reports have become an essential tool for 
measuring subjective quality of life. It is also largely agreed that wellbeing and 
life satisfaction can only be measured through the subjective view of individuals 
with a cognitive impairment (for reviews see Stancliffe, 2000; Schalock et al., 
2002) and cannot be measured through proxy reports (Cummins, 2002). The use 
of self-reports measures among those with a cognitive impairment is not without 
challenge. Diligentcare is needed in the planning and implementation of QOL 
measures as there are numerous ways that these questionnaires can be 
systematically invalidated. These will now be discussed below.  
 
Proxy Responding 
 
 The only valid way to measure SWB is through self-report. However, it is 
common among researchers measuring the quality of life of people with a 
disability to have a proxy answer on their behalf. Proxy responding is generally 
used where there is concern that the person answering the questions may not 
provide valid answers (for instance due to cognitive immaturity or damage). 
Proxy responding is where a person, who knows the person well, rates them. 
However, three reviews have concluded that proxies cannot be reliably substituted 
for self-reports in relation to behavioural/emotional problems experienced by 
adults (Achenbach, McConaughy & Howell, 1987) or the feelings experienced by 
children with disabilities (Yuker, 1988) or intellectual disabilities (Cummins, 
2002). Furthermore, parents who have an adolescent with autism were found to 
report their child’s QOL (as measured by the PedsQL) lower than their 
adolescents on three of the four subscales (see Sheldrick, Neger, Shipman & 
Perrin, 2012). Therefore, it is important for researchers to be aware that the 
validity of QOL measures are compromised when proxies respond on behalf of 
the person with a disability or autism. 
  
Respondent Ability 
 
 It is not uncommon for people with an autism spectrum condition to have 
a wide variety of cognitive abilities. For instance, children and adolescents with 
autism tend to perform at the extremes of overall cognitive ability (i.e., below 
average or superior) (Attwood, 2007). Furthermore, children or adolescents with 
an overall cognitive ability in the normal range are likely to have an uneven 
profile on the subdomains on cognitive tests (Attwood). This can make it difficult 
for researchers when investigating SWB. For example, a child or adolescent who 
has relatively advanced verbal reasoning skills and reading comprehension 
abilities may find reading and answering tests easy to achieve. However, for the 
person with below average reading and comprehension abilities may find reading 
and understanding questionnaires difficult. If this is the case, then some people 
with autism may not understand the questions and therefore respond in an 
inappropriate appropriate way. Therefore, it is recommended before participants 
complete research, that a pre-testing protocol is used (as described in the Personal 
Wellbeing Index – Intellectual Disability; Cummins & Lau, 2005) to determine if 
they have the ability to understand and respond to the questions. Failure to test for 
this may result in some participants not understanding the questions they have 
answered.  
 
 
 
 
 
Data Cleaning 
 
 Data cleaning involves the detection and correction or removal of errors or 
inconsistencies in a data set. If data is not cleaned appropriately then it is possible 
for the researcher to draw false conclusions from their results.  
 
Acquiescence responding 
 
 Acquiescence responding is the tendency of the participant to provide 
“yes” or “true” answers to questions, regardless of the question being asked 
(Hinz, Michalski, Schwarz & Herzberg, 2007). In a large representative sample of 
2,037 Germans, Hinz Michalski, Schwarz and Herxberg found that five per cent 
of their sample responded in an acquiescent manner. In comparison, the 
probability of acquiescence responding is greater among people with an 
intellectual disability, with researchers finding up to 40% of participants with an 
intellectual disability responding acquiescently (Nihira, Lelnad, & Lambert, 1993; 
Perry & Felce, 2002). It is strongly recommended, that prior to running statistical 
analyses, that routine data cleaning should seek to identify and remove 
acquiescent response data.  
 
Primacy and Recency Bias 
 
 Primacy bias is the tendency to choose the first response option offered by 
an either-or or multiple-choice question. Recency bias is the opposite, or the 
tendency to choose the last option offered. Sigelman, Budd, Spanhel, and 
Schoenrock (1981) report that primacy and recency bias occurred on average 28% 
of the time across three samples of people with an intellectual disability. Prior to 
running any statistical analyses, data should be examined for primacy and recency 
responding and the cases should be removed.  
 
 
 
Emotional State of Participants 
 
 The emotional state of the participants needs to be taken into account 
when examining SWB. If a participant has the maximum set point for SWB (90 
points) and is operating at the maximum upward extent of their set-point range 
(90+8 = 98 points) then it is likely that their response may be dominated by a 
positive emotion (rather than mood). This may be caused by a recent life event or 
drug. It is important to note that their response does not reflect what is trying to be 
measured, which is their level of normal SWB under the influence of HPMood. 
Thus, it is also important to ask the question, “Has anything happened to you 
recently causing you to feel happier or sadder than normal?” (IWG, 2013). This 
can assist in determining whether the participant is likely to have responded under 
the influence of emotions or moods.  
 
Factor Analysis 
          
 It is important to establish the factor structure of a scale before analysing 
results.  The importance of this cannot be understated. Unless a factor analysis is 
performed, the data may well be analysed in terms of invalid factors. For instance, 
a study that was investigating coping strategies among low-income urban African 
American adolescents found that the Children’s Coping Strategies Checklist 
(Ayers, Sandier, West & Roosa, 1996) did not replicate the 4-factor structure. 
Thus, the authors concluded it is important to examine the factor structures of 
coping measures with underrepresented groups. Moreover, researchers should 
examine the factor structure of the scales they have used among their sample. It is 
commonly recommended that the Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) be chosen 
when the aim is to replicate the specified factor structure documented in the 
literature (Yu et al., 2015).        
         
 
 
Summary 
 
 In summary, there are a number of considerations and factors that need to 
be accounted for to generate valid SWB data. While there are some challenges to 
measuring SWB for people with a cognitive impairment, these challenges can be 
overcome with careful planning. Researchers should not rely on proxy reporting, 
as it is an invalid way of measuring SWB. Furthermore, consideration needs to be 
given to the respondent’s ability and whether the questionnaire can allow the 
participant to provide valid responses. The use of a pre-test can assist in 
determining whether the questionnaire is suitable for participants. Furthermore, 
once a researcher has collected their data, careful examination is needed for 
acquiescent responding, or primacy and recency effects. Additionally, it is 
important to run a factor analysis to determine whether the scale has confirmed to 
the theoretical construct.  
  
Chapter Five: Methodology  
 
Participants 
 
A total of 113 Australian participants with autism (M = 31.60 years; SD = 
11.23 years) and 497 Australians participants from the general population (M = 
31.03 years; SD = 12.70 years) completed the online survey. Table 2 shows the 
demographics of the sample. 
 
Questionnaire 
 
A 66-item online questionnaire was self-completed by each participant. 
The questionnaire comprised scales measuring life satisfaction, subjective 
wellbeing, HPMood, self-esteem, optimism, perceived control, personality traits 
of extraversion and emotional stability, autism symptomology, and depression. 
Participants also responded to three items further investigating autism diagnoses 
(e.g., “Have you ever been diagnosed with an autism spectrum condition?”). 
Lastly, eight items obtained demographic information about the participant – 
these were age, gender, employment background, living arrangements, full-time 
occupations, part-time occupations and household income.  
 
Respondent Ability 
 
Before all participants completed the questionnaire, respondent ability was 
examined by a pre-testing protocol, as recommended by Cummins & Lau (2005). 
Participants were asked three questions, which they responded on an 11-point 
end-defined scale (0 = No Satisfaction at All: 10 = Complete Satisfaction). The 
first question asked, “If you felt no satisfaction at all, where would you rate?” 
Participant’s scores had to be below five on the scale to continue. Participants 
were then asked, “If you felt complete satisfaction, where would you rate?”. 
Participant’s scores had to be above 5 to continue. Lastly, participants were asked, 
“If you felt a little bit of satisfaction, where would you rate?”. Participants who 
responded on the scale minimum (0) or maximum (10) were not accepted into the 
survey. Furthermore, respondent ability was examined by a single question. They 
were given a warning on the screen, ‘The next question is just to check that you 
are a real person and not a robot.' This was followed by the question that asked 
‘How often have you been to the North Pole?’. Participants responded on an 11-
point end-defined scale (0 = Never; 10 = Almost Always). Participants who 
scored greater than one did not complete the rest of the survey and were thanked 
for their time.  
 
 
Major Dependent Variable and Other Variables 
 
Global Life Satisfaction (GLS)  
The measure of life satisfaction (GLS) is a single-item that asks ‘How 
satisfied are you with your life as a whole’ (0 = No Satisfaction and 10 = 
Complete Satisfaction).  
 
Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) 
The Personal Wellbeing Index (International Wellbeing Group, 2013) 
comprises of seven items (domains) of satisfaction, selected to represent the first 
level deconstruction of satisfaction with ‘life as a whole.' The manual for the PWI 
reports good internal reliability as Cronbach’s alpha is between .70 and .85.  
  
Table 2 
Demographic variables of Australian adults with and without an autism spectrum 
condition  
 Autism sample n = 113 General sample n = 497 
 n  % of sample n  % of sample 
Gender     
    Male 38 33.6 95 19.1 
    Female 73 64.6 390 78.5 
    Other 2 1.8 3 .6 
Age     
    18 to 25 44 39.6 213 42.9 
    26 to 35 29 26.1 98 19.7 
    36 to 45 23 20.7 59 11.9 
    46 to 55 11 9.9 44 8.9 
    56 to 65 4 3.6 24 4.8 
    66+ - - 4 .8 
Income     
    Less than AUD 
$15,000  
6 5.3 31 6.4 
    AUD $15,000 - 
$30,000 
13 11.5 43 8.8 
    AUD $30,001 - 
$60,000  
23 20.4 71 14.6 
    AUD $60,001 - 
$100,000  
17 15.0 85 17.5 
    AUD $100,001 - 
$150,000 
13 11.5 69 14.2 
    AUD $150,000 - 
$250,000 
10 8.8 52 10.7 
    AUD $250,001 - 
$500,000 
1 .9 14 2.9 
    AUD > $500,001  1 .9 5 1.0 
    Prefer not to say 8 7.1 30 6.2 
    I’m not sure 21 18.6 87 17.9 
Full-Time 
Occupations 
    
    Employment 28 25.2 115 29.6 
    Care 13 11.7 190 38 
    Study 34 30.6 161 41.4 
    Volunteer 0 0 4 1.0 
    None of these 40 36.0 86 22.1 
Part Time 
Occupations 
    
    Employment 27 24.3 101 26 
    Study 13 11.7 43 11.1 
    Volunteer 13 11.7 46 11.8 
    Casual 
employment 
23 20.7 102 26.2 
    None 36 32.4 107 27.5 
    Unemployed 20 18.0 44 11.3 
 Homeostatically Protected Mood (HPMood) 
 Homeostatically Protected Mood (HPMood) was measured using three 
adjectives (content, alert and happy). These three items have been found by 
Davern et al., (2007), Tomyn (2008), Blore et al., 2010, to co-vary with 
approximately 60% of the variance in SWB. Participants responded to each 
adjective on an 11-point end-defined scale as follows: ‘Thinking about your life, 
in general, how [insert adjective] do you feel?’ (0 = Not at all; 10 = Extremely). 
The responses were summed to obtain an overall HPMood score. 
 
Self-esteem  
Four-positively worded items from the Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale 
(Rosenberg, 1989) was used to measure global self-esteem, known as the Revised 
Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Weinberg, 2011). Unfortunately, due to human error, 
the item “I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others” 
was not included in the survey.  Participants are required to indicate their strength 
of agreement with statements such as ‘On the whole, I am satisfied with myself’ 
on an 11-point end defined-scale (0 = Strongly Disagree; 10 = Strongly Agree). 
The Revised Self-Esteem Scale has have been reported a Cronbach’s α = .91 
(Weinberg, 2011). A single composite score was calculated.  
 
Optimism 
Optimism was measured using the Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; 
Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). The LOT-R is a 10-item measure of optimism 
and pessimism. It has been found that a bi-dimensional relationship exists 
between optimism and pessimism (Chang, Maydeu-Olivares, & D’Zurilla, 1997), 
thus, only the three items measuring the construct of optimism were utilised in the 
present research. Participants were required indicate the strength of agreement 
with the statements, such as, ‘In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.' 
Responses were recorded on an 11-point end-defined scale (0 = Strongly 
Disagree; 10 = Strongly Agree). The LOT-R has been previously demonstrated 
good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .89; Tomyn, 2008). The three 
responses were summed together to obtain an overall optimism score.  
 
Perceived Control 
 Perceived Control was measured using the Personal Perceived Control 
Scale (PPCS; Holloway, 2003). The PPCS measures control along two 
dimensions; primary and secondary control. Only the primary control scale was 
used, measured by three items on an 11-point end-defined scale (0 = Strongly 
Disagree; 10 = Strongly Agree). Each item begins with a statement ‘When 
something bad happens to me … For example, ‘I ask others for help or advice’. 
The primary control scale has shown good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 
.77; Tomyn, 2008). 
 
Personality 
The personality dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism were 
measured using seven items (4-items measuring neuroticism and 3 items 
measuring extraversion) from the 16-Adjective Measure (Herzberg & Brӓhler, 
2006) based on the Ten-Item Personality Inventory [TIPI], Gosling, Rentfrow, & 
Swann Jr., 2003). The TIPI is a brief version of personality that taps into the Five-
Factor Model of Personality. However, research by Herzberg & Brӓhler found 
that the TIPI has low internal consistencies, non-normality of distribution of the 
five personality scales and relatively high inter-correlations. Thus, they expanded 
it from 10-items to 16 items (see Herzberg & Brӓhler for a review). Four items 
measuring neuroticism (one-item reverse coded) and three items measuring 
extraversion (each reversed coded) were included as these are the two personality 
constructs most related to SWB (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998). Responses are 
recorded on an 11-point end-defined scale (0 = Strongly Disagree; 10 = Strongly 
Agree) such as ‘I see myself as easily upset’ (neuroticism scale) and ‘I see myself 
as reserved’ (reverse scored, extraversion scale). Cronbach’s α is at acceptable 
levels for both the neuroticism and extraversion scale, at .67 and .69, respectively.   
 
Autism Symptomology 
To measure autism symptomology, the Autism Quotient-10 (AQ-10; 
Allison, Auyeung, & Baron-Cohen, 2012) was utilised. This self-report 
questionnaire comprises 10-items, such as ‘I find it easy to ‘read between the 
lines’ when someone is talking to me’. Research among adults with autism found 
that using a cut-off score of 6 (out of 10) yielded a sensitivity of .88, specificity of 
.91 and a positive predictive value of .85 (Booth et al., 2013). The scale was 
transformed from 4-point Likert scale to an 11-point end defined scale (0 = 
Strongly Disagree; 10 = Strongly Agree) based on previous research conducted by 
Cummins and Gullone (2000).  
 
Depression symptomology 
 Depression was measured using the depression subscale from the 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). 
This measure comprises of seven items. The response scale was transformed from 
a 4-point Likert scale to an 11-point end defined scale (0 = Never and 10 = 
Almost Always). Previous research by Bittar (2010) found that transforming the 
scale to an end-defined scale increased the reliability and validity. Furthermore, 
the Cronbach’s alpha was reported at .92 in her research.  
 
Procedure 
 
 After obtaining approval from the Deakin University Ethics Committee, 
participants were recruited through social media and the two autism associations 
(Amaze, and Autism Queensland). Participants went to a web link 
(www.wellbeingproject.net.au) where they were able to read the plain language 
statement. Consent was implied if the participants started the survey. Prior to 
starting the questionnaire, a pre-testing protocol was used (Cummins & Lau, 
2004) to determine whether the participants could understand the questionnaire. If 
a participant failed the pre-testing protocol, they were thanked for their time and 
did not continue with the survey. At the beginning of each set of items, the anchor 
descriptions were explained. At the completion of the questionnaire participants 
were asked if they would like were to enter a prize draw to win 1 of 8 gift 
vouchers values at $40. Participants were also thanked for their time.  
  
Results 
 
Data Screening and Preparation 
 
Data screening and analysis was examined in SPSS software (version 22).  
To standardise all data, scores have been converted to a Percentage of 
Scale Maximum (%SM). For any scale that is rated 0-x, %SM is calculated 
through the following formula:  
 
  
 
X  = the score or mean to be converted 
kmin = the minimum score possible on the scale  
kmax  = the maximum score possible on the scale 
 
Respondent Ability and Acquiescence Responding  
 
 Each participant’s ability was examined using the pre-test protocol 
(Cummins & Lau, 2004). Eighty-nine participants failed the first pre-test (“if you 
felt no satisfaction at all, where would you rate?”) and 15 participants failed the 
second pre-test (“if you felt complete satisfaction, where would you rate?”). 
These participants are considered unreliable and were unable to continue with the 
survey. 
 
 Acquiescence responding was also examined. This is deemed to occur 
when a participant responds consistently either at the scale minimum (0) or scale 
maximum (10) for all seven domains on the PWI. No cases were found to meet 
the criteria for acquiescence responding. Participants were also asked the 
question, “How often have you been to the North Pole?” to determine respondent 
ability. All participants responded never (0).   
 
 
Missing Data 
 The frequency of missing data for all variables across the entire data set 
was less than 5%. Given that these missing data appeared to be not at random, 
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analyses were conducted using pairwise deletion. Composite variables were 
computed on scales with multiple items. These composite scores were used for 
the remaining data screening and analysis. 
 
Outliers 
Examination of z-scores (>2.88, as recommended by Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2013) revealed outliers on the PWI domains of standard of living, safety. 
However, examination of the 5% trimmed mean for standard of living and safety 
showed that scores were within 1%SM point of the original mean. Thus, it was 
decided to include all outliers. However, eight cases were identified as 
multivariate outliers for the PWI, with a Mahalanobis distance greater than the 
critical value for the corresponding degree of freedom. These cases were deleted 
as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2014).  
 
 
Skew and Kurtosis 
Skewness and Kurtosis are considered acceptable within the range of -7.0 
to 7.0 (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2013). Thus, no variables underwent a 
transformation.  
 
Multicollinearity and Singularity 
To examine for multicollinearity and singularity correlations matrices 
were generated for all major independent variables, including GLS, SWB, 
HPMood, personality, self-esteem, optimism, perceived control, autism 
symptomology, and depression for both the autism (Table 3) and general sample 
(Table 4). 
 
  
Table 3 
Correlations between all variables for the autism sample (n = 113) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. PWI Total 1          
2. GLS .83** 1         
3. HPMood .83** .79** 1        
4. Self-esteem .79** .78** .81** 1       
5. Optimism .63** .67** .72** .76** 1      
6. Perceived 
Control 
.40** .44** .44** .52** .53** 1     
7. Emotional 
Stability 
-
.43** 
-
.38** 
-
.47** 
-
.52** 
-
.51** 
-
.31** 
1    
8. Extraversion .14 .12 .23* .18 .21* .27** -.13 1   
9. AQ- 10 -.24* -.22* -
.33** 
-.19 -
.29** 
-.21* .26** -
.21* 
1  
10. DASS21-D -
.68** 
-.68* -
.67** 
-
.70** 
-
.66** 
-
.54** 
.47** -.16 .25* 1 
*p<.05 
 
Table 4 
Correlations between all variables for the general sample (n = 497) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. PWI Total 1          
2. GLS .80* 1         
3. HPMood .80* .80* 1        
4. Self-esteem .74* .70* .79* 1       
5. Optimism .67* .64* .71* .75* 1      
6. Perceived 
Control 
.49* .48* .55* .57* .58* 1     
7. Emotional 
Stability 
-.49* -.43* -.57* -.59* -.59* -.43* 1    
8. Extraversion .31* .27* .38* .32* .33* .33* -.25* 1   
9. AQ -.41* -.29* -.41* -.35* -.35* -.37* .37* -.37* 1  
10. DASS21-D -.69* -.69* -.72* -.69* -.65* -.53* .53* -.33* .36* 1 
*p<.05 
 
 
As shown in Table 3 and Table 4 no variables were singular (above 0.9). 
For both the autism and general sample, the highest correlations (between .79 and 
.83) were between SWB and HPMood, SWB and Self-esteem, and HPMood and 
Self-esteem. Tabachnick & Fidell (2014) suggest that a researcher should think 
carefully before including two variables with a bivariate correlation greater than 
.70 due to the risk of inflated correlations between these variables. However, it 
was expected that some of the variables would correlate highly the nature of SWB 
research. Given that the aim of this research is to examine SWB Homeostasis 
Theory, it is necessary to include SWB, HPMood, and self-esteem to determine 
which variables contribute significant variance to the prediction of LS and SWB. 
Based on this reasoning, all variables were retained.  
 
Sample Size  
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), the criterion for multiple 
regression analysis is: 
 
 
where  N= minimum number of cases and 
m = number of IV’s 
In the present study, the maximum number of independent variables 
entered in any one regression analysis is 7. According to the rule: 
N > 50 + 8 x 7 
it is recommended that a minimum of 106 cases are needed for adequate 
statistical power. With 113 cases for the autism sample and 497 for the general 
sample, the present study meets this power requirement for all major analyses. 
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Chapter Six: Psychometric Properties 
 
 
To date, there is no published data on SWB for Australians adults with an 
autism spectrum condition. Thus, this analysis aims to investigate the 
psychometric properties of the Personal Wellbeing Index, wellbeing variables 
(i.e., HPMood, self-esteem, optimism and perceived control), personality 
(extraversion and emotional stability), and autism symptomology.  
 
 
Factor Analyses using Principal Component Analysis 
 
A principle components factor analyses were performed for each scale for 
both the autism and general sample. Nunnally (1978) recommends a minimum 10 
cases for each item that is to be factor analysed. In this research, the largest 
number of items to be analyzed at once is ten, thus, a minimum of 100 cases is 
recommended for each group. With the autism sample (n = 113) and general 
sample (n = 497), the minimum amount has been reached.  
 
Prior to analyses, the suitability of each variable for this method of 
analysis was assessed using the criterion of a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy greater than 0.6, and a significant score for Bartlett’s Test of 
sphericity (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). The correlation matrices for each variable 
(i.e., PWI, HPMood, self-esteem, optimism, perceived control, AQ-10) were 
checked to ensure the coefficients were above .30. For all variables, oblique 
(Direct oblimin) rotation was used to aid interpretation of the extracted factors. As 
a general rule, factors were extracted if they had eigenvalues exceeding 1, and 
inspection of the scree plot confirmed the final structure. For all analyses, factor 
loadings less than .40 were suppressed so that only items loading high enough 
onto factors are shown. 
 
Table 5 confirms the suitability of each scale for factor analysis, as 
revealed by the values for the KMO measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity.  
 
Table 5 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity scores for each variables to be factor analysed  
 
 Autism sample General sample 
 KMO Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity 
KMO Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity 
PWI .89 χ2 (21) =317.17, 
p=.000 
 
.90 χ2 (21) =1347.78, 
p=.000 
 
HPMood .64 χ2 (3) =136.58, 
p=.000 
 
.64 χ2 (3) =709.92, 
p=.000 
 
Self-Esteem .78 χ2 (6) =282.04, 
p=.000 
 
.82 χ2 (6) =1201.47, 
p=.000 
 
Optimism  .73 χ2 (3) =145.28, 
p=.000 
 
.73 χ2 (3) =610.67, 
p=.000 
 
Perceived 
Control 
.64 χ2 (3) =66.37, 
p=.000 
 
.65 χ2 (3) =449.28, 
p=.000 
 
Personality .72 χ2 (21) =256.61, 
p=.000 
 
.77 χ2 (21) =1502.51, 
p=.000 
 
AQ-10                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      .85 χ2 (45) =418.88,
p=.000 
 
.78 χ2 (45) =342.58,
p=.000 
 
DASS-D .91 χ2 (21) =664.215, 
p=.000 
 
.93 χ2 (21) =2886.35, 
p=.000 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the PWI scale 
 
A Principle Components Analysis (PCA) was performed on 7-items of the 
PWI for both the autism and general sample. The data met the assumption 
necessary for a factor analysis, with all items correlating greater than .30 with 
each other. Table 6 displays the factor loadings for the PWI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the PWI scale 
PWI Domains Autism sample (n 
= 133) 
General sample (n 
= 497) 
1. Standard .742 .741 
2. Health .744 .710 
3. Achieving .832 .806 
4. Relationships .652 .673 
5. Safety .711 .703 
6. Community .728 .769 
7. Future Security .711 .703 
 
A single-factor structure emerged with 56.65% and 55.90% of the 
variance accounted for in the autism and general sample, respectively.  
 
 
Factor Analysis of the HPMood scale  
 
The three HPMood items were analysed using principal component 
analysis. Table 7 shows the factor loadings of the three items. 
 
Table 7 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the HPMood scale 
Questionnaire Item Autism sample   
(n = 133) 
General sample 
(n = 497) 
1. Content .905 .903 
3. Happy .903 .925 
2. Alert .731 .755 
 
As expected, a single factor structure for HPMood emerged, explaining 
72.28% and 74.74% of the variance, for the autism and general sample, 
respectively.  
 
Factor Analysis for the Self-Esteem Scale 
 
 For the revised Self-Esteem scale, a principal components analysis was 
performed. Table 8 shows the factor loading for the four self-esteem items. 
 
  
Table 8 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Self-esteem scale 
Questionnaire Item Autism sample   
(n = 133) 
General sample 
(n = 497) 
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself 
.910 .905 
4. I take a positive attitude toward 
myself 
.895 .887 
2. I feel that I have a number of good 
qualities 
.883 .876 
3. I am able to do things as well as 
most other people  
.775 .817 
 
The data revealed a single-factor structure for self-esteem, explaining 
75.27% and 76.02% of the variance for the autism and general sample, 
respectively. 
 
Factor Analysis for the Optimism Scale 
 
Three items from the optimism scale were subject to a PCA. Table 9 
shows the factor loadings. 
 
Table 9 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Optimism scale 
Questionnaire Item Autism sample   
(n = 133) 
General sample 
(n = 497) 
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect 
the best 
.773 .867 
2. I am always optimistic about my 
future 
.787 .869 
3. Overall, I expect more good things 
to happen to me than bad 
.770 .891 
 
As expected, the three items from the optimism scale, showed a single 
factor, which accounted for 77.67% and 76.64% of the variance for the autism 
and general sample, respectively. 
 
  
Factor Analysis for the Perceived Control Scale 
 
 The three items used to measure Perceived Control were subject to a 
principal components analysis. Table 10 shows the factor loadings of the three 
perceived control items. 
 
Table 10 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Perceived Control scale 
Questionnaire Item Autism sample   
(n = 133) 
General sample 
(n = 497) 
2. When something bad happens to 
me, I look for different ways to 
improve the situation 
.858 .887 
3. When something bad happens to 
me, I use my skills to overcome the 
problem 
.801 .855 
1. When something bad happens to 
me, I ask others for help or advice 
.727 .746 
 
As expected, a single factor structure was revealed which accounted for 
63.55% and 69.16% of the variance for both the autism and general sample, 
respectively. Table 10 shows the factor loadings of the three perceived control 
items 
 
Factor Analysis for the Personality Scale 
 
 The seven items used to measure the personality traits of emotional 
stability and extraversion were subject to a principal components analysis. Table 
11 shows the factor loadings for the personality scale. 
  
Table 11 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Self-esteem scale 
  General Sample Autism Sample 
Questionnaire Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
3. I see myself as calm .811  .791  
2. I see myself as anxious .831  .773  
1. I see myself as easily 
upset 
.768  .759  
4. I see myself as 
emotionally stable 
.799  .755  
6. I see myself as quiet  .914  .900 
5. I see myself as 
reserved 
 .894  .884 
7. I see myself as 
introverted 
 .857  .825 
 
As expected, two factors emerged for both groups. Consistent with 
previous factor analyses of the personality scale, Factor 1 represents Emotional 
Stability and Factor 2 represents extraversion.   
For the autism sample, the two factors accounted for 37.25% and 29.78% 
of the variance respectively, together accounting 67% of the variance. For the 
general sample, the two factors accounted for 44.60% and 27.74% of the variance 
respectively, together explaining 72.35% of the variance.  
 
Factor Analysis for the Autism Scale 
Autism Sample 
A principal component analysis was performed on the 10 items of the 
Autism Quotient. A two-factor solution emerged. However, there were only two 
items in Factor 2, (“I often notice small sounds when others do not” and “I like to 
collect information about categories of things”) thus these items were deleted. A 
factor analysis was rerun on the remaining eight items. The items “I usually 
concentrate more on the whole picture, rather than small details”, “I find it easy to 
‘read between the lines’ when someone is talking to me”, and “if there is an 
interruption, I can switch back to what I was doing very quickly” was found to 
have an item loading below .4 and was removed from the analyses. A factor 
analyses was performed on the remaining five items. Table 12 shows the factor 
loadings. 
Table 12 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Autism Quotient-5 for the 
autism sample (N = 113) 
 
A single factor emerged, accounting for 49.45% of the variance. 
 
General Sample  
 
 A principle component analysis was performed on the 5-items that 
accounted for one-fact among the autism sample. Table 13 shows the factor 
loadings. 
Table 13 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Autism Quotient-5 for the 
autism sample (N = 497) 
 
A single factor emerged, accounting for 52.73% of the variance. Thus, to 
enable comparisons between the autism and general sample, the 5-items that 
provided one-factor solution will be used, now known as the AQ-5.  
 
Questionnaire Item Factor 
5 I find it easy to ‘read between the lines’ when someone is talking to 
me 
.784 
6 I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting bored .633 
7 When I’m reading a story I find it difficult to work out the character’s 
intentions 
.598 
9 I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or feeling just by 
looking at their face 
.816 
10 I find it difficult to work out peoples intentions  .657 
Questionnaire Item Factor 
5 I find it easy to ‘read between the lines’ when someone is talking to 
me 
.784 
6 I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting bored .791 
7 When I’m reading a story I find it difficult to work out the character’s 
intentions 
.529 
9 I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or feeling just by 
looking at their face 
.746 
10 I find it difficult to work out peoples intentions  .749 
  
Calculation of Autism Cut-Off Score 
The original AQ-10 has four choices per question, with two choices being 
awarded a score of one and two choices being awarded a score of zero. This 
results in a score range from zero to ten. As per the AQ-10, a cut-off of score of 6 
is used to determine the likelihood of an autism spectrum condition. For the 11-
point response scale data, the five items were summed; minimum score = 0, 
maximum score = 50. Autism cut-off scores were then calculated using the 
formula (cut-off score/10) x (50/1). Thus, the autism cut-off score for the 11-point 
response scale data is 30 and above.  
 
Scale Analysis 
 
While most of the scales are widely used with general population groups, 
this is not so for people who have an autism spectrum condition. Each scale's 
internal consistency is shown in table 14. Using the acceptability criterion of 0.7 
(Pallant, 2013),  
 
Table 14 
Reliability Analyses of all Scales  
Subscales Autism sample (N = 113) 
α 
General sample (N = 497) 
Α 
PWI .87 .87 
HPMood .80 .83 
Self-esteem .89 .89 
Optimism .86 .85 
Perceived Control .70 .75 
Emotional Stability .77 .82 
Extraversion .84 .88 
AQ-5 .80 .85 
 
Overall, Cronbach’s alphas for the autism and general sample revealed 
that the data related to the total scores for these scales is acceptable and reliable.  
 
  
Discussion 
 
Overview 
 The aim of this chapter is to examine the psychometric properties of the 
Personal Wellbeing Index, and the scales measuring Homeostatically Protected 
Mood (HPMood), self-esteem, optimism, perceived control, extraversion, 
emotional stability, and autism. This is achieved by (1) using a pre-testing 
protocol and (2) by applying Factor analyses to the scales, examining Cronbach’s 
alphas for both the autism and general sample.  
 
Pre-testing Protocol 
The first issue addressed in this thesis involves establishing the reliability 
and validity of the subjective data. The first step involved using a pre-testing 
protocol, adapted from the Personal Wellbeing Index-Intellectual Disability 
(PWI-ID; Cummins & Lau, 2004). The purpose of the pre-testing protocol is to 
determine if participants understand the questions being asked, and to eliminate 
those participants who do not have the cognitive capacity to respond validly. It 
was interesting to find that 89 participants failed the first pre-test (“if you felt no 
satisfaction at all, where would you rate?) and 15 participants failed the second 
pre-test (“if you felt complete satisfaction, where would you rate?”). This pre-
testing protocol provides a reasonable level of confidence that the remaining 113 
participants with autism and 497 participants from the general population 
provided valid answers. 
 
In summary, the pre-testing protocol found a 104 people failed to 
understand the questions being asked of them, and they were unable to complete 
the questionnaire. It is recommended that future studies examining Subjective 
Wellbeing (SWB) employ a pre-testing protocol to determine if participants have 
the ability to complete the questionnaire.   
 
Autism sample 
The PWI as an indicator of SWB among people with autism was 
supported psychometrically. A factor analysis confirmed the presence of a single 
factor accounting for 56.65% of the variance among the autism sample. These 
results are higher than previous representative research among Australian adults, 
which have found the PWI conforms to a single factor accounting for 50.54% of 
the variance (Cummins et al., 2003). As expected, factor analysis confirmed the 
presence of a single factor for the HPMood, self-esteem, optimism and both 
perceived control scales. Further, as expected, two factors replicating extraversion 
and emotional stability were found for the autism sample. Additionally, the 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) for all the wellbeing and personality scales were 
between .70 to .89. Thus all scales appear psychometrically valid and reliable for 
use among Australians adults with autism.  
 
 An interesting finding was the Autism Quotient-10 (AQ-10) did not yield 
a single factor. The AQ-10 is a brief screening instrument designed to determine 
the likelihood that a person may have an autism spectrum condition. A factor 
analysis revealed that five items (re-named as the AQ-5) emerged as one factor 
for the autism and sample accounting for 49.45% of the variance with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.80. Thus, the AQ-5 was used to determine the likelihood of 
autism and appears to be psychometrically valid and reliable among the autism 
sample.  
 
General sample 
Among the general sample, a factor analysis confirmed the presence of 
one factor for the PWI, accounting for 55.90% of the variance, similar to previous 
research among Australian adults (Cummins et al., 2003). As expected, a factor 
analysis confirmed the presence of a single factor for HPMood, self-esteem, 
optimism and perceived control, while two factors replicating extraversion and 
emotional stability were found for the general sample. Furthermore, the reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha) for all the wellbeing and personality scales were between .75 
to .89. Thus, the scales appear psychometrically valid and reliable for use among 
the general population. 
 
 As above in the autism sample, the AQ-10 did not account for one-factor. 
In fact, the same five items (AQ-5) used in the autism sample, also produced one 
factor among the general sample, accounting for 52.73% of the variance, with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .85. Thus, the AQ-5 appears to be psychometrically valid and 
reliable among the general population.  
 
Summary 
In conclusion, the PWI, and the scales measuring HPMood, self-esteem, 
optimism, perceived control, and the traits of extraversion and emotional stability, 
along with the AQ-5 appear to be psychometrically sound among Australian 
adults with and without autism.   
Chapter Seven: Descriptive Analysis 
 
The aim of this section is to examine if there are any differences between 
Australian adults with and without autism in respect to their personal wellbeing. 
This will include comparing Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) with household 
income, gender, age, household composition, and employment and autism 
symptomology. The means and SDs for the variables are presented in Table 15. 
 
Table 15 
Means and SD for all variables measured.  
 Autism sample 
(n = 113) 
General sample 
(n = 497) 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Life as a whole 53.60 25.28 66.93 20.94 
SWB 52.97 19.82 64.60 18.34 
HPMood 55.95 21.75 68.58 17.63 
Self-esteem 56.83 23.63 69.97 19.20 
Optimism 48.67 24.33 61.74 21.08 
Control 65.72 21.99 68.76 18.83 
Extraversion 51.06 25.61 70.87 24.28 
Emotional Stability 56.62 10.19 56.57 9.30 
Autism symptomology 77.00 11.04 30.99 16.44 
 
A notable impression of Table 15 is the fact that both the autism and 
general sample overall PWI scores are below the Australian normative range of 
73.5 to 76.5 points (Capic et al., 2015). While it is expected for the autism sample 
to have a lower SWB score than the general sample, the fact that the general 
sample is well below the normative Australian range, suggests that sample has a 
higher percentage of participants who are likely to be experiencing homeostatic 
challenge or defeat.  
 
 Homeostasis Theory predicts that a group SWB mean score below 70 
points indicates that the group contains a higher than normal proportion of people 
who are at risk of depression and that some of these people will be exhibiting a 
loss of homeostatic control. Consequently, their SWB will be below their set-
point range and these low scores will cause the sample variance to increase.  
 
 The relatively low mean and high SD for the general sample has 
implications for a number of the predictions being tested. This is because the 
pattern of results will differ depending on whether the homeostatic system is 
resting or under threat or defeat. Under conditions of low challenge, SWB will be 
maintained within its set-point range and HPMood is believed to approximate 
SWB. However, when there are challenges that defeat the homeostatic system, 
SWB will fall below equilibrium levels. As a consequence, HPMood no longer 
reflects SWB. Instead, the experience of SWB will reflect the loss of HPMood as 
control over SWB is assumed by cognitions and affects associated with the 
challenging agent. Thus, because the general sample has a mean below 70 points, 
the general sample is not considered to be representative of the Australian 
population.  
 
 A likely explanation of why the general sample has SWB below normative 
ranges is the fact the general sample has 38% of carers in the sample. Due to the 
online recruitment and recuitment through autism associations, it is possible that 
adults who care for people were recruited into the sample. Research by 
Hammond, Weinberg, and Cummins (2014) found that Australian carers have a 
mean SWB of 58 points. This suggests that the carers are likely to have an SWB 
score that reflects a homeostatic system that is likely to be under threat or defeat. 
Thus, careers were removed from the general sample. The means, and standard 
deviations for the general sample (with carers removed) are shown in Table 16.  
 
 
  
Table 16 
Means and SDs for all variables measured.  
 Autism sample 
(n = 113) 
General sample 
(n = 307) 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
GLS 54.05 24.84 70.58 17.10 
SWB 52.97 19.82 72.32 12.18 
HPMood 55.95 21.75 71.70 15.50 
Self-esteem 56.83 23.63 72.30 18.04 
Optimism 48.67 24.33 64.82 19.18 
Control 65.72 21.99 70.54 17.43 
Extraversion 51.06 25.61 70.88 24.28 
Emotional Stability 56.62 10.19 56.86 9.13 
Autism 
symptomology 
77.00 11.04 30.81 10.76 
 
Table 16 shows that the general sample (with carers removed) has a mean 
SWB score of 72.32 points. However, before results for the general sample can be 
reliably interpreted, a factor analysis will be performed of the variables (PWI, 
HPMood, self-esteem, optimism, control, personality and autism symptomology). 
This will now be presented.  
 
 
Factor Analyses using Principal Component Analysis for the General Sample 
(Carers removed) 
Table 17 confirms the suitability of each scale for factor analysis, as 
revealed by the values for the KMO measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity.  
 
  
Table 17 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity scores for each variable to be factor analysed  
 KMO Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
PWI .77 χ2 (21) =409.47, p=.000 
 
HPMood .61 χ2 (3) = 397.64, p=.000 
 
Self-Esteem .84 χ2 (6) = 690.85, p=.000 
 
Optimism  .71 χ2 (3) = 304.69, p=.000 
 
Perceived Control .63 χ2 (3) = 182.01, p=.000 
 
Personality .75 χ2 (21) = 891.29, p=.000 
 
AQ-10                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      .77 χ2 (21) = 474.56, p=.000 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the PWI scale 
 
A PCA was performed on 7-items of the PWI for the general sample 
(carer’s removed). The data met the assumption necessary for a factor analysis, 
with all items correlating greater than .30 with each other. Table 18 displays the 
factor loadings for the PWI. 
 
Table 18 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the PWI scale 
PWI Domains General sample 
 (n = 307) 
1. Standard .67 
2. Health .61 
3. Achieving .73 
4. Relationships .50 
5. Safety .47 
6. Community .67 
7. Future Security .74 
 
A single-factor structure emerged with 54.08% of the variance accounted 
for in the general sample.  
 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the HPMood scale  
 
The three HPMood items were analysed using PCA. Table 19 shows the 
factor loadings of the three items. 
 
Table 19 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the HPMood scale 
Questionnaire Item General sample  
(n = 307) 
1. Content .89 
3. Happy .72 
2. Alert .93 
 
As expected, a single factor structure for HPMood emerged, accounting 
for 72.35% the variance, for the general sample. 
 
Factor Analysis for the Self-Esteem Scale 
 For the revised Self-Esteem scale, a PCA was performed. Table 20 shows 
the factor loading for the four self-esteem items. 
 
Table 20 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Self-esteem scale 
Questionnaire Item General sample 
 (n = 307) 
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself .89 
4. I take a positive attitude toward myself .87 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities .83 
3. I am able to do things as well as most other people  .88 
 
The data revealed a single-factor structure for self-esteem, accounting for 
75.25% of the variance for the general sample. 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis for the Optimism Scale 
Three items from the optimism scale were subject to a PCA. Table 21 
shows the factor loadings. 
 
Table 21 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Optimism scale 
Questionnaire Item General sample 
 (n = 307) 
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best .74 
2. I am always optimistic about my future .69 
3. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad .76 
 
As expected, the three items from the optimism scale, showed a single 
factor, which accounted for 72.97% of the variance for general sample. 
 
Factor Analysis for the Perceived Control Scale 
 The three items used to measure Perceived Control were subject to a 
principal components analysis. Table 22 shows the factor loadings of the three 
perceived control items. 
 
Table 22 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Perceived Control scale 
Questionnaire Item General sample 
 (n = 307) 
2. When something bad happens to me, I look for different ways to 
improve the situation 
.69 
3. When something bad happens to me, I use my skills to overcome the 
problem 
.88 
1. When something bad happens to me, I ask others for help or advice .88 
 
As expected, a single factor structure was revealed which accounted for 
66.89% of the variance for the general sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis for the Personality Scale 
 
 The seven items used to measure the personality traits of emotional 
stability and extraversion were subject to a principal components analysis. Table 
23 shows the factor loadings for the personality scale. 
 
Table 23 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Self-esteem scale 
  General sample 
Questionnaire Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
3. I see myself as calm .79  
2. I see myself as anxious .84  
1. I see myself as easily upset .78  
4. I see myself as emotionally stable .80  
6. I see myself as quiet  .90 
5. I see myself as reserved  .91 
7. I see myself as introverted  .88 
 
As expected, two factors emerged for both the general sample. Consistent 
with previous factor analyses of the personality scale, Factor 1 represents 
Emotional Stability, accounting for 40.55% of the variance, and Factor 2 
represents extraversion accounting for 31.27% of the variance.  
 
Factor Analysis for the Autism Scale 
A principal component analysis was performed on the AQ-5. Table 24 
shows the factor loadings. 
 
 
  
Table 24 
Component matrix showing item loadings for the Autism Quotient-10 for the 
general sample (N = 307) 
  
A single factor emerged, accounting for 48.80% of the variance.  
 
Scale Analysis 
Each scale's internal consistency is shown in Table 25. Using the 
acceptability criterion of 0.7 (Pallant, 2013).  
 
Table 25 
Reliability Analyses of all Scales  
Subscales  General sample (carer’s 
removed) 
 (n = 307) 
α 
PWI  .73 
HPMood  .80 
Self-esteem  .89 
Optimism  .82 
Perceived Control  .71 
Emotional Stability  .78 
Extraversion  .88 
 (AQ-5)  .74 
 
Overall, Cronbach’s alphas for the general sample group revealed that the 
data related to the total scores for these scales is acceptable and reliable.  
 In summary, each of the variables for the general sample (with careers 
deleted) factored as they should and have an acceptable internal consistency 
Questionnaire Item Factor 
5 I find it easy to ‘read between the lines’ when someone is talking to 
me 
.76 
6 I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting bored .77 
7 When I’m reading a story I find it difficult to work out the character’s 
intentions 
.48 
9 I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or feeling just by 
looking at their face 
.72 
10 I find it difficult to work out peoples intentions  .73 
score. Thus, analyses can proceed to compare the autism sample with the general 
sample with careers removed (henceforth referred to as the general sample).   
 
Comparing the Wellbeing Variables, personality and autism symptomology  
Utilising a one-way ANOVA, the first analyses examines the differences 
between the autism and the general sample group among Global Life Satisfaction 
(GLS), the Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI), Homeostatically Protected Mood 
(HPMood), self-esteem, optimism, perceived control, the personality traits of 
extraversion and emotional stability, and autism symptomology. The means and 
standard deviations for each variable are shown in Table 26. Included in Table 1 
is the effect size, using eta squared. Cohen (1988) states that .01 as a small effect 
size, .06 as a medium effect size, and .14 as a large effect size. 
 
Table 26 
Descriptive statistics for all variables measured.  
 Autism sample 
(n = 111) 
General 
sample 
(n = 307) 
  
 Mean SD Mean SD ANOVA Eta 
squared 
GLS 54.05 24.84 70.58 17.10 F(1, 416) = 58.90, p = .00 .12 
SWB 52.97 19.82 72.32 12.18 F(1, 403) = 134.60, p = 
.00 
.25 
HPMood 55.95 21.75 71.70 15.50 F(1, 404) = 65.58, p = .00 .14 
Self-esteem 56.83 23.63 72.30 18.04 F(1, 414) = 50.20, p =.00 .11 
Optimism 48.67 24.33 64.82 19.18 F(1, 401) = 48.49, p = .00 .11 
Control 65.72 21.99 70.54 17.43 F(1, 403) = 1.92, p = .17 .00 
Extraversion 51.06 25.61 70.88 24.28 F(1, 397) = 48.45, p = .00 .11 
Emotional 
Stability 
56.62 10.19 56.86 9.13 F(1, 406) = 0.05, p = .82 .00 
Autism 
symptomology 
77.00 11.04 30.81 10.76 F(1, 406) = 319.75, p = 
.00 
.46 
 Bold indicates no significance  
 
 The ANOVAs shows for the wellbeing variables, Australian’s with an 
autism are significantly more likely to have lower life satisfaction with life as a 
whole (GLS), SWB, HPMood, self-esteem, and optimism than Australians 
without autism. There is no difference between the two groups on perceived 
control. In regards to the personality variables, participants with autism were 
significantly less likely to be extroverted than participants without autism. There 
was no difference between the personality traits of emotional stability between the 
two groups. Lastly, as expected those with an autism reported significantly higher 
levels of autism symptomology than participants without autism. 
 
In summary, Australian adults with autism report lower levels of life 
satisfaction, subjective wellbeing, HPMood, self-esteem, optimism than 
Australians without autism. Furthermore, Australian adults with autism self-report 
lower levels of extraversion and higher autism symptomology than Australians 
without autism. The next section examines the PWI domains. 
 
Comparing the Personal Wellbeing Index domains 
 
 To establish whether there are any differences on the PWI domains 
between the autism and general sample, a one-way ANOVA was utilised. Table 
27 shows the means and standard deviations, and eta squared across the two 
groups for the Personal Wellbeing Index.  
 
  
Table 27 
Comparison of means and SDs of the Personal Wellbeing Index 
 Autism sample 
(n = 113) 
General sample 
(n = 307) 
  
 Mean SD Mean SD ANOVA Eta 
squared 
Standard 66.95 22.83 79.58 16.76 F(1, 416) = 37.74, p = 
.00 
.08 
Health 53.28 25.31 66.97 21.12 F(1, 416) = 30.71, p = 
.00 
.07 
Achieving 49.88 28.59 69.58 20.19 F(1, 415) = 61.22, p = 
.00 
.13 
Relationships 51.04 32.46 71.29 22.44 F(1, 416) = 51.49, p = 
.00 
.11 
Safety 66.49 25.56 85.07 15.14 F(1, 414) = 82.10, p = 
.00 
.17 
Community 41.98 26.79 65.83 21.23 F(1, 411) = 88.41, p = 
.00 
.18 
Future 
Security 
40.08 26.59 65.03 21.91 F(1, 409) = 87.24, p = 
.00 
.18 
 
The ANOVAs show that there is a significant difference between the 
autism and general sample on all seven of the PWI domains. In fact, participants 
with an autism reported overall, lower satisfaction with each domain compared to 
the general sample. Furthermore, there was a medium effect size on the PWI 
domains of satisfaction with standard of living, health, achieving, and 
relationships between the autism and general sample. Whereas there was large 
effect size on the domains of safety, community, and future security, between the 
two groups.  
 
In summary, Australian adults with autism report lower levels of a 
subjective quality of life on the PWI domains than Australian without an autism 
spectrum condition. Possible reasons for these differences will be discussed in the 
discussion. 
 
 The next analyses examines the relative contribution that the seven PWI 
domains make to “satisfaction with life-as-a-whole”, for both groups. 
 
 
Regression analysis of Life Satisfaction on PWI domains for both groups 
 
 The PWI domains represent the first level deconstruction of the global 
“Satisfaction with life-as-a-whole” (GLS). It is proposed that each domain 
contributes unique variance when regressed with GLS. The combination of 
unique and shared variance by the PWI domains has been shown to account for 
approximately 50% to 60% of the variance in “satisfaction with life-as-a-whole” 
(International Wellbeing Group, 2013). However, it is unknown how much 
variance the PWI domains explain in “satisfaction-with-life-as-whole” for adults 
with autism.  
 
 Before proceeding with the regression analysis, the variables were 
assessed for multicollinearity and singularity. Table 28 shows the correlations 
between the PWI domains for the autism and general sample. 
Table 28 
Correlations between PWI domains for the autism and general sample 
 Autism Sample (n = 113) General Sample (n = 307) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Standard  -       -       
2 Health .49 -      .39 -      
3 Achieving .51 .62 -     .41 .33 -     
4 Relationships .40 .44 .52 -    .22 .25 .25 -    
5 Safety .49 .43 .49 .44 -   .22 .12 .16 .15 -   
6 Community .49 .49 .57 .41 .38 -  .20 .30 .37 .35 .33 -  
7 Future  .58 .56 .66 .48 .58 .55 - .44 .30 .53 .17 .29 .39 - 
 
The correlation matrices for both groups indicate no multicollinearity or 
singularity, indicating the variables are suitable for a multiple linear regression 
analysis to be reliable. As discussed in the method section, the sample size is 
adequate for both groups for a multiple regression to proceed with confidence.  
Table 29 shows the multiple regression examining the relative 
contribution for each PWI domains to the prediction of GLS for the autism and 
general sample. The table includes the unstandardised (B) and standardised 
regression coefficients (β), squared semi-partial correlations (sr2), R2 and adjusted 
R2 and unique and shared variance. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2013), in 
standard multiple regression, sr (semi-partial correlation) express the unique 
contribution between an IV and a DV when the influence of other IV’s in the 
model are removed. It is, thus a very useful measure of the importance of a 
predictor. In SPSS, sr2 values are provided in SPSS output under the column 
‘part’ and, when squared, provide the unique contribution of an IV to the total 
variance of a DV.  
Table 29 
Standard Multiple Regression of PWI domains on Life Satisfaction for the autism 
and general sample 
 Autism Sample (n = 113) General Sample (n=307) 
Variable B Β sr2 B β sr2 
1. Standard .15* .14 .01 1.45** .14 .01 
2. Health .13 .13 .01 .92* .11 .01 
3. Achieving .28*** .32 .04 4.07** .48 .15 
4. 
Relationships 
.19*** .25 .04 1.54** .20 .03 
5. Safety .05 .05 .00 -.78 -.07 .00 
6. Community .12 .13 .01 .49 .06 .00 
7. Future 
Security 
.09 .09 .00 .38 .05 .00 
 Unique Variance = .11 R
2 = .72 Unique Variance = 
.20 
R2 = .55 
 Shared Variance = .60  Adjusted R
2 
= .71 
Shared Variance = 
.34 
Adjusted R2 
= .54 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001    
 
The results show that there are some differences between the autism and 
general sample regarding the relative contribution of each PWI domain to the 
prediction of GLS. For the autism group, the R for the regression was 
significantly different from zero, F(7, 101) = 37.83, p < .01. The results reveal 
that three out of the seven PWI domains make a statistically significant unique 
prediction to GLS. These are Standard (sr2 = .01, p < .05), Achieving (sr2 = .04, p 
< .01) and Relationships (sr2 = .06, p < .04). The domains Achieving and 
Relationships makes the strongest unique prediction (4%), while the domain 
Standard makes the lowest prediction to “life-as-a-whole”. Together, the seven 
domains contribute just under 11% in unique variance and 60% of explained 
shared variance in GLS. 
 
The results reveal a similiar story for the general sample. The R for the 
regression was significantly different from zero, F(7, 289) = 49.86, p < .01. The 
results reveal that four out of the seven PWI domains make a statistically 
significant unique prediction to GLS. These are Standard (sr2 = .02, p < .01), 
Health (sr2 = .01, p < .05), Achieving (sr2 = .08, p < .01), and Relationships (sr2 = 
.04, p < .04). The domain Achieving makes the strongest unique prediction (15%) 
while the domains Health and Standard makes the lowest contribution to life-as-a-
whole. Together, the seven domains contribute 20% in unique variance and 54% 
of explained variance to life-as-a-whole.  
 
In summary, the regression analyses revealed similar results between the 
autism and general sample on the PWI domains that contributed to the prediction 
of life-as-a-whole. In the autism group, three out of the seven domains (standard, 
achieving, and relationships) make a unique prediction to life-as-a-whole, with 
the seven domains contributing 11% in unique variance and 60% of explained 
variance to the prediction of life-as-a-whole. For the general sample, four out of 
the seven life domains (standard, health, achieving, and relationships) contribute 
20% unique variance and 54% shared variance to life-as-a-whole.  
 
Demographic comparisons  
 
The aim of the next set of analyses is to examine if there are any 
differences between Australian adults with and without autism in regards to their 
subjective wellbeing based on their demographic profile. The analyses will 
include comparing household income, household composition, gender, age, full 
and part-time occupations and autism symptomology.  
 
Household Income 
 
 All participants were asked to indicate their household income. The 
income categories have been defined as: “less than $15,000”, “$15,000 - 
$30,000”, “$30,001 - $60,000”, “$60,001 - $100,000”, “$100,001 - $150,000”, 
“$151,001 - $250,000”, “$250,001 - $500,000”, “more than $500,000”, “I’m not 
sure” and “prefer not to answer”. Table 30 presents the distribution of household 
income according to these categories for both groups.  
 
Table 30 
Income Frequency for the autism and general sample 
 Autism sample (n = 113) General sample (n = 307) 
Income n % of sample n % of sample 
     <$15K  6 5.3 17 5.5 
   $15K - $30K 13 11.5 22 7.2 
   $30K - $60K  23 20.4 37 12.1 
   $60K - $100K 17 15.0 51 16.6 
   $100K - $150K 13 11.5 45 14.7 
   $150K - $250K 10 8.8 38 12.4 
   $250K - $500K 1 .9 11 3.6 
   >$500K  1 .9 4 1.3 
    Prefer not to say 8 7.1 17 5.5 
    I’m not sure 21 18.6 56 18.2 
 
In order to obtain higher N values and enable adequate comparisons 
between groups, the lowest two income categories (“less than $15,000” and 
“$15,000-$30,000”) were combined to form a single category (“less than 
$30,000). Furthermore, the highest three income brackets (“$150,001 - 
$250,000”, “$250,001 - $500,000” and “More than $500,000”) were combined to 
form the category “More than $150,000”. Table 31 shows the distribution of 
household income with the new categories.  
 
  
Table 31 
Income Frequency for the autism and general sample with changed variables 
 Autism sample (n = 113) General sample (n = 307) 
Income n % of sample n % of sample 
    Less than AUD 
$30,000 
19 17.1 39 12.7 
    AUD $30,001 - 
$60,000  
23 20.7 37 12.1 
    AUD $60,001 - 
$100,000  
17 15.0 51 16.6 
    AUD $100,001 - 
$150,000 
13 11.5 45 14.7 
    More than AUD 
$150,000 
12 10.8 53 17.3 
    Prefer not to say 8 7.2 17 5.5 
    I’m not sure 21 18.9 56 18.2 
 
 
To determine whether there was a difference between the two groups on 
household income a Chi-square was performed. There was no significant 
difference between the autism and general sample regarding household income χ2 
(4) = 8.01, p > .05.  
 
To examine if there were any differences between participants SWB 
scores with and without autism and household income, a two-way between-
groups analysis of variance was conducted. Participants were divided into seven 
categories (as mentioned above). The Levene’s Test of Equality of Error 
Variances was significant suggesting that the variance of dependent variables 
across both groups was not equal. Thus, a more stringent significance level (.01) 
was used to evaluate the results of the two-way ANOVA.  Table 32 shows the 
mean and standard deviations and ANOVA for SWB based on reported household 
income.  
 
  
Table 32 
Comparing the household income of Australian adults with and without autism 
 Autism Sample General Sample  
 N Mean  SD N Mean  SD ANOVA 
Income        
< $30,000 18 41.10 19.61 37 67.71 13.70 F(1, 53) = 34.19, p 
= .00 
$30,001 - $60K 23 50.53 19.74 35 72.07 14.13 F(1, 56) = 23.47, p 
= .00 
$60,001 - 
$100K 
15 57.48 13.69 51 71.28 11.86 F(1, 64) = 14.62 p 
= .09 
$100,001 - 
$150K 
12 56.55 22.54 43 74.20 11.15 F(1, 53) = 14.33, p 
= .00 
>$150,000K 12 65.66 16.92 53 77.11 10.26 F(1, 63) = 9.37, p 
= .00 
ANOVA F(6, 102) = 2.26, p 
<.05 
$30,000 < More 
than $150,000 
 
F(6, 281) = 2.70, p <.05 
$30,000 < $60-100K 
$30,000 < $100-150K 
$30,000 < More than $150,000 
 
 
The interaction effect between participants with and without autism and 
household income was not statistically significant F(6, 397) = 1.40, p = .21. There 
was a statistically significant main effect for those with and without autism, F(1, 
397) = 105.48, p = .00 with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .21), 
indicating participants without autism were more likely to have higher levels of 
SWB than participants with autism. Additionally, there was a statistically 
significant main effect for household income F(6, 397) = 5.56, p = .00, with a 
medium effect size (partial eta squared = .08), with the results indicating 
participants who had higher levels of household income had higher levels of 
SWB. Post-hoc tests revealed for the autism sample that there was a significant 
difference for the SWB scores. Those earning less than $30,000 had significantly 
lower SWB scores than those earning over $150,000. For the general sample, the 
data showed that the SWB scores are lower for those earning between $30,001 to 
$60,000 than people who earn between $100,001 - $150,000 or more than 
$150,000.  
 In summary, a two-way ANOVA found that participants who had higher 
household incomes have higher SWB scores than those with lower household 
incomes. Furthermore, participants with autism who had a household income of 
more than $150,000 had significantly higher SWB scores than participants with a 
household income below $30,000. The next set of analyses examines SWB and 
household composition.  
 
Household Composition 
The data for this section was derived from the following question, “please 
indicate from the list, your living arrangements”.  Table 33 presents the 
distribution of household composition for both the autism and general sample. 
 
Table 33 
Household composition for the autism and general sample 
 Autism sample n = 113 General sample n = 307 
 n  % of sample n  % of sample 
Household Composition    
  Alone 14 12.8 16 5.2 
  Partner Only 22 20.2 81 26.4 
  Partner & Children 18 16.5 48 15.6 
  With children 11 10.0 22 7.2 
  With parents 38 34.9 98 31.9 
  Other adults 6 6 32 10.4 
 
To determine whether there was a difference between the two groups on 
household composition a Chi-square was performed. There was no significant 
difference between the autism and general sample regarding household income χ2 
(4) = 8.01, p > .05.  
 
To examine if there were any differences between participants SWB 
scores with and without autism and household composition, a two-way between-
groups analysis of variance was conducted. Participants in the autism and general 
sample were divided into six groups, The Levene’s Test of Equality of Error 
Variances was significant suggesting that the variance of dependent variables 
across both groups was not equal. Thus, a more stringent significance level (.01) 
was used to evaluate the results of the two-way ANOVA. Table 34 shows the 
mean and standard deviations and ANOVAs for the PWI based on reported 
household composition. 
 
Table 34 
Comparing the household composition between the autism and general sample 
 Autism sample General sample  
 N Mean  SD N Mean  SD ANOVA 
Household        
Alone 14 53.91 18.55 16 68.37 15.65 F(1, 37) = 8.75, p < 
.01 
Partner only 22 58.54 21.46 79 75.56 11.46 F(1, 99) = 24.77, p 
< .01 
Partner and 
children 
18 58.33 15.83 48 75.15 12.10 F(1, 64) = 21.29, p 
<.01 
With children 11 53.13 14.30 20 72.62 11.36 F(1, 26) = 18.79, p 
<.01 
With parents 38 51.23 21.47 93 69.72 11.84 F(1, 127) = 34.18, 
p <.01 
Other adults 6 27.23 18.18 31 69.73 12.20 F(1, 40) = 39.87, p 
< .01 
ANOVA F(5, 103) = 2.79, p < .05 F(5, 281) = 3.19, p < 
.05 
 
 Other adults < partner, p 
<.01 
Partner only > with 
parents 
 
 Other adults < partner & 
children, p < .05 
  
 
The interaction effect between participants with and without autism and 
household composition was not statistically significant F(5, 396) = 1.73, p = .12. 
There was a statistically significant main effect for those with and without autism, 
F(1, 396) = 113.43, p = .00 with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .23), 
indicating participants without autism were more likely to have higher levels of 
SWB than participants with autism. Furthermore, there was also a statistically 
significant main effect for household composition F(5, 396) = 4.97, p = .00, with 
a medium effect size (partial eta squared = .06). Post-hoc tests revealed for the 
autism sample that participants who live with “other adults” have a significantly 
lower PWI scores than participants who live with a partner or a partner and child. 
Whereas for the general sample, participants who live with their parents have a 
lower PWI score than for participants who live with a partner.  
 
In summary, a two-way ANOVA found that for people with autism who 
live alone have significantly lower PWI scores than those living with a partner or 
partner and children. Whereas, for the general sample, participants who live with 
their parents have a lower PWI score than living with a partner. The next analyses 
examines the differences between genders.  
 
Gender 
Table 35 presents the distribution of gender composition for both the 
autism and general sample. 
 
Table 35 
Gender composition for the autism and general sample 
 Autism sample n = 109 General sample n = 307 
 n  % of sample n  % of sample 
Gender    
  Male 37 33.3 47 15.3 
  Female 72 64.9 250 81.4 
 
There is a significant difference between the autism and general sample 
with proportionally more females in the general sample χ2 (2) = 18.23, p < .01.  
 
To examine if there were any differences between participants PWI scores 
with and without autism and gender, a two-way between-groups analysis of 
variance was conducted. Participants in the autism and general sample were 
divided into two groups, based on their gender. The Levene’s Test of Equality of 
Error Variances was significant suggesting that the variance of dependent 
variables across both groups was not equal. Thus, a more stringent significance 
level (.01) was used to evaluate the results of the two-way ANOVA. Table 36 
shows the mean and standard deviations and ANOVAs for SWB based on 
reported genders. 
 
Table 36 
Comparing gender and SWB between the autism and general sample 
 Autism sample General sample  
 N Mean  SD N Mean  SD ANOVA 
Gender       
Male 35 50.69 21.96 44 71.68 11.98 F(1, 77) = 29.29, p 
< .01 
Female 72 54.55 19.25 243 72.54 12.26 F(1, 313) = 89.76, 
p < .01 
Other 2 42.54 34.49 1 49.87 - - 
ANOVA F(2, 106) = 0.70, p > .05 F(5, 285) = 1.79, p > .05  
 
The interaction effect between participants with and without autism and 
gender was not statistically significant F(2, 396) = 0.49, p = .61. The main effect 
for group showed statically lower SWB scores for the autism sample F(1, 396) = 
6.18, p = < .05 with a small effect size (partial eta squared = .02). The main effect 
for effect for gender was not significant F(2, 396) = 2.40, p = .09.  
 
In summary, for the autism and general sample, there is no difference 
between males and females on their SWB scores. However, males and females 
with autism report lower SWB scores than males and females from the general 
sample. The next analyses examines age. 
 
Age 
Participants were asked to specify their age. The age categories have been 
defined as “18-25 years”, “26-35 years”, “36-45 years”, “46-55 years”, “56-65 
years” and “66 years and older”. Table 37 presents the distribution of age groups 
for both the autism and general sample. 
 
 
 
Table 37 
Age categories for the autism and general sample 
 Autism sample (n = 113) General sample (n = 307) 
Age n % of sample n % of sample 
18-25 45 40.5 145 47.2 
26-35 30 27.0 75 24.4 
36-45 21 18.9 30 9.8 
46-55 11 9.9 28 9.1 
56-65 4 3.6 17 5.5 
65+ 0 0 3 1.0 
 
In order to obtain higher N values to enable adequate comparisons 
between groups, the age groups “46-55” and “56-65” and “65+” were combined 
to form a single category “46 years and older”. Table 38 shows the distribution of 
age groups with the new categories.  
Table 38 
Age categories for the autism and general sample with changed variables 
 Autism sample (n = 113) General sample (n = 307) 
Age n % of sample n % of sample 
18-25 45 40.5 145 47.2 
26-35 30 27.0 75 24.4 
36-45 21 18.9 30 9.8 
46+ 15 13.5 48 15.6 
 
 
There is no significant difference between the autism and general sample 
with regards to age distribution χ2 (3) = 6.34, p > .05.  
 
To examine differences between participant SWB with and without autism 
and between age groups, a two-way between-groups analysis of variance was 
conducted. Participants were divided by age (4 levels) and disability group (2 
levels). Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances was significant suggesting 
that the variance of dependent variables across both groups was not equal. Thus, a 
more stringent significance level (.01) was adopted. Table 39 shows the means, 
standard deviations, and ANOVAs. 
 
 
Table 39 
Comparing age groups between the autism and general sample  
 Autism sample General sample  
 N Mean  SD N Mean  SD ANOVA 
Age        
18-25  44 55.88 18.71 136 70.02 11.82 F(1, 37) = 8.75, p 
< .01 
26-35 29 45.66 21.89 74 73.66 11.07 F(1, 99) = 24.77, p 
< .01 
36-45 21 52.01 20.55 30 74.229 13.16 F(1, 64) = 21.29, p 
<.01 
46+ 15 60.80 18.30 48 75.59 13.64 F(1, 61) = 11.35, p 
<.01 
ANOVA F(3, 105) = 2.41, p > .05 F(3, 284) = 3.38, p < .05  
 
The main effect for group showed lower wellbeing for the autism sample 
F(1, 396) = 119.03, p = < .01 with a large effect size (partial eta squared = .23). 
There was also a statistically significant main effect for age F(3, 389) = 3.37, p = 
< .05, with a small effect size (partial eta squared = .03). The interaction was 
statistically significant F(4, 389) = 4.26, p = <.01. Post-hoc tests for age groups 
revealed for the autism sample, there were no significant differences in SWB. 
However, for the general sample, SWB increases with ages.  
 
In summary, for each age group, people with autism had lower SWB than 
people without autism. However, while SWB increased with age for the general 
sample, this did not occur for people with autism. The next analyses examines the 
impact of occupations and SWB.  
 
Occupations 
 
Table 40 presents the distribution of part and full-time occupations. 
  
  
Table 40 
Full and Part-Time Occupations Frequency for the autism and general sample 
 Autism sample (n = 113) General sample (n = 307) 
Full-time occupations n % of sample n % of sample 
   Employment 28 25.2 95 30.9 
   Home or family care 13 11.7 0 0 
   Study 34 30.6 135 44 
   Volunteer 13 11.5 36 11.7 
Part-time occupations     
   Employment 27 24.3 83 27 
   Volunteer 13 11.7 36 11.7 
   Casual employment 23 20.7 91 29.6 
   Unemployed 20 18.0 31 10.1 
   None of these 36 32.4 84 27.4 
 
 To examine differences between the two sample and PWI scores, 
independent sample t-tests were performed. To reduce the chance of Type 1 error, 
a Bonferroni adjustment was applied (.05/7), with a new alpha level of .007. 
Where the Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances was significant, the table 
Equal Variances not assumed was used in SPSS. Table 41 shows the mean, 
standard deviations and t-tests of full-time and part-time occupations between the 
autism and general sample.  
 
Table 41 
Comparing full and part-time occupations of Australian adults with and without 
autism 
 Autism Sample General Sample  
 N Mean  SD N Mean  SD T-tests 
Full-time         
   Employed 28 58.23 22.41 94 77.79 10.09 t(30.33) = 4.49, p = .000 
   Study 33 61.46 18.65 126 71.25 11.53 t(38.64) = 2.88, p = .007 
Part-time         
   Employment 27 61.03 18.02 80 72.46 12.70 t(105) = 3.62, p = .000 
   Study 13 58.74 17.86 32 70.94 13.19 t(43) = 2.53, p = .015 
   Volunteer 13 57.35 22.85 36 72.49 10.56 t(13.89) = 2.30, p = .037 
   Casual 
employment 
22 59.89 19.59 87 72.05 11.47 t(24.81) = 2.81, p = .009 
   Unemployed 20 50.04 24.19 29 62.81 11.40 t(24.88) = 2.20, p = .037 
 
Consistent with the previous results, people with autism reported generally 
lower SWB. This was significant in relation to people in full and part-time 
employment.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
 It is self-evident that many people with autism are likely to face more 
challenges in terms of education, paid employment, independent living and social 
relationships (Billstedt et al., 2005; Eaves and Ho, 2008; Howlin et al., 2004) than 
people from the general population. While research has examined the broad 
Quality of Life construct among people with autism (Cottenceau et al., 2012; 
Helles et al., 2016; Jennes-Coussens, Magil-Evans and Koning, 2006; Renty and 
Toeyers, 2006; van Hejist & Geurts, 2015) no research to date has specifically 
investigated the Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) of Australian adults with autism. 
Thus, the aim of this investigation was to provide comparative data between 
people with and without autism on their self-reported levels of SWB.   
 
It is not surprising that people with autism report significantly lower levels 
of SWB (52.97 points) compared to Australians from the general population 
(SWB 72.32) (Cummins, 2010; Cummins et al., 2003). These results suggest that 
people with autism are more likely to be experiencing negative challenges in their 
lives than are people from the general population. Furthermore, these results also 
suggest that the autism sample has a higher percentage of people who are likely to 
be experiencing homeostatic challenge or defeat. That is, the autism sample is 
more vulnerable to depression compared to the general sample.  
 
 It is known that when a challenging agent becomes too strong, 
homeostasis will become overwhelmed, and control of SWB will shift from 
homeostasis to the challenging agent. Thus, SWB will fall, and this may be 
experienced as depression (Cummins, 2010). Challenging agents that are likely to 
impact SWB include unemployment, or income under $30,000, as well as a 
disconnection from family or friends.  
  
Income is known to be a protective factor for SWB as it allows a person to 
defend against homeostatic failure or assist in homeostatic recovery. It is argued 
by Cummins (2010) that income protects wellbeing by preventing certain 
negative events from occurring. For instance, having income means that a person 
can buy food, pay their bills, as well as use income to pay for products and 
services. Among the general sample, a household income of $30,000 or above has 
been found to be associated with SWB scores that fall within the normative range. 
These findings are in line with previous research (Capic et al, 2015; Cummins et 
al., 2009). However, these findings are not replicated among the autism sample. 
First of all, people with autism who report a household income between $30,000 
and $60,000 have an SWB score of 50.53 points. Those with autism, who report a 
household income above $150,000, have an average SWB of 65.66 points. This 
suggests, that people with autism are likely to face a number of more challenges 
relative to the general population. While SWB significantly increases as 
household income increases, the fact that people with autism that have a 
household income of $150,00 or more, show that income alone is not enough for 
SWB to move in the normal range (i.e., above 70 points). This indicates that 
people with autism, regardless of income, are likely to require additional support. 
  
Relationships are another important external buffer that can be a 
protective factor for SWB. The stress buffering theory (Cohen & Wills, 1985) of 
social support suggests that during times of stress, it is not the amount of support 
that is available; rather, it’s the quality of the support that predicts wellbeing. 
Within Australia, the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index has shown that people 
living with a partner, or with partner and children, report higher levels of SWB 
compared to people living on their own (Cummins et al., 2009). This current 
research found similar results among the general sample. However, for the autism 
sample, there were significant differences. Whilst, the highest level of SWB was 
found among those who live with a partner (58.54 points) and partner and 
children (58.33 points) these were still significantly lower than the general 
population. It is known that social communication and social interaction can be 
difficult for people with autism. The time that may be required to process 
information (Reed & McCarthy, 2012), as well as understand topics, or engage in 
bi-directional conversations can be difficult for some people with autism (Carters, 
Davis, Klin & Volkmar, 2005; Church, Alisanski, & Amanullah, 2000). Thus, it 
can be difficult for individuals with autism to be involved in conversations with 
social partners (Laugeson et al., 2010) and this may impact on their SWB. 
However, future research is needed to explore the relationship between social 
communication, social interaction and SWB among people with autism.  
  
Perhaps, the most concerning finding were that people with autism who 
live with other adults report an average SWB score of 27.23 points compared to 
the general sample, living with other adults, who report an SWB score of 69.73 
points. It is possible that there are a number of additional challenges impacting on 
the SWB of adults with autism living with other adults. As mentioned above, 
impairments in social communication and social interaction may impact on their 
ability to socialise, which could be a challenge that impacts on their SWB. 
Further, living with other adults likely means that these individuals need to pay 
for rent, food, and other expenses. It is known that people with autism who have 
employment, are more likely to have poorly paid jobs or jobs that do not provide 
them with adequate financial support to live independently (Howlin et al., 2004). 
Thus, if their income is not adequate to prevent negative events from occurring, 
this is likely to also impact upon their SWB. However, some caution needs to be 
applied to these findings, as these results are based on a group of six participants 
who lived with other adults, and future research is needed to further validate these 
findings. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that a significant amount of support 
is required for adults who live with other adults.  
In terms of age groups, there were significant differences between people 
with and without autism. For the general sample, SWB increased as age groups 
increased. While the age group 18-25 years had an average SWB score of 70.02 
points, the age group 46 years and older had an SWB average of 75.59 points, 
which is in line with previous research conducted by the Australian Unity 
Wellbeing Index (Capic et al., 2015). However, the story is different for people 
with autism. It was found that people with autism report significantly lower levels 
of SWB for each age category than the general population. However, among the 
autism sample, a closer inspection of the results revealed that the lowest level of 
SWB was for people in the age category of 26-35 years. This is contrary to the 
general sample, where SWB increased as age groups increased. These results 
indicate that the age category of 26-35 years may be more difficult for a person 
with autism than any other time in their adult life. Within western cultures, the 
age category of 26-35 years is when milestones such as moving out of parent’s 
home, completing post-secondary vocations or higher education, and living 
independently are likely to occur. Future research is needed to explore the 
challenges adults with autism are likely to face in the age category of 26-35 years, 
so that appropriate support services may be provided.  
 
Further information on the construction of SWB may be obtained by 
examining the unique variance contributed by each domain of the Personal 
Wellbeing Index (PWI; standard of living, health, achieving, personal 
relationships, safety, community, future security) when regressed against the 
global questions life-as-a-whole. That is, which PWI domains predict satisfaction 
with life-as-a-whole, and does this prediction differ between people with and 
without autism.  
 
The PWI domains represent the first level of deconstruction of the global 
satisfaction with life-as-a-whole and have been shown to account 30-60% of 
unique and shared variance (International Wellbeing Group, 2013). Results from 
the regression analysis show similarities between people with and without autism. 
For both samples three life domains (Standard of Living, Achieving, and 
Relationships) predicted GLS. However, these results are contrary to the PWI 
guidelines, which state the scale is constructed such that each domain on the PWI 
contributes unique variance (International Wellbeing Group, 2013). These 
guidelines are not always met, with the domains of Satisfaction with Safety often 
not contributing unique variance in general Australian samples (Cummins et al., 
2009). Furthermore, research by Weinberg (2011) found among Australians and 
Jewish Australians that only three PWI domains (standard of living, achieving, 
and personal relationships) contributed unique variance to the global question 
satisfaction with-life-as-a-whole.  
 
Nevertheless, these current findings have important implications for 
service providers in meeting the needs of people with autism. As these results 
indicate, an important consideration in the maintenance of SWB for people with 
and without autism is standard of living, personal relationships and achieving.  
 
Standard of living, or also known as income, has the power to protect 
SWB as a flexible resource to assist homeostasis (Cummins, 2000). Having 
sufficient money allows people to minimise unwanted challenges in their day-to-
day lives. The power of money is particularly evident for adults with autism. It is 
known that adults with autism are more likely to encounter discrimination, to be 
unemployed, and may be more dependent on carers. So for people with autism, 
the role of money to assist with standard of living is magnified. This is 
highlighted in the current study as SWB significantly increases as household 
income increases. Thus, having money to improve standard of living should assist 
homeostasis to maintain SWB for people with autism. However, the fact that 
people with autism who have a household income of $150,000 or more, show that 
income alone is not enough for SWB to move in the normal range (i.e., above 70 
points). Nonetheless, it will be important for service providers and government 
policy to assist people with autism to obtain adequate and meaningful 
employment, so that people with autism can have a standard of living that is 
equivalent to the general population.   
 
The second significant domain is satisfaction with personal relationships, 
which involves the mutual sharing of intimacies and support. There is strong 
research that attests to the power of such relationships to moderate the influence 
of stressors on SWB (Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990). Thus, it appears that for 
people with autism, personal relationships are an important factor for their overall 
SWB, just as people from the general population. However, people with autism 
report significantly lower levels of satisfaction with personal relationships than 
the general population. This may be due to one of the core features of autism 
being an impairment in social communication and social interaction. These 
deficits may make it more difficult to form quality friendships. Previous research 
among the general population  has found satisfaction with social relationships is 
strongly associated with happiness (Chadsey & Beyer, 2001), self-esteem and 
confidence (Srivastava, 2001). Thus, it will be important for service providers, as 
well as people who work with people who have autism, to foster environments in 
which meaningful social relationships can take place.  
 
Achieving in life is the third significant domain that assists SWB. In their 
review, McKnight and Kashdan (2009) state that purpose in life is a “cognitive 
process that defines life goals and provides personal meaning” (p. 242). A large 
body of literature shows that when people are deprived of this homeostatic buffer, 
for example during unemployment, or losing an active role in their family 
(Schaffer, 1953), their SWB is likely to be threatened (Clark, Diener, Georgellis, 
& Lucas, 2008). People with autism are at an increased risk of failing to secure 
this buffer as shown by their significantly lower levels of satisfaction with 
achieving than people from the general population. A large concern is the fact that 
people with autism are more likely to be unemployed than the general population 
(ABS, 2015). It is important for service providers to assist people with autism, to 
determine their life goals and what provides them personal meaning, so their 
SWB can be improved. 
 
In summary, three domains (standard of living, personal relationships, and 
achieving) were found to provide significant unique variance to the global 
question satisfaction-with-life-as-a-whole, for both the autism and general 
sample. Together, these three domains have a strong ability to support SWB 
homeostasis. However, these three domains are also likely to be the most difficult 
resources to ensure among adults with autism. It will be important for service 
providers and government policy to assist adults with autism to obtain meaningful 
employment, which might assist with standard of living and achieving in life, as 
well as support to form meaningful social relationships. Future research is needed 
on how best to support adults with autism to obtain and stay in meaningful 
employment as well as how to best support people with autism maintaining 
quality friendships.  
  
Chapter Eight: Theoretical Investigation 
 
Two major theoretical investigations are presented and analysed in this 
section. First, the relationship between Homeostatically Protected Mood 
(HPMood), personality, and Subjective Wellbeing (SWB). Secondly, the 
relationship between HPMood and the buffer variables to SWB in adults 
experiencing homeostatic challenge.  
 
Overview 
 
One of the most interesting findings in the SWB literature is that SWB is 
not free to vary over the entire range of values offered by a particular 
measurement instrument. Rather, SWB is held around a set-point and is rather 
stable across time (Cummins, 1995; Headey and Wearing, 1989, 1992; Eid & 
Diener, 2004; Schimmack et al., 2002). In an attempt to explain the stability in 
SWB, it has been proposed by some researchers that personality is the strongest 
predictor of satisfaction judgments (e.g., DeNeeve & Cooper, 2001; Headey & 
Wearing, 1989, 1992; Vitterso & Nilsen, 2002). However, research conducted by 
Davern et al. (2007) and Blore et al. (2010), suggest that contrary to previous 
research, personality fails to make a contribution to SWB when HPMood is 
accounted for. Thus, the aim of this set of analyses is to test (a) the relative 
contribution of the adjectives comprising HPMood (happy, content and alert) to 
the prediction of SWB, and (b) test the relative contribution of HPMood and 
personality (i.e., extraversion and emotional stability) to the prediction of SWB 
among Australians with and without autism.  
 
Predicting SWB with HPMood 
 To test the relative contribution of HPMood (consisting of the adjectives 
happy, content and alert) to the prediction of SWB, a multiple regression will be 
performed for both the autism and general sample. Before proceeding with the 
multiple regression, the variables were assessed for multicollinearity and 
singularity. Table 42 displays the correlations between the variables for the 
autism and general samples.  
 
Table 42 
Correlations between variables for the autism and general sample 
  Autism sample 
n = 113 
General Sample 
 n = 307 
 Variable 1. 2. 3. 4 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. SWB -    -    
2. Happy .84** -   .69** -   
3. Content .47** .50** -  .47** .41** -  
4. Alert .80** .79** .48** - .66** .80** .52** - 
 
A first impression is that the pattern of correlations is remarkable similar 
within both groups It is also evident that no variables are singular (above 0.90), 
indicating that the variables for both groups are suitable for a multiple regression. 
Table 43 shows the multiple regression for the autism and general sample.  
 
Table 43 
Predicting SWB using HPMood for the autism and general sample 
  Autism sample  
n = 113 
General sample  
n = 307 
  DV:SWB B β sr2 DV:SWB B β sr2 
1. Content .84 4.36* .55 .11 .69 2.67** .39 .05 
2. Alert .47 0.41 .05 .00 .47 1.21** .19 .02 
3. Happy .80 2.62* .34 .04 .66 1.63** .25 .02 
     Unique Variance = .15    R2 = .76 Unique Variance = .09    R2 = .51 
      Shared Variance = .60 Adjusted R2 = .75 Shared Variance = .42 Adjusted R2 = .51 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001    
 
 
The results show that there are some differences in the contribution of 
HPMood variables to the prediction of SWB for adults with and without autism. 
For the autism group, the R for the regression was significantly different from 
zero, F(3, 107) = 110.89, p < .001. Two independent variables contributed 
significant unique variance to the prediction of SWB; content (sr2 = .11) and 
happy (sr2 = .04). The affect alert failed to make a unique prediction to SWB. 
Altogether 75% of the variability in SWB can be predicted from scores on these 
three IVs that make up HPMood.  
 
For adults in the general sample, the R for this regression was significantly 
different from zero, F(3, 286) = 100.60, p < .001. Compared to the autism group, 
where only ‘Content’ and ‘Happy’ contribute significant unique variance to SWB, 
all three affects that make up HPMood contribute significant unique variance to 
the prediction of SWB for adults without autism; content (sr2 = .08), happy (sr2 = 
.02) and alert (sr2 = .01). For the general sample, 67% of the variability in SWB 
can be predicted from scores on these three IVs for the general sample. 
 
In summary, only two out of three affects that make up HPMood, ‘happy’ 
and ‘content’ contributed significant unique variance to the prediction of SWB for 
adults with autism. Whereas, for adults without autism, all three affects that 
makeup HPMood contributed significant unique variance to the prediction of 
SWB. 
 
Predicting SWB with HPMood and Personality  
The aim of the next set of analyses was to determine how much variance 
in SWB can be accounted for by extraversion and emotional stability, after 
removing variance attributed by HPMood. Before proceeding with a hierarchal 
multiple regression, the variables were assessed for multicollinearity and 
singularity. Table 44 displays the correlations between the variables for the 
autism and general sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 44 
Correlations between variables for the autism and general sample 
  Autism sample 
n = 113 
General sample  
N = 307 
 Variable 1. 2. 3. 4 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. SWB -    -    
2. HPMood .83** -   .80** -   
3. Extraversion .14 .23* -  .31** .34** -  
4. Emotional 
Stability 
-.43** -.47* -.13 - -
.49** 
-
.57** 
-
.25** 
- 
 
 The first impression of Table 44 is that the correlations appear to be fairly 
similar between groups, with the exception of personality scales and SWB. The 
correlation matrices indicate that no variables were singular (above 0.90), 
indicating that the variables for both groups were suitable for a hierarchal 
multiple regression. The hierarchal multiple regression for the autism sample is 
presented in Table 45 and for the general sample in Table 46. 
 
Table 45 
Predicting SWB using the personality dimensions of extraversion and emotional 
stability for the autism sample (n = 113) 
 R2 Adj. R2 ∆R2 B SE B b sr² 
Step 1        
 Extraversion    -.15 .08 -.18 .03 
     Emotional Stability    .54** .19 .27 .07 
 .09 .08      
        
Step 2        
 Extraversion    .03 .05 .04 .00 
 Emotional Stability    .02 .12 .01 .00 
 HPMood    .78** .06 .84 .60 
 .70 .69 .60     
*p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
 
 A hierarchical multiple regression was used to determine how much 
variance in SWB can be accounted for by extraversion and emotional stability, 
after removing variance attributed by HPMood. Extraversion and Emotional 
Stability was entered at step 1, explaining 9% of the variance in SWB. After the 
entry of HPMood at Step 2, the total variance explained by the model as a whole 
was 70%, F(3, 100) = 76.61, p < .01. The personality scales of extraversion and 
emotional stability did not explain any additional variance in SWB, after 
controlling for HPMood, R squared change = .60, F change (1, 100) = 199.05, p 
< .05. In the final model, HPMood was statistically significant, while neither 
extraversion nor emotional stability accounted for any additional variance in the 
autism sample.  
  
 The hierarchal multiple regression for the general sample is presented 
below in Table 46. 
 
Table 46 
Predicting SWB using the personality dimensions of extraversion and emotional 
stability for the general sample (n = 307) 
 R2 Adj. R2 ∆R2 B SE B b sr² 
Step 1        
 Extraversion    -.23** .03 -.33 .10 
     Emotional Stability    .36** .09 .18 .01 
 .12 .12      
        
Step 2        
 Extraversion    -.03 .02 -.05 .00 
 Emotional Stability    .05 .06 .03 .00 
 HPMood    .75** .03 .79 .52 
 .65 .65 .53     
*p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
The results for the general sample tell a similar story to the autism sample 
above.  
Extraversion and emotional stability were entered at Step 1, explaining 12% of 
the variance in SWB, which is three percent more than the autism sample. After 
entry of the HPMood scale at Step 2, the total variance explained by the model as 
a whole was 65%, F(3, 277) = 92.03, p < .01. The extraversion and emotional 
stability scales did not explain any additional variance in SWB, after controlling 
for HPMood, R squared change = .53, F change (1, 277) = 251.86, p < .01. In the 
final model, HPMood was statistically significant, while neither extraversion nor 
emotional stability accounted for any additional variance in the general sample. 
 
 In summary, these results support the findings from Daven et al (2007) 
and Blore et al. (2010), and that the personality traits of extraversion and 
emotional stability fail to make a contribution to SWB when HPMood is 
accounted for Australian adults with and without autism.  
 
Predicting SWB using autism symptomology and HPMood 
The aim of the next set of analyses is to determine how much variance in 
SWB can be accounted for by the AQ-5, after removing variance attributed by 
HPMood. Before proceeding with a hierarchal multiple regression, the variables 
were assessed for multicollinearity and singularity. Table 47 displays the 
correlations between the variables for the autism and general sample 
 
Table 47 
Correlations between variables for the autism and general sample 
  Autism sample 
n = 113 
General sample  
n = 307 
 Variable 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 
1. SWB -   -   
2. AQ-5 -.22* -  -.26* -  
3. HPMood .83** -.30** - .71** -.25** - 
 
 A first impression of Table 47 is that the correlations are fairly similar for 
the two sample. The correlation matrices indicate that no variables were singular 
(above 0.90), indicating that the variables for both groups were suitable for a 
hierarchal multiple regression. The hierarchal multiple regression for the autism 
sample is presented in Table 48 and for the general sample in Table 49. 
 
Table 48 
Predicting SWB using the AQ-5 for the autism sample (n = 113) 
 R2 Adj. R2 ∆R2 B SE B b sr² 
Step 1        
 AQ-5    -.28* .12 -.22 .05 
 .05 .04 .05     
        
Step 2        
 AQ-5    .03 .07 .03 .00 
 HPMood    .79*** .06 .84 .65 
 .70 .69 .65     
*p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
A hierarchical multiple regression was used to determine how much 
variance in SWB can be accounted for by the AQ-5, after removing variance 
attributed by HPMood. The AQ-5 was entered at step 1, explaining 5% of the 
variance in SWB. After the entry of HPMood at Step 2, the total variance 
explained by the model as a whole was 69%, F(2, 97) = 110.99, p < .01. The AQ-
5 did not explain any additional variance in SWB, after controlling for HPMood, 
R squared change = .65, F change (1, 97) = 206.11, p < .01. In the final model, 
HPMood was statistically significant, while the AQ-5 do not account for any 
additional variance in the autism sample.  
  
 The hierarchal multiple regression for the general sample is presented 
below in Table 49. 
 
  
Table 49 
Predicting SWB using the AQ-5 for the general sample (n = 307) 
 R2 Adj. R2 ∆R2 B SE B b sr² 
Step 1        
 AQ-7    -.30** .07 -.26 .07 
 .07 .07 .07     
        
Step 2        
 AQ-7    -.11 .05 -.10 .00 
 HPMood    .54*** .04 .68 .44 
 .51 .50 .44     
*p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
The results for the general sample tell a similar story to the autism sample 
above.  
The AQ-5 was entered at Step 1, explaining 7% of the variance in SWB, which is 
two percent more than the autism sample. After entry of the HPMood scale at 
Step 2, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 50%, F(2, 260) = 
134.08, p < .01. The AQ-5 did not explain any additional variance in SWB, after 
controlling for HPMood, R squared change = .44, F change (1, 260) = 231.58, p 
< .01. In the final model, HPMood was statistically significant, while the AQ-5 
did not account for any additional variance in the autism sample.  
 In summary, these results support the findings from Daven et al (2007) 
and Blore et al. (2010), and that HPMood accounts for the majority of variance in 
SWB.  
 
Examining the relationship between high and low Subjective Wellbeing  
 
Homeostasis Theory of Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) allows people to be 
categorised into relatively homogenous groups based on their level of SWB as: 
people with normal levels of SWB (SWB > 70 points), people likely to be 
experiencing some level of homeostatic challenge (SWB between 50 and 69 
points) and people most likely to experiencing homeostatic defeat (SWB < 50 
points).  
The theory asserts that under normal, unthreatening conditions, set-point 
levels of HPMood will be maintained, thus, so to will levels of SWB. 
Furthermore, because SWB is not likely to be challenged, it is predicted that the 
cognitive buffers will remain un-activated and SWB will be driven by HPMood. 
Based on this reasoning, it is predicted for both the autism and general sample, 
that for people with SWB in the normal range, the cognitive buffers will not 
contribute significant variance in SWB.  
 
However, when SWB homeostasis is under threat, the cognitive buffers 
will be activated in an attempt to restore and then maintain SWB within the 
normal range. Thus, for people with SWB between 50 and 69 points , it is 
predicted that the cognitive buffers will account for unique variance in SWB 
above HPMood (which is operating at a diminished capacity).  
 
Finally, homeostatic defeat occurs when a level of challenge has reached a 
threshold to which the system cannot adapt. As a consequence, control over SWB 
will be taken away from homeostasis and handed to the external, challenging 
agent(s). For these people, a loss of HPMood and defeat of the cognitive buffers 
is predicted.   
 
 The aim of the next set of analysis is to examine the above propositions 
among those with and without autism. The first of these analyses will examine the 
participants with SWB >70 points in both the autism and general sample.  
 
SWB 70 points and above  
 To test the relative contribution of HPMood and the buffer variables (self-
esteem, optimism and perceived control) to the prediction of SWB scores > 70 
points a multiple regression will be performed for both the autism and general 
sample. It is predicted that HPMood will provide unique variance to SWB and 
that the cognitive buffers will remain un-activated. However, before proceeding 
with the multiple regression, the variables were assessed for multicollinearity and 
singularity. Table 50 displays the means, standard deviations and correlations for 
the autism and general sample.  
 
Table 50 
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations between variables for SWB > 70 
points for the autism and general sample  
 Autism sample (n = 23) General sample (n = 173) 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
SWB 78.45 7.09 -     81.04 6.48 -     
HPMood 79.17 13.16 .52** -    79.43 12.22 .53** -    
Self-Esteem 80.94 9.14 .69** .79** -   81.23 12.71 .45** .58** -   
Optimism 67.54 15.28 .55** .60** .72** -  72.51 16.30 .37** .51** .56** -  
Control 68.75 19.51 .33 .48* .39 .31 - 74.61 16.26 .31** .37** .50** .46** - 
 
 
 A first impression of Table 50 is that the SWB scores are remarkably 
similar within both groups, and that SWB scores for the autism and general 
sample are almost at the theoretical limit of 80 points (Cummins et al, 2014). It is 
also evident that no variables are singular, indicating that the variables for both 
groups are suitable for a multiple regression. However, it should be noted that 
there are 23 cases in the autism sample with SWB above 70 points. According to 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2013), this does not meet the adequate statistical power for 
such analysis to be reliable. As a consequence, the regression analysis for the 
autism sample will be interpreted as a pilot only.  
  
Table 51 
Predicting SWB using HPMood and the buffer variables for participants with 
SWB >70 points 
  Autism sample  
n = 23 
General sample  
n = 173 
  DV:SWB B β sr2 DV:SWB B β sr2 
HPMood .52 -.11 -.20 .01 .53 .21** .39 .09 
Self-esteem .69 .60* .76 .15 .45 .10* .19 .02 
Optimism  .55 .04 .07 .00 .37 .02 .05 .00 
Control .33 .05 .14 .01 .31 .02 .05 .00 
     Unique Variance = .16    R2 = .51 Unique Variance = .11    R2 = .32 
      Shared Variance = .35 Adjusted R2 = .41 Shared Variance = .19 Adjusted R2 = .30 
 
The results show that there are some differences between the autism and 
general sample on the predictors of >70 points for SWB. For the autism sample, 
the R for the regression was significantly different from zero, F(4, 18) = 4.75, p 
< .01. Surprisingly, HPMood failed to make a unique prediction to SWB. 
However, the cognitive buffer, self-esteem, contributed significant unique 
variance to the prediction of SWB (sr2 = .15), while optimism and perceived 
control failed to make a unique prediction to SWB. Altogether, 51% (adjusted 
41%), of the variability in SWB (for participants with SWB > 70 points) can be 
predicted by HPMood and the buffer variables. However, these results need to be 
treated with caution, as there were not enough participants for a reliable analysis 
to be conducted.   
 
For adults in the general sample, the R for the regression was significantly 
different from zero, F(4, 104) = 12.43, p < .01. HPMood and self-esteem 
contributed significant unique variance to the prediction of SWB. The cognitive 
buffers, optimism and perceived control failed to make a unique prediction to 
SWB. Altogether, 34% (adjusted 31%) of the variability in SWB (for participants 
with SWB > 70 points) can be predicted by HPMood and the buffer variables. 
 
 In summary, this analyses examined a sub-category of participants in the 
autism and general sample who were unlikely to be experiencing challenging 
conditions. Overall, the SWB mean scores between the autism (M = 78.45) and 
the general sample (M = 81.22) were fairly similar. It was predicted that because 
SWB is not likely to be challenged, that the cognitive buffers will remain un-
activated and HPMood will provide statistically significant unique variance to the 
prediction of SWB. However, for the autism sample, only self-esteem was found 
to provide unique variance to the prediction of SWB. Whereas, for the general 
sample, HPMood and Self-esteem were found to provide unique variance to the 
prediction of SWB. The implications of these findings, including the low N for 
the autism sample will be discussed in the discussion. The next analysis examines 
the relative contribution of HPMood and the buffer variables in a category of 
participants who have SWB scores between 50 and 69 points. 
 
SWB between 50 to 69 points 
 
When SWB homeostasis is under threat, it is predicted that the system of 
cognitive buffers will be activated in an attempt to restore and then maintain SWB 
within the normal range. Thus, for people with SWB between 50 and 69 points, it 
is predicted that the cognitive buffers will explain unique variance in SWB above 
HPMood (which is operating at a diminished capacity). However, before 
proceeding with a hierarchal multiple regression, the variables were assessed for 
multicollinearity and singularity. Table 52 displays the means, standard 
deviations, between the variables for the autism and general sample.  
  
Table 52 
Predicting SWB using HPMood and the buffer variables for participants with 
SWB between 50 and 69 points 
 General sample (n = 38) General sample (n = 110) 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
SWB 61.27 5.80 -     61.51 4.99 -     
HPMood 62.89 13.51 .50** -    62.85 12.20 .48** -    
Self-Esteem 64.21 20.07 .29 .61** -   62.46 15.71 .31** .52** -   
Optimism 55.70 20.46 .08 .44** .65** -  56.88 17.54 .29** .42** .53** -  
Control 62.63 20.05 .08 .44** .62** .66** - 67.98 15.04 .55** .47** .32** .30** - 
*p <.05. **p <.01 
 
  
Examining Table 52, it can be seen that overall SWB between the autism 
and general sample is similar at approximately 60 points. Furthermore, Table 52 
indicates that the variables are suitable for a multiple regression. However, as 
before, the autism sample does not have enough participants for a reliable 
interpretation of the results, thus they will be treated as pilot information only. 
Table 53 shows the multiple regression for the both the autism and general 
sample.  
 
Table 53 
Predicting SWB using HPMood and the buffer variables for participants with 
SWB between 50 to 69 points 
  Autism sample 
n = 38 
General sample  
n = 110 
  DV:S
WB B β sr
2 DV:SWB B β sr
2 
HPMood .50 .24** .55 .19 .48 .10* .25 .04 
Self-esteem .29 .05 .16 .01 .31 .01 .02 .00 
Optimism  .08 -.05 -.16 .01 .29 .02 .06 .00 
Control .08 -.05 -.16 .01 .55 .13** .40 .16 
     Unique Variance = .20    R2 = .30. Unique Variance = .20    R2 = .36 
      Shared Variance = .10 Adjusted R2 = .21 Shared Variance = .13 Adjusted R2 = .33 
 
 The results from Table 52 are similar between the autism and general 
sample. For the autism sample, the R for the regression was significantly different 
from zero, F(4, 33) = 3.46, p < .05. Only HPMood contributed significant unique 
variance to the prediction of SWB. The three cognitive buffers failed to make any 
unique variance to the prediction of SWB.  
 
 The results for the general sample tell a similar story to the autism sample. 
The R for the regression was significantly different from zero, F(4, 71) = 10.14, p 
< .01. HPMood and Perceived Control contributed significant unique variance to 
the prediction of SWB. It is important to note, for the autism sample, HPMood 
contributed 19% of the unique variance, whereas, for the general sample, 
HPMood only contributed 4% of unique variance to the prediction of SWB. 
 
 In summary, HPMood was found to provide unique variance to the 
prediction of SWB in both the autism and general sample. Surprisingly, the 
cognitive buffers for both the autism and general sample did not provide any 
unique variance to the prediction of SWB. These results will be discussed further 
in the discussion.  
 
The next set of analysis will examine the relative contribution of HPMood 
and the buffer variables in a category of participants who have SWB scores below 
50 points. 
 
 
SWB below 50 points  
Homeostasis theory asserts that people who have an SWB score below 50 
points are likely to be experiencing homeostatic defeat. This occurs when a level 
of challenge has reached a threshold to which the system cannot adapt. As a 
consequence, control over SWB will be taken away from homeostasis and handed 
to the external, challenging agent(s). For these people, a loss of HPMood and 
defeat of the cognitive buffers is predicted. Before proceeding with the multiple 
regression, the variables were assessed for multicollinearity and singularity. Table 
54 displays the means, standard deviations, between the variables for the autism 
and general sample.  
 
Table 54 
Predicting SWB using HPMood and the buffer variables for participants with 
SWB below 50 points 
 Autism sample (n = 44) General sample (n = 13) 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
SWB 33.28 10.78 -     47.83 1.06 -     
HPMood 38.41 15.87 .55** -    51.01 17.66 -.19 -    
Self-Esteem 38.52 16.25 .55** .57** -   53.22 20.95 -.41 .89** -   
Optimism 33.18 21.58 .33** .55** .53** -  47.67 15.27 -.29 .82** .82** -  
Control 52.50 19.33 .34** .11 .26 .30* - 58.01 24.06 .07 .77* .73* .80* - 
*p <.05. **p <.01 
 
Table 54 shows that the SWB scores between the autism and general 
sample seem to fairly similar. Furthermore, the correlations matrices indicate that 
variables are suitable for a regression analysis. However, it should be noted that 
there are 44 cases in the autism sample and 13 cases among the general sample 
with SWB below 50 points. Thus, this does not meet the adequate statistical 
power for such analysis to be reliable for both groups. As a concern, the 
regression analysis for both groups will be interpreted as a pilot only. The 
multiple regression for the autism and the general sample is presented in Table 
55. 
 
Table 55 
Predicting SWB using HPMood and the buffer variables for participants with 
SWB below 50 points 
  Autism sample 
n = 44 
General sample 
n = 13 
  DV:S B β sr2 DV:SW B β sr2 
WB B 
HPMood .55 .29* .43 .10 -.19 .03 .57 .05 
Self-esteem .55 .21 .31 .06 -.41 -.06 -1.09 .22 
Optimism  .33 -.07 -.14 .01 -.29 -.04 -.56 .07 
Control .34 .14 .25 .06 .07 .04 .87 .25 
     Unique Variance = .23    R2 = .44 Unique Variance = .59    R2 = .56 
      Shared Variance = .21 Adjusted R2 = .39 Shared Variance = -.3    Adjusted R2 = -.32 
 
The results show that there are some differences between the autism and 
general sample on the predictors of <50 points for SWB. For the autism sample, 
the R for the regression was significantly different from zero, F(4, 39) = 7.75, p 
< .01. HPMood contributed significant unique variance to the prediction of SWB. 
The three cognitive buffers did not make a unique prediction to SWB. Altogether, 
44% (adjusted 39%) of the variability in SWB can be predicted from HPMood 
and the three cognitive buffers.  
 
For adults in the general sample, the R for the regression was significantly 
different from zero, F(4, 86) = 8.48, p < .01. HPMood and self-esteem 
contributed significant unique variance to the prediction of SWB. The cognitive 
buffers, optimism and perceived control failed to make a unique prediction to 
SWB. Altogether, 28% (adjusted 25%) of the variability in SWB (for participants 
with SWB < 50 points) can be predicted by HPMood and the buffer variables. 
 
 In summary, HPMood was found to provide unique variance. For the 
autism sample, whereas in the general sample, HPMood and Self-esteem were 
found to provide unique variance to the prediction of SWB. The above results will 
now be discussed.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
 One of the most interesting findings in the Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) 
literature is that SWB is not free to vary over the entire range of values offered by 
a particular scale. Rather, an individual’s SWB is normally held within a narrow 
range of values (Cummins, 1995; Headey and Wearing, 1989, 1992; Eid & 
Diener, 2004; Schimmack et al., 2002). In an attempt to explain the stability in 
SWB, it has been proposed by some researchers that personality is the strongest 
predictor of life satisfaction judgments (e.g., DeNeeve & Cooper, 2001; Headey 
& Wearing, 1989, 1992; Vitterso & Nilsen, 2002).  However, more recent 
research disputes these claims. In fact, Davern et al. (2007), Blore et al., (2010) 
and Tomyn & Cummins (2011) suggest that personality fails to make a 
contribution to SWB when Homeostatically Protected Mood (HPMood) is 
accounted for. Thus, the aim of this investigation was to (a) test the relative 
contribution of the adjectives defining HPMood, namely ‘happy’, ‘content’ and 
‘alert’ to the prediction SWB; and (b) test the relative contribution of HPMood 
and personality (the traits of extraversion and emotional stability) to the 
prediction of SWB among Australian adults with and without autism.  
 
As expected, among the general sample, the adjectives that makeup 
HPMood (happy, content and alert) were found to be independent, significant 
unique predictors for SWB. These three adjectives accounted for 51% of the 
variance in SWB. This finding is consistent with previous research that found 
SWB is primarily driven by affects that make up the construct HPMood (Blore et 
al., 2010; Davern et al., 2007; Tomyn & Cummins, 2011).  
 
Among the autism sample, only two adjectives, ‘content’ and ‘happy’ 
were found to be independent, significant unique predictors for SWB. The affect, 
‘alert’ failed to make a significant unique prediction to SWB. Previous research 
has found that the affect ‘alert’ is the weakest predictor out of the three affects 
(Davern et al., 2007). Altogether, these three adjectives accounted for 75% of the 
variance in SWB. Thus, these results also confirm that HPMood appears to have a 
dominant influence over SWB among people with autism.  
 
 The proposal that the personality traits of extroversion and emotional 
stability are a major determinant of SWB (e.g., DeNeeve & Cooper, 2001; 
Headey & Wearing, 1989, 1992; Vitterso & Nilsen, 2002), was not supported in 
this investigation for either the autism or general sample. This is consistent with 
previous research that, once HPMood is accounted for; personality fails to make a 
significant prediction to SWB (Blore et al., 2010; Davern et al., 2007; Tomyn & 
Cummins, 2011). This reinforces the role of HPMood in underlying SWB 
judgments for both people with and without autism.  
 
 HPMood was also found to contribute to measures of autism 
symptomology to SWB. It was found that, while autism symptomology 
contributed 5% and 7% of unique variance to SWB for both the autism and 
general sample, respectively, when HPMood was accounted for, autism 
symptomology did not significantly contribute to SWB. This indicates that autism 
symptomology is unlikely to influence SWB.  
 
 In summary, this investigation supports previous research suggesting that 
SWB is primarily an affective construct and reinforces the role of HPMood in 
explaining the construction of SWB. These results also suggest that similar 
relationships are evident between SWB, personality and HPMood among people 
with and without autism. This lends support to the robustness of SWB 
Homeostasis Theory among people with autism.  
 
Examining the relationship between high and subjective wellbeing 
 
According to SWB homeostasis theory, under non-threatening conditions, 
a normative range of SWB will be maintained, with the individual rating SWB in 
terms of their idiosyncratic set-point. In such conditions, it is predicted that the 
cognitive buffering system will be relatively inactive, and therefore, will not 
contribute significant variance in SWB. However, when conditions threaten 
homeostasis, the cognitive buffers become activated as they attempt to restore and 
maintain SWB within the normative range, and thus will increase the explained 
unique variance in SWB. However, when the level of challenge has reached the 
threshold to which the homeostatic system can no longer adapt (Cummins, 2003), 
homeostatic defeat is predicted to occur. As a consequence of this circumstance, 
control over SWB transfers from homeostasis to the challenging agent.  
 
These homeostatic predictions were tested by separating participants SWB 
into groups representing three levels: people with normal levels of SWB (SWB > 
70 points), people likely to be experiencing some level of challenge (SWB 
between 50 and 69 points) and people most likely to be experiencing homeostatic 
defeat (SWB < 50 points). As argued by Cummins et al. (2003), SWB at 70 points 
is the average level at which homeostasis resistance occurs and is defended. 
 The first prediction, that for people with SWB within the normal range, 
the cognitive buffers will not contribute significant variance in SWB, was partly 
supported among the general sample. As expected, the cognitive buffers 
(optimism and perceived control) did not contribute any unique variance to SWB, 
while HPMood contributed significantly to SWB. However, an unexpected 
finding was that the buffer variable self-esteem contributed significant unique 
variance to people who are experiencing normal levels of SWB. This suggests 
that people who are experiencing normal levels of SWB may use HPMood along 
with self-esteem to help overcome any challenges or negative events that they 
face. A key feature of self-esteem is that people with high self-esteem can 
separate themselves from a negative situation (Corning, 2002; Cummins, Gullone, 
& Lau, 2002).  It could be that people with high levels of self-esteem are more 
likely to have normal levels of SWB. However, the causality of this relationship 
cannot be determined by this analysis. Examining the results from the autism 
sample, there was an inadequate sample size to reliably interpret the results.  
 
Turning to the second prediction, that cognitive buffer variables will be 
activated in an attempt to restore and maintain SWB among a group of people 
likely to be experiencing homeostatic challenge, this was partly supported. 
Among the general sample, HPMood and the buffer variable perceived control 
were activated (significantly contributed unique variance), while the buffers of 
self-esteem and optimism failed to make a significant contribution. An interesting 
finding was the fact that perceived control accounted for 16% of unique variance 
to SWB, while HPMood only accounted for 4% of unique variance. These results 
suggest that people who are experiencing homeostatic challenge are likely to be 
using the buffer variable of perceived control to assist their homeostatic system. 
This can be achieved by changing the way one perceives the world so that they 
believe they are in control, regardless of the actual control they have over the 
situation. As above, there was an inadequate sample size to reliably examine this 
prediction amongst the autism sample.  
 
The last prediction concerns homeostatic defeat, where the level of 
challenge has reach a threshold where the system cannot adapt. Thus control over 
SWB is taken away from homeostasis and passed to the dominating threat. 
However, there was an inadequate sample for both the autism and general sample 
to infer reliable results. Thus, it is recommended future research examining the 
role of the cognitive buffers, will need to recruit large samples to enable testing of 
this hypothesis.  
  
Chapter Nine: Psychometric Equivalence of the PWI and DASS21-D 
 
The aim of this set of analyses is to evaluate the psychometric equivalence 
of the Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI) and the depression subscale of the 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS7-D) among Australian adults with 
and without autism using tests of measurement invariance. However, before 
conducting tests of measurement invariance, an overview of Measurement 
Invariance will be provided.  
 
Overview 
 
Measurement Invariance (MI) is an advanced statistical procedure that is 
of upmost importance in the field of psychology, including subjective wellbeing. 
Until the MI of a scale has been successfully conducted, between-group 
differences cannot be validly interpreted. Thus, it is necessary to determine 
whether the Personal Wellbeing Index is invariant (i.e., equivalent) within 
comparison groups (e.g., gender, age, ability groups). MI tests the equivalences 
across groups, by applying sets of parameters (e.g., factor loadings, factor 
covariances, and structural regression paths) that are tested in a logical order and 
increasingly restrictive practice. 
 
The Process of Measurement Invariance 
 
This section will discuss the process of conducting MI. In regards to the 
direct programming of MI using multi-group Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA), it is recommended the resources by Byrne (2009) “Testing for Multigroup 
Invariance Using AMOS Graphics: A Road Less Traveled” and Byrne (2010) 
“Structural Equation Modeling with AMOS: Basic Concepts, Applications and 
Programming” be used. Thus, the discussion below will not directly discuss the 
programming, rather the concepts and applications required for SWB research. 
First a brief outline of the Model Fit Indices will be provided. 
Model Fit Indices 
 
As recommended by Byrne (2010) and Hu and Bentler (1999), there are 
four model fit indices that are suggested to test model fit acceptability: 
The most commonly used test is the relative Chi-Square (χ2) test. The Chi-
Square test is determined by the Chi-Square number divided by the degrees of 
freedom. It is generally accepted that number (χ2 /df) should be less <5, and 
significant Chi-Square values reflect poor model fit. However, Chi-square is 
sensitive to sample size and is almost always likely to reject reasonable models 
with large sample sizes (N>200), and may fail to reject poor models with small 
sample sizes (Kline, 2010). Thus, Chi-square should be interpreted in relation to 
other fit indexes in the determination of model fit (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; 
DiStefano & Hess, 2005). There are three other types of fit indices that can be 
used to assess the fit of a model. 
 
 First, the Comparative Fit Indices (CFI) compare the fit of the model 
under consideration with fit of the baseline-model. Fit is considered adequate for 
the value is ≥ 0.90 and good if ≥ 0.95 (van de Schoot, Lutpig, & Hox, 2012). 
 
 Second, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
examines the closeness of fit. The cut-off value for RMSEA is ≤ 0.08 for 
adequate fit and <0.05 for a good fit. The RMSEA is insensitive to sample size, 
but sensitive to model complexity (van de Schoot, Lugtig, & Hox, 2012). 
  Third, the Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) is an 
absolute measure of fit. The cut-off value for SRMR is <0.08 for adequate fit and 
< 0.05 for good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). A limitation of SRMR is that it is biased 
towards low sample sizes (Kenny, 2015). 
 
Steps Involved in Conducting Measurement Invariance 
 
Step 1. Determine the model fit for each group separately  
The first step in conducting MI is to determine the model fit for each 
group separately, also known as a baseline model. The estimation of baseline 
models is performed separately, thus involves no between-group constraints.  The 
purpose of testing model fit is to test the validity of scores provided. This is to 
determine whether the data from the instrument (i.e., the PWI) fits the theoretical 
model (i.e., one factor for the Personal Wellbeing Index). Following adequate fit, 
tests for equivalence of parameters can be conducted across groups at each step of 
increasingly stringent levels.  
 
Step 2: Testing Configural invariance (i.e., equivalence) across groups 
Configural invariance requires that the same number of factors and the 
factor-loading pattern be the same across data sets, but allows item parameters 
(factor loadings, residual variances, and intercepts) to vary across groups (Byrne, 
2010). In other words, configural invariance tests whether a scale has the same 
number of underlying factors across groups. That is, do the seven PWI items 
demonstrate one factor for both groups (e.g., males and females). Testing for 
configural invariance also provides the model fit for which all subsequent tests for 
equivalence can be conducted. If the configural invariance shows a structure that 
is fitting across groups, then the next step of testing weak invariance can be 
conducted. 
 
 
Step 3: Testing Weak (metric) Invariance 
The third step of MI analysis assesses the factorial structure of a latent 
construct across groups (known as metric or weak invariance). Weak invariance 
requires factor loadings to be constrained as equal between groups, but the factor 
loadings are allowed to differ between groups. This tests whether participants 
across groups attribute the same meaning to the latent construct under 
examination. For example, whether males attribute the same meaning to the 
questions on the PWI in the same way as females).  
 
Step 4: Testing Strong (scalar) Invariance  
The fourth step of MI assesses the item intercepts (known as scalar or 
strong invariance). Strong invariance requires that factor loadings and item 
intercepts are constrained to be equal across groups to evaluate potential 
systematic bias in responses from one group to another. Strong invariance tests 
whether the meaning of the construct (factor structure) and the levels of the 
underlying items (intercepts) are equal in both groups. Consequently, groups that 
are found to be invariant at this step means their scores can be compared on the 
latent variable. 
 
Step 5: Testing Strict Invariance  
The fifth step of MI (known as strict invariance) constrains residual 
variance to be equal across groups. If there is evidence of adequate model fit at 
Strict Invariance, this indicates that the explained variance for every item is the 
same across groups. In other words, the latent construct is measured identically 
across groups.   
 
  
Partial Invariance 
In the event that the third (metric or weak invariance) or fourth step (scalar 
or strong invariance) is found to be non-invariant (i.e., not established), both 
forms of invariance can be relaxed to obtain partial invariance (Gregorich, 2006). 
Partial invariance assesses the groups by removing specific parameters that are 
suspected to be non-invariant. In other words, the goal of partial tests of 
invariance is to find out which of the loadings or intercepts differ across groups. 
According to Byrne, Shavelson & Muthen (1989) as long as there are at least two 
loadings and intercepts that are constrained equal across groups, then valid 
inferences about the differences between latent factors means can be conducted. It 
is important to note, however, that to be able to compare the sum of scores or 
comparable observed means, full scalar equivalence needs to be observed.  
 
How to determine Invariance? 
 
Based on a comprehensive and rigorous approach using Monte Carlo 
testing of several goodness-of-fit indices, Cheung and Rensvold (2002) 
recommend that evidence of noninvariance be based on a difference in CFI 
(∆CFI) with values exhibiting a change of less than 0.01. 
 
Missing Data 
 
When dealing with missing data, Byrne (2010) recommends replacing 
missing data with the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation algorithm when 
conducting measurement invariance using multi-group Confirmatory Factor 
Analyses (CFA). This is because ML is theoretically based, and is likely to be the 
least biased option compared to using pairwise or listwise deletion (see Arbuckle, 
1996 for a comparison on the advantages and disadvantages of using listwise, 
pairwise and ML on incomplete data).  
 
Assumptions 
 
There are two basic assumptions that are required when conducting MI. 
First, the data are on a continuous scale, and second, the data show a multivariate 
normal distribution (Byrne, 2010).  
 
Non-Normal Data: Use The Bootstrap 
 
When faced with non-normal multivariate data, one procedure that can be 
utilised to correct the non-normality is a technique known as “the bootstrap” 
developed by West et al., (1995).  
 
Bootstrapping is a resampling procedure. Multiple subsamples are drawn 
randomly from the original sample. This allows the examination of parameter 
distributions relative to each of the subsamples. These subsamples totaled 
together provide a bootstrap sample distribution. “The bootstrapping sampling 
distribution is concrete and allows for comparison of parametric values over 
repeated samples that have been drawn (with replacement) from the original 
sample” (Byrne, 2010 p. 331). 
 
An advantage of the bootstrap is that it allows the stability of parameter 
estimates, which can then be reported with a greater degree of accuracy (Byrne, 
2010, p 332). However, a limitation of the bootstrap is that it assumes that data 
are representative of the population. If the data are not representative of the 
population, the results may lead to misleading results (Zhu, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Before meaningful comparisons can be made between groups of interest, 
the psychometric properties of an instrument needs to be determined. Conducting 
measurement invariance allows researchers to determine if the instrument 
operates in exactly the same way, and whether the underlying construct being 
measured has the same theoretical structure for each group they are testing. These 
procedures will now be applied. 
 
Tests of Measurement Invariance among the PWI 
 
 Prior to proceeding with the tests of measurement invariance, preliminary 
single-group analysis were performed to establish adequate model fit for both the 
autism and general sample. Table 56 shows the baseline models. 
 
Table 56 
Baseline model fit summary 
Model χ2  df χ2/df χ2/df CFI SRMR RMSEA 
Autism 10.93** 14 0.78 .78 .99 .03 .01 
General 41.33** 14 2.95 2.95 .98 .03 .06 
*p<0.01, **p< 0.001  
 
Table 56 shows the baseline model provides adequate of the data across 
both the autism and general sample, suggesting that the PWI measures a uni-
dimensional construct. Although the chi-squares were significant, the CFI, 
SRMR, and RMSEA were all acceptable, suggesting the chi-square was reflecting 
moderate to large sample sizes rather than model misspecification. Table 57 
shows the measurement invariance testing.  
 
  
Table 57 
Model Fit Summary of the PWI 
Model χ2  df χ2/df χ2/df CFI SRMR RMSEA 
Configural 52.26** 28 1.87  .99 .03 .038 
Weak 55.65** 34 1.64 .00 .99 .06 .033 
Strong 92.09** 41 2.25 .02 .97 .08 .046 
Strict 102.71** 48 2.14 .00 .97 .04 .044 
*p<0.01, **p< 0.001 Bold font indicates poor fit 
  
As discussed earlier, Cheung and Rensvold (2002) recommended 
examining the change in CFI when placing increasingly stringent invariance 
conditions on the data. A CFA change of .01 or less indicates that the model being 
tested is invariant. The above table shows four levels of measurement invariant 
testing. The test of configural invariances showed that the PWI has the same 
underlying factor across both the autism and general sample. The test of weak 
invariance showed that the participants in the autism and general sample attribute 
the same meaning to the PWI. In other words, the overall PWI mean score can be 
used within each group. However, the test of strong invariance was shown not to 
be equivalent across groups. This indicates that there is a discrepancy in the 
understanding on one or more of the PWI domains between the autism and 
general sample. An inspection of the modification indices suggests that strong 
invariance did not hold for the domains “Health”, “Safety”, “Community” and 
“Future Security”.  Table 58 shows the model fit summary for the autism and 
general sample for the domains of “Standard”, “Achieving” and “Relationships”, 
now known as the PWI-3.  
 
Table 58 
Model Fit Summary of the PWI-3 
Model χ2  df χ2/df χ2/df CFI SRMR RMSEA 
Configural 42.25 28 1.51  .99 .03 .03 
Weak 42.82 30 1.43 .00 .99 .05 .03 
Strong 62.98 33 1.91 .01 .98 .07 .04 
Strict 71.60 36 1.99 <.01 .98 .03 .04 
 
  
As can be seen above, the PWI-3 shows placing increasingly stringent 
invariance conditions on the data failed to lead to a substantial reduction in model 
fit. At no point do these models exhibit a change in CFI that exceeds the cut-off of 
0.01. This suggests that the domains of “Standard of Living”, “Relationships” and 
“Achieving in Life” function equivalently across Australian adults with and 
without an autism spectrum condition.  
   
Differences in SWB between the autism and general sample 
 As excluding the domains, Health, Safety, Community and Future from 
the PWI may affect the comparison analysis of SWB (average PWI domain 
scores), t-tests were performed to investigate whether the exclusion of Health, 
Safety, Community and Future results in a significant change in SWB.  
 
 A paired samples t-test was conducted to evaluate the difference in SWB 
scores between the original PWI and PWI-3. For the autism sample, there was a 
significant difference in scores for the PWI (M = 53.09, SD = 20.29) and the 
PWI-3 (M = 56.37, SD = 22.45; t(109) = 4.39, p = .000, two tailed). The 
magnitude of the difference in the means (mean difference = 3.28, 95% CI: 1.80 
to 4.76) was very small (eta squared = .009).  
 
For the general sample, there was a significant difference in scores for the 
PWI (M = 72.32, SD = 12.18) and the PWI-3 (M = 73.99, SD = 14.00); t(295) = 
4.03, p = .000, two tailed). The magnitude of the difference in the means (mean 
difference = 1.67, 95% CI: 0.85 to 2.48) was very small (eta squared = .003). 
Given the very small effect sizes for both the autism and general sample, these 
differences in PWI scores are considered trivial.  
 
In summary, the tests of measurement invariance showed that the PWI has 
the same underlying factor structure between the autism and general sample and 
that the overall PWI means can be interpreted. However, discrepancies on the 
domains of the PWI were found. Partial invariance was found, indicating that 
valid comparisons of the domains of “Standard”, “Achieving” and 
“Relationships” could be made between Australian adults with and without 
autism.  
 
Tests of Measurement Invariance among the DASS7-D 
 
 Prior to proceeding with the tests of measurement invariance for the 
DASS21-D, preliminary single-group analysis was performed to establish 
adequate model fit for both the autism and general sample. Table ? shows the 
baseline models. 
Table 59 
Baseline model fit summary for the DASS5-D 
Model χ2  df χ2/df χ2/df CFI SRMR RMSEA 
Autism 45.53** 14 3.25  .95 .04 .14 
General 59.97** 14 4.28  .97 .03 .11 
*p<0.01, **p< 0.001 Bold font indicates poor fit 
 
 
Table 59 shows reveal that the single factor model provided poor fit for 
the autism and general sample as indicated by the RMSEA. An examination of 
the standardised residual covariance matrix suggested that item 6 (‘I felt I wasn’t 
much of a person’) and item 7 (‘I felt life was meaningless’) may explain the data 
misfit for both groups, thus were removed from the analysis.  
 A single-group analysis was re-run to determine adequate model fit on the 
remaining 5 items as shown in Table 60. 
 
  
Table 60 
Baseline model fit summary for the DASS5-D items 
Model χ2  df χ2/df χ2/df CFI SRMR RMSEA 
Autism 13.84 5 2.76  .98 .03 .06 
General 8.87 5 1.77  .99 .02 .05 
*p <0.01, **p< 0.001  
 
Table 60 shows the chi-squares, CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA were all 
acceptable for the new 5 item baseline model suggesting that the DASS5-D items 
measures a uni-dimensional construct for both the autism and general sample. 
Table 61 shows the measurement invariance testing.  
 
Table 61 
Model Fit Summary of the DASS5-D 
Model χ2  df χ2/df χ2/df CFI SRMR RMSEA 
Configural 22.71* 10 2.27  .99 .04 .06 
Weak 28.45* 14 2.03 .00 .99 .07 .05 
Strong 84.61** 19 4.45 .04 .95 .10 .09 
Strict 120.48** 24 5.02 .03 .92 .04 .10 
*p<0.01, **p< 0.001 Bold font indicates poor fit 
 
As shown in Table 61, the test of configural invariances showed that the 
DASS5-D has the same underlying factor across both the autism and general 
sample. The test of weak invariance showed that the participants in the autism and 
general sample attribute the same meaning to the DASS5-D. However, the test of 
strong invariance was shown not to be equivalent across groups. This indicates 
that there is a discrepancy in the understanding on one or more of the DASS5-D 
items among the autism and general sample. An inspection of the modification 
indices did not reveal any specific item that may explain the non-invariance. 
Further, the test of strict invariance was also found to be non-equivalent. Thus, 
comparisons among each group can be made, however, comparisons between the 
autism and general sample on depression items may not be reliable or valid.  
 
 
 
Discussion  
 
It is well known that people with autism have a different and clinically 
distinctive way of perceiving, thinking and learning, compared to people from the 
general population (Scarpa, White & Attwood, 2013). The cognitive profile 
among people with autism is heterogeneous, with individuals scoring anywhere 
from very low cognitive ability to very superior cognitive abilities (Attwood, 
2007). Even individuals with autism who have cognition in the normal range 
usually have uneven cognitive profiles on IQ tests (Scarpa et al.). Additionally, 
some individuals with autism may have language impairments that may affect 
comprehension (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Therefore, it is 
important for research to investigate whether people with autism interpret 
common psychological instruments the same way as people from the general 
population. One way this can be achieved is using tests of measurement 
invariance.  
 
Measurement Invariance (MI) is an advanced statistical procedure that 
applies a series of parameters (e.g., factor loadings, factor covariance’s, and 
structural regression paths), in a logical and restrictive manner to data sets. This 
allows a number of comparisons to be made to determine whether valid 
comparisons of scales, such as the Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI) and the 
depression subscale of the DASS can be made between people with and without 
autism.  
 
There are four important steps of MI to determine whether valid 
comparisons can be made between groups. If the first step (Configural invariance) 
is met, it can be concluded that the scale under investigation has the same number 
of factors across groups. If the second step (weak invariance) is met, it can be 
concluded that the latent construct being measured can be used within each group. 
The third step (strong invariance) tests whether participants from each group 
understand the construct and the items of the scale in the same way as each other. 
If groups are found to be invariant at this stage, this indicates that their scores can 
be validly compared on the latent construct. If the last step (strict invariance) is 
found, then it can be concluded that the items and latent construct are measured 
identically across groups. 
 
 In the event that the second or third step is found to be non-invariant, both 
forms of invariance can be relaxed to obtain partial invariance (Gregorich, 2006). 
Partial invariance assesses groups by removing specific parameters that are 
suspected to be non-invariant. In other words, the goal of partial tests of 
invariance is to find out which of the loadings or intercepts differ across groups 
and to remove the items from the analyses. However, to be able to compare the 
sum of scores or compare means, strong invariance needs to be observed. 
 
 While tests of measurement invariance have been gaining prominence 
over the last decade, it is still commonly neglected regarding SWB measures 
(Tomyn et al., 2013) and lacking in the social sciences literature (Gregorich, 
2006). Gregorich proposes two key explanations for this. First, there is a general 
lack of understanding of the importance of measurement invariance testing in 
social sciences. And secondly, many researchers lack the technical skills required 
to conduct such tests. Nonetheless, measurement invariance remains an important 
procedure, as until the scale has been found to be invariant between groups, valid 
comparisons cannot be made.  
 
The Personal Wellbeing Index 
Previous research has found that two versions of the Personal Wellbeing 
Index, the PWI-Adult (PWI-A; IWG, 2013) and the PWI-School Children (PWI-
SC; Cummins & Lau, 2004) have been found to meet strict invariance. In their 
study, Tomyn, Fuller Tyszkiewicz and Cummins (2013) found among 1,029 
Victorian high school students (using the PWI-SC) compared to 1,965 Australian 
adults (using the PWI-A) that the PWI-SC and PWI-A demonstrated strict 
invariance. This suggests that the PWI measures the same underlying construct in 
adolescent and adult populations and that valid quantitative comparison can be 
made between adult and adolescent SWB data. However, the results from the 
current study tell a different story when comparing SWB between adults with and 
without autism. 
 
The results from the current study demonstrate that only weak invariance 
was found between people with autism when compared to the general population. 
This finding suggests that the PWI is likely to measure SWB among people with 
and without autism. However, as strong invariance was not found, comparisons 
between people with and without autism is not valid. This is because people with 
autism and people from the general population interpret and understand the 
questions on the PWI in a different way. This finding is somewhat expected, as it 
is well known that people with autism have a different way of perceiving and 
thinking about the world (Scarpa et al., 2013; Vulchanova et al., 2015) compared 
to people from the general population. For example, the domain ‘How satisfied 
are you with your future security’ could be interpreted as future physical safety, 
future income, or even national security; ‘How satisfied are you with your health’ 
could have referred to physical or mental health. Further qualitative research is 
needed to explore the difference in understanding of the PWI domains among 
people with and without autism.  
 
However, all is not lost. Partial invariance was found among three items of 
the PWI. In fact, strict invariance was found using the PWI domains of ‘Standard 
of Living’, ‘Achieving’ and ‘Personal Relationships’ (now known as the PWI-3). 
This indicates that direct comparisons can be made between people with and 
without on these three items as they respond in exactly the same way. Further, as 
strict invariance was found, the overall mean of the PWI-3 can be used to validly 
compare SWB between people with and without autism.  
 
Using the PWI-3, people with autism reported significantly lower levels of 
SWB on the PWI-3 compared to the general population. Furthermore, people with 
autism report significantly lower levels on the domains of Standard of Living, 
Achieving and Relationships than people from the general population. It is 
possible that the challenges that people with autism face, such as difficulties 
obtaining employment, difficulties with social interaction and difficulties with 
independent living may explain differences on these domains. 
 
A major implication of the findings and the establishment of measurement 
invariance for the PWI-3 is the facilitation of future research that may investigate 
the differences in happiness between people with and without autism which may 
reveal further insights into the factors that promote and hinder normal 
psychological wellbeing. The present investigation also highlights the importance 
of testing for measurement invariance in the scales used by people with autism. In 
order to have greater confidence in the results comparing people with autism to 
other groups of interest, it is recommended that researchers assess the equivalence 
of SWB instruments, using stringent multiple-group Confirmatory Factor 
Analyses (CFA) procedures, prior to the analyses and reporting of means. 
Measurement invariance testing would help researchers determine whether 
differences between people with autism reflect true differences on the SWB as 
opposed to measurement bias.  
 
 In summary, these findings indicate the importance of conducting tests of 
measurement invariance. Previous research has highlighted that people with 
autism have a clinically and distinctive way of thinking and perceiving. Thus, it is 
important to test whether people with autism understand and interpret the 
Personal Wellbeing Index the same way as the general population. Results 
showed that people with autism interpret the PWI in a different way to the general 
population. However, further investigation found that three domains of the PWI, 
Standard of Living, Achieving and Relationships were likely to be understood and 
interpreted in the same for people with and without autism. Thus, it is 
recommended future research that compares the SWB of people with and without 
autism, utilises the PWI-3.  
 Depression subscale from the DASS5-D 
 Emerging evidence across the world suggests that depression may be a 
common psychiatric condition occurring in persons with autism (Singhal, Daley, 
Taneja & Barua (2014). However, available research on depression has focused 
largely on children and adolescents. Much less has been published on adults with 
autism and depression. It is known that many adults with autism are likely to face 
many challenges that are associated with increased risk of depression, such as 
difficulty gaining employment, difficulty being understood by family and friends, 
and difficulties with independent living. Due to these increased challenges, it 
could be possible that adults with autism may be at risk of more depression than 
the general population. One way depression could be measured is using a valid 
and reliable measure of depression, such as the depression subscale from the 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). However, 
before such comparisons can be made, it is imperative that the psychometric 
equivalence of the DASS21 be assessed.  
 
 The results from the current study demonstrate that the original seven 
items from the depression subscale of the DASS did not provide adequate model 
fit for both the autism and general sample. This indicates that items on the 
DASS7-D may not be valid. Instead, five items (excluding item 6 “I felt I wasn’t 
much of a person” and item 7 “I felt life was meaningless”) were found to provide 
adequate model fit for both groups. The reason these items misfit is not clear. 
 
 Nonetheless, the DASS5-D was found to meet weak invariance for both 
the autism and general sample. This finding suggests that the DASS5-D is likely 
to measure depression among people with and without autism. However, as strong 
invariance was not found, comparisons between people with and without autism 
and depression is not valid. This indicates that people with autism interpret each 
item on the DASS5-D differently from people from the general population. For 
instance, the item “In the past week I felt down hearted and blue” could have been 
interpreted as feeling discouraged, feeling sad or miserable.  
 
 The fact that partial invariance could not be achieved has the implication 
that direct valid comparisons between people with and without autism on the 
DASS5-D cannot be made. Future research is to investigate the interpretation that 
people with autism apply to the DASS-D items compared to the general 
population. This will provide useful insight in designing a depression 
questionnaire that can validly compare depression between the two groups.  
 
 In summary, depression is believed to be a common disorder among 
people with autism due to the additional challenges they are likely to face. 
However, the majority of research on depression has focused on children and 
adolescents with autism. Before direct valid comparisons can be made between 
people with and without autism, tests of measurement should be performed. 
Overall, using the DASS5-D, direct comparisons cannot be made between adults 
with and without autism, as each group interprets each item in a different way. 
Future research that compares people with autism to other groups, should perform 
tests of measurement invariance to determine whether valid comparisons can be 
made.   
 
  
Chapter Ten: Subjective Wellbeing and Depression 
 
 
According to SWB Homeostasis Theory (Cummins, 2010; Cummins & 
Wooden, 2014), SWB is actively maintained and controlled within a narrow, 
positive range of values around a set-point, which averages at 80 points. The level 
of this set-point is genetically determined and a homeostatic system actively 
defends the affective core of SWB, termed Homeostically Protected Mood 
(HPMood). HPMood is conceptualised a neuro-physiologically generated affect 
comprising the simplest, constant, non-reflective feeling (Cummins & Wooden). 
It is not modifiable by conscious experience, yet is a ubiquitous component of 
conscious experience. It is this steady-state, affective set-point, that homeostasis 
seeks to defend.  
 
 Under normal conditions, SWB is an approximation of HPMood, which 
approximates the set-point range. It is proposed that while the affect generated as 
HPMood is constant, the conscious experience of affect is highly variable. Such 
conscious awareness comprises a combination of HPMood and other emotions 
which are being generated by momentary experience. On occasion, these 
emotions are a stronger source of affect than HPMood, thereby causing 
experienced affect to be different from set-point. Cummins & Wooden (2014) 
propose, that when this occurs, homeostatic forces (as described in Chapter 3) are 
activated to return experienced affect to its set-point. Therefore, actual affective 
experience normally fluctuates around its set-point, and, as long as homeostasis is 
in control, affective experience remains within its set-point-range.  
 
 When SWB moves outside of its set-point-range due to a challenging 
agent, homeostatic forces are activated to return SWB to set-point. These 
processes include behaviour, adaptation, and habituation, along with external and 
internal resources (cognitive buffers of self-esteem, optimism, perceived control) 
which will normally allow recovery back to the set-point-range of HPMood. 
However, if the negative challenge is chronic or strong, full recovery may not 
take place. The homeostatic system has limited capabilities to recover normal 
functioning, and if these capabilities are exceeded, recovery is unlikely to occur. 
Under such conditions, homeostasis will be persistently defeated and the loss of 
positive affect will remain as the dominating experience. Thus, in the presence of 
low SWB, the person becomes vulnerable to depression.  
 
 Consequently, describing SWB management in terms of homeostasis give 
rise to a number theoretical predictions regarding the relationship between SWB 
and other variables. For instance, Cummins (2010) has proposed that SWB will 
demonstrate an inverse curvilinear relationship with increasing levels of negative 
challenge. Cummins cites evidence for this proposal from earlier investigations 
into SWB and depression conducted through the Australian Unity Wellbeing 
Index. The results show SWB demonstrating a curvilinear relationship with 
depression across increasing depression ratings, and homeostatic failure was 
found to correspond to a depression rating of moderate using the depression 
subscale from the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). In this situation, depression is seen to represent the challenging 
agent, with low depression scores reflecting low level of homeostatic challenge 
and high depression scores reflecting a very strong challenge.  
 As individuals with autism are more likely to experience greater day-to-
day challenges in their lives than people without autism (Bilstedt et al., 2005; 
Eaves and Ho, 2008; Howlin et al., 2004) it is relevant to explore the above SWB 
approximations, due to their increased risk of homeostatic challenge / defeat.  If 
depression represents the suppression of HPMood following homeostatic failure, 
then it is important to understand the mechanisms through which SWB may be 
controlled and maintained over time. This understanding could assist in the 
development of interventions as well as enhancing wellbeing to prevent 
depression before the symptoms emerge. Thus, a fundamental step forward 
explaining the mechanisms that underpin the maintenance of SWB among people 
with autism is the systematic testing of SWB Homeostasis Theory. 
 
Summary and Aims 
Previous research supports the notion that depression and Subjective 
Wellbeing (SWB) are inversely related. This is in line with the theoretical 
proposition that depression may be conceptualised as a loss of normal levels of 
SWB subsequent to the failure of homeostasis (Cummins et al., 2009), or more 
precisely the loss of Homeostaically Protected Mood (HPMood). This proposition 
is in line with predictions made by SWB Homeostasis Theory regarding the 
relationship between SWB and depression. For instance, Cummins and Nistico 
(2002) have proposed that SWB is actively maintained by genetically pre-wired, 
neurological systems, that have evolved to maintain SWB that is controlled within 
a narrow, positive range of values around a set-point, which averages at 80 points 
(Cummins et al., 2015). The goal of homeostasis is to defend the affective core of 
SWB, termed HPMood because a positive sense of wellbeing is adaptive and 
provides the motivation for living (Cummins et al., 2014). Additionally, Cummins 
(2010) have proposed a guide to interpreting SWB scores under increasing 
conditions of challenge based on the following propositions:  
1. There is a threshold value for SWB that is being defended by homeostatic 
processes. 
2. As the threshold value is approached, the homeostatic system works 
harder than normal to retain control. In this context, SWB levels remain 
relatively stable and demonstrate a ‘plateau’ effect despite conditions of 
increasing challenge.  
3. Once the threshold has been exceeded, homeostasis has failed and is no 
longer controlling SWB.  
4. If the individual SWB score is above 70 points then the homeostatic 
system is likely to be functioning normally and the person is not depressed 
5. If the individual score is below 60 points, the person is highly likely to be 
depressed.  
 
Thus, the aim of the study is to investigate the above propositions made 
within the context of SWB homeostasis Theory (Cummins, 2010). In this 
analysis, SWB is measured by the Personal Wellbeing Index (International 
Wellbeing Index, 2013) and depression is measured by the depression subscale of 
the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS5-D; Lovibond  & Lovibond, 
1995). 
Predictions 
 To address the study aims, a number of hypotheses are proposed regarding 
the relationship between SWB and depression. These are as follows:  
1. Consistent with previous research, it is hypothesised that depression will 
demonstrate moderate negative correlations with SWB.  
2. It is hypothesised that SWB 70 points or above is unlikely to demonstrate 
DASS depression. 
3. It is hypothesised that SWB between 50 and 69 points is likely to 
demonstrate to a DASS depression.  
4. It is hypothesised that all participants with an SWB score below 50 points 
will demonstrate a rating on the DASS5-D consistent with depression.  
5. In confirmation of the operation of homeostatic processes to maintain 
normal levels of SWB, SWB scores will demonstrate a curvilinear 
relationship with increasing depression scores.   
Testing of hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 will be performed through an examination of 
the distribution of DASS5-D scores within specific PWI score categories.  
 
Calculation of DASS depression scale 
 The DASSwas originally constructed using a 4-point response scale 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), with responses being multiplied by 2 (as per the 
manuals instructions). This means that the depression subscale of the DASS has a 
score range from zero to 42. Scale scores are awarded a depression severity rating 
(normal, mild, moderate, severe or extremely severe) according to cut-off scores 
derived from the normative sample data described in the DASS manual. For the 
11-point response scale data, the five items were summed and multiplied by two; 
minimum score = zero, maximum score = 100. Depression severity score ranges 
were then calculated using the formula (cut-off score/42) x (100/1). Depression 
severity score ranges for the original 4-point and 11-point response scales are 
presented in Table 62 below.  
 
Table 62 
DASS Depression Severity Scores Ranges for 4- and 11-point Response Formats 
Severity Ratings Score Ranges 
4-point 11-point 
Normal 0-9 0-30 
Mild 10-13 30.1 – 43.3 
Moderate 14-20 43.4 – 66.7 
Severe 21-27 66.8 – 90 
Extremely severe 28+ 90.1+ 
  
To be able to compare depression scale scores, and SWB scores in terms 
of their means and standard deviations and comparable depression severity 
ratings, they key was to convert all data to a standard form, known as Percentage 
of Scale Maximum (%SM), outlined in the methodology chapter. This conversion 
makes it look as though all scales had been rated on zero to 100 point scale. 
Scores ranges for depression severity ratings are presented as %SM values in 
Table 33 below.  
 
Table 63 
DASS Depression Severity Ratings Expressed as %SM Score Ranges 
Severity Ratings %SM Adj. %SM range 
Normal 0-21.42 0-21.42 
Mild 23.81-30.95 21.43-30.95 
Moderate 33.33-47.62 30.96-47.62 
Severe 50.00-54.29 47.63-64.29 
Extremely severe 66.67+ 64.30+ 
 
 Table 63 highlights the differing range of scores within each rating of 
depression severity. This table also displays the discrepancies created between 
depression categories when converting scale scores based on the 11-point scale 
to %SM values. For example, the cut-off score rating of normal depression 
(21.42) does not reach the lower boundary for a rating of mild (23.81), creating a 
dead-space between the two ratings of 2.39 points. Similar between-ratings 
discrepancies are seen across the five levels of depression. For this reason, the 
lower cut-off values for depression ratings were adjusted downwards to prevent 
omission of valid depression scale scores from the analyses. Therefore a 
depression rating of mild started at 21.43 points, moderate at 30.96 points, severe 
at 47.63 points and extreme at 64.30 points.  
 
 
  
Hypotheses 1 
 It is hypothesised that depression will demonstrate moderate to strong 
negative correlation with SWB. To determine this, the relationship between SWB 
and depression was investigated using Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient for both the autism and general samples. Preliminary analyses were 
performed to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and 
homeoscedascity. For the autism sample, there was a moderate, negative 
correlation between the two variables, r = -.31, n = 113, p < .01. For the general 
sample, there was a strong, negative correlation between the two variables r = -
.58, n = 307, p < .01.  
 In summary, as predicted, the DASS5-D demonstrated a moderate and 
strong negative correlation with the PWI for the autism and general sample, 
respectively. The next analyses examines that distribution of DASS5-D categories 
amongst SWB categories.  
 
Distribution of DASS5-D scores within specific SWB score ranges 
It is hypothesised that if individual SWB score lies above 70 points using 
the PWI, the person is likely to be functioning normally and therefore should 
demonstrate a depression rating of normal. Secondly, it is hypothesised that all 
individuals with an SWB score of less than 50 points will demonstrate a DASS5-
D score consistent with depression. Thirdly, SWB between 50 and 70 points will 
have a combination of people who are not depressed or experiencing depression. 
This is because any score within this range may indicate homeostatic failure of a 
high set point or homeostatic normality of a low set point. The distribution of 
DASS5-D scores within specific SWB score ranges is presented below in Figures 
2 to Figure 4, for both the autism and general sample.  
 
Figure 2 shows the shows the distribution of depression ratings for 
participants whose SWB is 70 points and above..  
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Distribution of DASS5-D scores for SWB scores 70 points and 
above 
 
Figure 2 shows for the general sample, 73.4% of the participants with 
SWB >70 points have reported a depression rating of ‘normal’, while 26.6% of 
the sample report some level of depression. For the autism sample, only 17.4% of 
this sample report a depression rating of normal, while 82.6% of the sample report 
some level of depression. While it is conceivable that SWB > 70 points might 
contain a few people who are depressed. For instance, if a person has a set-point 
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of 90 and SWB score of 71, this 19 point difference may indicate homeostatic 
challenge or defeat, which would make that individual more vulnerable to 
depression. However, the fact that 82.6% of the autism sample is experiencing 
some level of depression exceeds theoretical predictions within the theory of 
SWB homeostasis.  
The next figure, Figure 3, shows the shows the distribution of depression 
ratings for participants whose SWB is between 50 and 69 points. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of DASS21-D scores for SWB scores above between 50 
and 69 points 
Figure 3 reveals that for the general sample, that 31.4% of the participants 
have reported a depression rating of normal, while 68.6% of the sample have 
reported some level of depression. For the autism sample, 5.1% of the participants 
have reported a depression rating of normal, while 94.9% of participants with 
autism have reported some level of depression.  
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The next figure, Figure 4, shows the shows the distribution of depression 
ratings for participants whose SWB is below 50 points. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of DASS21-D scores for SWB scores above between 50 
points 
 
Figure 4 reveals that 23.1% of the general sample report a depression 
rating of normal, while 76.9% of the sample report some level of depression. For 
the autism sample, no participants have reported a depression rating of normal, 
while 100% of the group have reported some level of depression.  
Summary 
 Reviewing Figures 2 to 4 in succession suggests that the gross prediction 
of an inverse relationship between SWB and depression has been supported for 
both the autism and general sample. For example, among the general sample, as 
SWB moves down from the greater than 70 points to SWB between 50 and 70 
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points, depression increases by 42%. As SWB moves from 50 to 70 points to 
below 50 points, depression increase by a further 8.3%.  
 The results tell a similar story among the autism sample. As SWB moves 
down from the greater than 70 points to SWB between 50 and 70 points, 
depression increases by 12.3%. As SWB moves from 50 to 70 points to below 50 
points, depression increase by a further 5.1%.  
Nevertheless, there are some incontinences with the theoretical predictions 
made from SWB Homeostasis Theory and its relationship with depression. Such 
interpretation relies on the assumption that the DASS5-D is valid in terms of the 
presumed categories of depression. 
  
It is asserted by Cummins (2005) that only SWB scores above 70 points 
indicates that the homeostatic system is functioning normally. Thus, if depression 
is conceptualised as a loss of normal levels of positive adaptive wellbeing, then 
the presence of depression evidences homeostatic failure and indicates a 
maladaptive state. Therefore, it is unlikely that depression should co-exist with 
SWB scores above 70 points, and should be present when SWB is below 50 
points. However, the above analysis disputes some of these predictions, for 
instance: 
a. Among the autism sample, 82.6% of participants with autism report some 
levels of depression, with SWB scores great than 70 points. According to 
homeostasis theory, SWB scores above 70 points, should indicate that the 
homeostatic system is functioning normally, and thus not depressed. 
While it is conceivable that a people may have a high set-point, for 
instance, 90 points, and report a SWB score of 71 points, with a 19 point 
difference, may indicate homeostatic challenge or failure, thus depression, 
the fact that 82.6% of the autism sample reported some level of depression 
is inconsistent with homeostasis theory. 
b. Among the general sample, for SWB below 50 points, 23.1% reported 
depression scores that lie within normal limits. This is, once again, 
inconsistent with homeostasis theory. 
Although these above findings appear to highlight some 
inconstancies with theoretical predictions from homeostasis theory, the 
relationship between SWB and depression requires a closer examination. 
If depression represents the suppression of HPMood following 
homeostasis failure (Cummins, 2010), then it will be important to examine 
the contribution of depression and HPMood to SWB.  
 
Examining the relationship between SWB and Depression 
 
 To test the relative contribution of depression and HPMood to the 
prediction of SWB, a hierarchal regression will be performed for both the autism 
and general sample. However, before proceeding with the regression, the 
variables will be assessed for multicollinearity and singularity. Table 64 displays 
the correlations for the autism and general sample.  
 
Table 64 
Correlations between PWI-3, HPMood, and DASS5-D 
 Autism sample 
(n = 109) 
General sample 
(n = 307) 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 
1. PWI-3 -   -   
2. HPMood .70** -  .66** -  
3. DASS5-D -.60** -.61** - -.55** -.62** - 
 
 The correlation matrices indicate that no variables are singular (above 
0.90), indicating that the variables for both groups are suitable for a hierarchal 
multiple regression. The hierarchal regression for the autism sample is presented 
in Table 51 and for the general sample Table 65.  
 
  
Table 65 
Predicting SWB (PWI-3) using the DASS5-D and HPMood for the autism sample  
(n = 109) 
 R2 Adj. R2 ∆R2 B SE B b sr² 
Step 1        
 DASS5-D    -.49*** .06 -.60 .36 
 .36 .35      
        
Step 2        
 DASS5-D    -.14* .06 -.17 .02 
 HPMood    .72*** .07 .70 .31 
 .66 .66 .31     
*p < .05 *** p < .001 
 
  
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to determine how much 
variance in SWB can be accounted for by depression, after removing variance 
attributed by HPMood. Depression was entered at step 1, accounts for 35% of the 
variance in SWB. After the entry of HPMood at step 2, the total variance 
explained by the model as a whole was 66%, F(2, 106) = 104.22, p < .01. The 
depression scale explain 2% in additional unique variance in SWB, after 
controlling for HPMood, R squared change = .31, F change (1, 106) = 96.48, p < 
.01.  
 
 The hierarchal multiple regression for the general sample is presented 
below in Table 66. 
 
  
Table 66 
Predicting SWB (PWI-3) using the DASS5-D and HPMood for the general sample  
(n = 296) 
 R2 Adj. R2 ∆R2 B SE B b sr² 
Step 1        
 DASS5-D    -.34*** .03 -.55 .30 
 .30 .30      
        
Step 2        
 DASS5-D    -.14*** .03 -.22 .03 
 HPMood    .48*** .05 .53 .17 
 .47 .46 .17     
*** p < .001 
  
 
The results for the general sample tell a similar story to the autism sample 
above. Depression was entered at step 1, explaining 30% of the variance in SWB. 
After the entry of HPMood at step 2, the total variance explained by the model as 
a whole was 46%, F(2, 288) = 126.67, p < .01. The depression scale explains 3% 
additional unique variance in SWB, after controlling for HPMood, R squared 
change = .17, F change (1, 288) = 92.12, p < .01.  
  
In summary, a hierarchal multiple regression found that after controlling 
for HPMood, depression only contributes 2% and 3% to the prediction of SWB, 
among the autism and general sample, respectively.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
The major aim of this analysis was to investigate the propositions made 
within SWB homeostasis theory (Cummins, 2010; Cummins & Wooden, 2014) 
regarding the relationship between SWB and depression. Specifically, this analyse 
sought to test the theoretical predictions and diagnostic approximations regarding 
the relationship between SWB and depression (as measured by the DASS21; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). To address the research aims, a number of 
hypotheses were proposed. The results will now be discussed.  
 
The first hypothesis, consistent with previous research and SWB 
homeostasis theory, that depression will demonstrate moderate negative 
correlations with SWB was supported. In line with previous research (Davern, 
2004; Goldberg & Harrow, 2005; Hansson, 2002), there was a strong (r = -.58) 
inverse relationship between SWB and depression among the general sample. For 
people with autism, a moderate (r = -.31) inverse relationship between SWB and 
depression was found. These findings are consistent with theoretical predictions 
that depression represents that failure of the homeostatic system to maintain 
SWB, and the subsequent loss of the normal positive sense of HPMood 
(Cummins et al., 2009). In these terms, it may be reasonable to expect that a 
person reporting SWB within the normal range (i.e., SWB > 70 points) would be 
unlikely to report a DASS5-D score consistent with depression. Alternatively, 
SWB scores that lie within the defeated range (i.e., SWB < 50 points) should 
likely correspond to a DASS5-D rating of depression.  
 
However, results from the current investigation revealed a number of 
inconsistencies with these theoretical predictions. However, it is important to note 
that such an interpretation relies on the assumption that the DASS5-D is valid in 
terms of the presumed categories of depression. According to SWB and DASS5-
D scores: 
 
a) When SWB is greater than 70 points, 29.1% of the general sample 
and 63.2% of the autism sample report some level of depression 
(i.e., mild to extreme).  
 
b) When SWB is less than 50 points, 15.8% of the general sample 
and 4.5% of the autism sample reported a depression rating of 
normal.  
 
These results are not easily explained within homeostasis theory as it is 
currently explained within the literature. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
SWB and depression requires a closer examination. If depression represents the 
suppression of HPMood following homeostatic failure (Cummins, 2010), then it 
will be important to examine the contribution of depression and HPMood to 
SWB.  
 
Examining the relative contribution of depression and HPMood to SWB 
revealed some interesting results. In step 1 of the hierarchal multiple regression, it 
was found that depression accounts for 35% and 30% of the variance to SWB for 
the autism and general sample, respectively. However, when HPMood was 
entered at step 2, the unique variance provided by depression was significantly 
reduced by HPMood for both samples. The novel feature introduced by this 
finding, is the small role depression plays, as it contributes 3% and 2% of unique 
variance to SWB in the presence of HPMood, for both the autism and general 
sample. This indicates that most of the relationship between depression and SWB 
may be caused by the common element of HPMood and suggests that SWB is a 
construct that involves HPMood.  
 
This result, if replicated, may require a reinterpretation of previous 
literature which has reported moderate to strong correlations between depression 
and SWB (Davern, 2004; Goldberg & Harrow, 2005; Hansson, 2002). A likely 
reason that depression correlates with SWB is because it is perfused with 
HPMood. Unless this shared variance is removed, researchers may wrongly 
attribute their correlations. Depression appears to be virtually independent of 
SWB once the shared variance due to HPMood as been removed. Thus, this may 
explain why there were inconsistencies with the theoretical predictions between 
SWB and depression reported above. It is recommended that future research 
remove the shared variance between HPMood and depression. This is so that 
relationship and theoretical predictions between SWB and “pure” depression can 
be explored.  
 
 In summary, this analyse supports previous research suggesting that SWB 
is primarily an affective construct and reinforces the role of HPMood in 
explaining the construction of SWB. These results also suggest the relationship 
between depression and SWB need to be re-explored as depression appears to be 
perfused with HPMood among people with and without autism.  
 
Chapter Eleven: General Discussion 
 
Overview 
 
 A common theme presented in this thesis is that adults with autism are 
likely to face many more challenges in their day-to-day lives, relative to people 
from the general population. These challenges are not limited to, but may include, 
difficulties in education, paid employment, independent living and social 
relationships (Billstedt et al., 2005; Eaves & Ho, 2008; Howlin et al., 2004). 
Despite these challenges, no research to date has examined Subjective Wellbeing 
(SWB) among adults with autism. Given that improving wellbeing is an important 
treatment outcome of many psychological and social services, it is evident that 
understanding the SWB of people with autism is needed to assist in the 
identification and planning of individualised support needs. However, the 
appropriate use of SWB measures requires a critical understanding of the theory 
related to SWB. Therefore, this thesis empirically investigated the application of 
SWB Homeostasis Theory among Australian adults with autism compared to 
Australian adults from the general population.  
 
Between-Group Differences 
 
The first aim of this thesis is to provide comparative data between people 
with autism and people from the general population on their self-reported levels 
of SWB, within an Australian context. Consistent with expectations, Australian 
adults with autism report significantly lower Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) scores. 
This indicates that people with autism may be at increased risk of homeostatic 
challenge or defeat. Previous research has highlighted people with autism are 
more likely to face challenges in terms of social relationships, employment, 
education and independent living, which are all known risk factors impacting the 
homeostatic system (Cummins, 2003). While this thesis did not specifically focus 
on common challenges people with autism face, it did investigate two known 
areas that are most likely to impact a person’s SWB; these being income and 
relationships.  
 
Income is known to be a protective factor for SWB as it allows a person to 
defend against homeostatic failure or assist in homeostatic recover (Cummins, 
2010), by preventing certain negative events from occurring. For instance, having 
income means that a person can pay their bills, buy food, and use their income for 
products or services. Among the general population, having an income of $30,000 
or more is associated with SWB scores that fall within the normative range. 
However, the results for the autism tell a different story. While SWB increases as 
income increases, the fact that an income over $150,000 does not bring SWB into 
the normative range suggests that people with autism are facing negative life 
events that are reducing their overall SWB. This indicates that people with autism 
may require additional assistance to support their wellbeing beyond income.  
 
Personal relationships are another important protective factor for SWB. 
The stress buffering theory (Cohen & Wills, 1985) of social support suggests that 
during times of stress, it is not the amount of support available; rather, it is the 
quality of support that predicts wellbeing. Within Australia, the Australian Unity 
Wellbeing Index has shown that people living with a partner report the highest 
levels of SWB compared to people living on their own (Capic et al., 2015), with 
results being replicated among the general sample. However, for the autism 
sample, while the highest levels of SWB were found among those who live with a 
partner, (SWB approximately 58 points), this was still significantly below the 
general sample. This indicates, that a person with autism living with a partner 
may still require additional support beyond what is required for the general 
population. Future research is needed to examine the quality of support people 
with autism receive to determine best outcomes in supporting their overall SWB.  
 
Another interesting finding was the differences in age groups. It was 
found that people with autism report significantly lower levels of SWB for each 
age category than the general population. However, among the autism sample, a 
closer inspection of the results revealed that the lowest level of SWB was for 
people in the age category of 26-35 years. This is contrary to the general sample, 
where SWB increased as age groups increased. These results indicate that the age 
category of 26-35 years may be more difficult for a person with autism than any 
other time in their adult life. Within western cultures, the age category of 26-35 
years is when milestones such as moving out of parent’s home, completing post-
secondary vocations or higher education, and living independently are likely to 
occur. Future research examining the challenges adults with autism are likely to 
face in the age category of 26-35 years is needed so appropriate support services 
can be provided.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis has confirmed that Australian adults with autism 
report significantly lower levels of SWB than people from the general population. 
This may be due to the additional challenges people with autism face in their day-
to-day lives. Additionally, it appears that the age category of 26-35 years appears 
to be the time when people with autism require the most amount of support. 
Longitudinal studies will provide further insight into this phenomena.  
 
Theoretical Investigations 
 
 The second aim of this thesis was to test a number of theoretical 
predictions based on SWB Homeostasis Theory. Cross-sectional and longitudinal 
studies have found that SWB is not free to vary over the entire range of values 
offered by a particular scale. Rather, a person’s SWB is normally held within a 
narrow range of values around a set-point (Cummins, 1995; Cummins & Wooden, 
2014). In explanation of this stability some researchers have claimed that 
personality is the strongest predictor of SWB (e.g., DeNeeve & Cooper, 2001; 
Headey & Wearing, 1989), while more recent research disputes these claims. In 
fact, Davern et al. (2007), Blore et al. (2010), and Tomyn & Cummins (2011) 
demonstrate that personality fails to make a contribution to SWB when 
Homeostatically Protected Mood (HPMood) is accounted for. In line with this 
more recent thinking, in the current study HPMood accounted for 51% and 75% 
of the variance for the general and autism sample, respectively. Furthermore, the 
personality traits of extraversion and emotional stability did not significantly 
predict SWB once HPMood was accounted for. This reinforces the role of 
HPMood in underlying SWB judgments for both people with and without autism.  
 
 This thesis also examined three different SWB categories based on SWB 
level (normal levels of SWB, challenged SWB and defeated SWB), and the role 
of the cognitive buffers (i.e., self-esteem, optimism and perceived control). 
According to SWB Homeostasis Theory, under non-threatening conditions, a 
normative range of SWB will be maintained. In such conditions, it is predicted 
that the cognitive buffering system will be relatively inactive, and therefore, will 
not contribute significant unique variance to SWB. However, when conditions 
threaten homeostasis, the cognitive buffers become activated as they attempt to 
restore and maintain SWB within the normative range. However, when the level 
of challenge has reached the threshold to which the homeostatic system can no 
longer adapt (Cummins, 2003), Homeostatic defeat is predicted to occur. As a 
consequence, control over SWB transfers from homeostasis to the challenging 
agent(s).  
 
 These homeostatic predictions were tested by separating participants SWB 
scores into groups representing three levels: people with normal levels of SWB 
(i.e., SWB > 70 points), people likely to be experiencing some level of challenge 
(SWB between 50 and 69 points) and people most likely experiencing 
homeostatic defeat (SWB < 50 points). However, by doing this, the autism sample 
failed to have enough participants to enable reliable comparisons. Thus, it is 
recommended that future research examining the role of the cognitive buffers 
among people with autism recruit large samples to enable reliable results.  
 
Nevertheless, findings from the general sample revealed that HPMood and 
self-esteem contributed significantly to people experiencing normal levels of 
SWB. This suggests that HPMood along with self-esteem may be used among 
people with normal levels of SWB to help overcome any challenges that they may 
face in their day-to-day lives. They may do this by separating themselves from a 
negative event that happens (Corning, 2002; Cummins, Gullone, & Lau, 2002). 
For example, Corning found that perceived discrimination among female 
participants was linked with less distress among those with high self-esteem, 
compared to woman with low self-esteem. The participants with high self-esteem 
were able to separate themselves personally from the discrimination targeted 
towards the group of which they were apart. Whereas those in the low self-esteem 
group were more likely to internalise the discrimination as relating to them. 
Therefore, it is possible that self-esteem moderates the impact of negative events 
that occur.  
 
Turning to the second prediction that the cognitive buffers will be 
activated in an attempt to restore and maintain SWB among a group of people 
likely to be experiencing homeostatic challenge, was partly supported. Among the 
general sample, HPMood and the buffer variable perceived control contributed 
significant unique variance to SWB, while the buffers self-esteem and optimism 
failed to make a contribution. An interesting finding was that perceived control 
accounted for 16% of unique variance to SWB, while HPMood only accounted 
for 4% of unique variance. This may suggest that people who are experiencing 
homeostatic challenge may use the buffer variable of perceived control to assist 
their homeostatic system. This can be achieved by changing the way one 
perceives the world so that they believe they are in control, regardless of the 
control they have over the situation (Cummins, Gullone & Lau, 2002; Thompson 
& Spaceman, 1991.  
 
The last prediction examines people who are experiencing homeostatic 
defeat. However, there was an inadequate sample size among the general sample 
to infer reliable results. Thus, it is recommended, as above, that future research 
examining SWB groups and the cognitive buffers recruit large sample sizes.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis supports previous research suggesting that SWB 
is primarily an affective construct and reinforces the role of HPMood in 
explaining the construction of SWB. These results also suggest that similar 
relationships are evident between SWB, personality, and HPMood among people 
with and without autism. This lends support for the robustness of SWB 
Homeostasis Theory among people with autism. 
 
Psychometric Equivalence 
 
 An additional aim of this thesis was to examine the psychometric 
equivalence of the Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI; International Wellbeing 
Group, 2013) and the depression subscale of the Depression Anxiety and Stress 
Scale (DASS21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) among Australians with and 
without autism. It is well known that people with autism have a different and 
clinically distinctive way of perceiving, thinking and learning, compared to 
people from the general population (Scarpa, White & Attwood, 2013). Therefore, 
it is important to determine whether the PWI and the depression subscale of the 
DASS can be validly compared between these groups.  
 
 Measurement Invariance (MI) is an advanced statistical procedure that 
applies a series of parameters (e.g., factor loadings, factor covariance’s, and 
structural regression paths), in a logical and restrictive manner to data sets. This 
allows a number of comparisons to be made to determine whether valid 
comparisons of a scale can be inferred between groups. There are four important 
steps involved in MI testing. The first step, configural invariance, if met, indicates 
that the scale under investigation has the same number of factors across groups. 
The second step, weak invariance, if met, indicates that the latent variable can be 
completed by the participants within each group. The third step, strong 
invariance, tests whether participants from each group understand the construct 
and the items of the scale in the same way as each other. If groups are found to be 
invariant at this stage, then it indicates that their scores can be validly compared 
on the latent construct. Lastly, strict invariance, if met, indicates that the items 
and latent construct are measured identically across groups.  
 
 Overall, tests of MI found that PWI demonstrated weak invariance 
between people with and without autism. This indicates that the PWI is likely to 
validly measure SWB among people with and without autism. This also indicates 
that at an individual level, the PWI can be validly used among adults with and 
without autism, to determine whether someone is a risk of homeostatic failure, 
and can be used to identify areas in their life where additional resources may be 
needed. Additionally, service providers can use the PWI to assist how effective 
their intervention is in improving the subjective quality of life of people with and 
without autism. 
 
However, as strong invariance was not found, direct comparisons on the 
PWI items or the overall SWB mean cannot be made between people with and 
without autism. This is because people with and without autism are likely to 
interpret the questions on the PWI in a different way. This finding is somewhat 
expected as people with autism have a different way of thinking and perceiving 
the world compared to people from the general population (Scarpa et al., 2013; 
Vulchanova et al., 2015).  
 
 However, partial invariance was found among three items of the PWI. In 
fact, strict invariance was found using the PWI domains of ‘Standard of Living ‘, 
‘Achieving’ and ‘Personal Relationships’. This indicates that direct comparisons 
can be made between people with and without autism on these three items as they 
interpret the items in the same way. Furthermore, as strict invariance was found, 
the three items can be summed, now known as the PWI-3, and the overall mean 
can be used to validly compare SWB between people with and without autism. A 
major implication of this is that at a population level, future research can validly 
and reliable investigate and compare the SWB of both groups. If it is important 
for all Australians to experience normal levels of SWB, including people with 
autism, then measuring SWB using the PWI-3 is an excellent indicator to the 
degree that is being achieved.  
 
 Turning to the depression subscale of the DASS21 it was found that the 
original seven items (DASS7-D) did not provide adequate model fit for both the 
autism and general sample. This indicates that items on the DASS7-D may not be 
valid. Instead, five items were found to provide adequate model fit, now known as 
the DASS5-D. The reasons for the misfit are not clear. 
 Just like the PWI, the DASS5-D was found to meet weak invariance. In 
other words, the DASS5-D is likely to be measuring depression among the autism 
and general sample. However, as strong invariance was not found, valid 
comparisons between people with and without autism cannot be made. This 
indicates that people with and without autism interpret the items in a different 
way to one another. An important finding from the analyses was that partial 
invariance could not be obtained. This indicates that on all five items on the 
DASS5-D, people with and without autism interpret all of the items in a different 
way. Future research is needed to investigate the interpretation people with autism 
apply to the DASS5-D items compared to the general population. This will 
provide useful insight in designing a depression questionnaire that can validly 
compare depression between the two groups.  
 
 In conclusion, these findings indicate the importance of conducting tests 
of measurement invariance. Previous research has highlighted that people with 
autism have a clinically and distinctive way of thinking compared to people from 
the general population. Thus, it is important to test whether people with autism 
understand and interpret scales in the same way as the population on which they 
were normed. Future clinical trials are needed to test the effectiveness of the PWI, 
so that it can be used by service providers or clinicians to assist in treatment 
planning and measuring treatment outcomes. This will be useful as will help 
identify people with autism who are at risk of homeostatic failure, and areas they 
may require additional support. Another important finding was that the PWI-3 is 
understood and interpreted in the same way among people with and without 
autism. This provides a useful tool for future research at a population level, to 
investigate the degree that normal levels of SWB are being obtained by people 
with autism compared to the general population.  
 
 
 
SWB and Depression 
 
 Another major aim of this thesis was to investigate the propositions made 
within SWB homeostasis theory (Cummins, 2010; Cummins & Wooden, 2014) 
regarding the relationship between SWB (as measured by the PWI-3) and 
depression (as measured by the DASS5-D). As expected, there was a strong (r = -
.58) and moderate (r = .31) inverse relationship between SWB and depression for 
the general and autism sample, respectively. These findings are consistent with 
theoretical predictions that depression represents the failure of the homeostatic 
system to maintain SWB, and subsequent loss of the normal positive sense of 
HPMood (Cummins et al., 2009). In these terms, it may be reasonable to expect 
that a person reporting SWB within the normal range (i.e., SWB > 70 points) 
would be unlikely to report a DASS5-D score consistent with depression. 
Alternatively, SWB scores that lie within the defeated range (i.e., SWB < 50 
points) should likely correspond to a DASS5-D rating of depression.  
 
 However, results from the current investigation revealed a number of 
inconsistencies with these theoretical predictions. That is, when SWB is greater 
than 70 points, 29.1% of the general sample and 63.2% of the autism sample, 
report a depression rating of mild or greater. Further, when SWB is less than 50 
points, 15.8% of the general sample and 4.5% of the autism sample report a 
depression rating of normal. These results are not easily accounted for by 
homeostasis theory as it is currently explained. Thus, the relationship between 
SWB and depression requires a closer examination. If depression represents that 
suppression of HPMood following homeostatic failure (Cummins, 2010), then it 
is important to examine the contribution of depression and HPMood to SWB.  
 
 Examining the relative contribution of depression and HPMood to SWB 
revealed some interesting results. That is, in step 1 of an hierarchal regression, 
depression accounts for 35% and 30% of the variance to SWB for the autism and 
general sample, respectively. However, when HPMood is entered in step 2, 
depression only contributes 3% and 2% of the unique variance to SWB, while 
HPMood accounts for 17% and 31% of unique variance to SWB for both the 
general and autism sample, respectively. Therefore depression plays a small role 
in SWB in the presence of HPMood. This indicates that most of the relationship 
between depression and SWB may be caused by the common element of 
HPMood and suggests SWB is a construct that involves HPMood.  
 
 The result, if replicated, may require a reinterpretation of previous 
research that has reported moderate to strong correlations between SWB and 
depression (Davern, 2004; Goldberg & Harrow, 2005; Hannson, 2002). A likely 
reason depression correlates with SWB is that it is perfused with HPMood. Unless 
this shared variance is removed, researchers may wrongly attribute their 
correlations.  
 
 Indeed, depression appears to be virtually independent of SWB once the 
shared variance due to HPMood has been removed. Thus, this may explain why 
there are inconsistencies with the theoretical predictions between SWB and 
depression reported above. It is recommended that future research remove the 
shared variance between HPMood and depression, this is so the relationship and 
theoretical predictions between SWB and “pure” depression can be explored.  
 
 In conclusion, this analysis supports previous research suggesting that 
SWB is primarily an affective construct and reinforces the role of HPMood in 
explaining the construction of SWB. These results also suggest the relationship 
between depression and SWB need to be re-explored as depression appears to be 
perfused with HPMood among people with and without autism.  
 
Clinical Implications for People with Autism 
 
Where previous clinical research has largely focused on adult outcomes, 
such as independent living, employment and education (Billstedt et al., 2005; 
Eaves & Ho, 2008; Howlin, 2004), these objective indicators do not tell us about 
the perceived wellbeing of people with autism. Therefore, it is important, where 
possible, to obtain data from respondents so that valid conclusions concerning 
their perceived wellbeing can be drawn. By doing so, service providers and 
clinicians can have a better understanding of the SWB of people with autism so 
that quality services can be provided to meet their needs, while also ensuring their 
personal fulfilment and life satisfaction. 
 
 The conceptual framework of this thesis is that people with autism are 
likely to have additional challenges in their lives, which is going to challenge the 
homeostatic system, beyond the normal life challenges experienced by the general 
population. As a consequence of the additional challenges, their ability to regulate 
SWB will be compromised. The extent to which their autism will actually be 
evident as a source of stress is dependent on the individual’s external and internal 
resources. When resources are sufficient to neutralise the additional demands 
caused by autism, the homeostatic system will maintain SWB within normative 
levels, relative to that person’s set-point range. However, if the demands 
overwhelm the resources, then homeostasis will fail and SWB will fall below the 
normative range (Cummins, 2010; Cummins & Wooden, 2014). Results from this 
thesis provide guidance and direction to areas or domains of possible vulnerability 
for people with autism.   
 
 Examining the life domains that significantly contribute to SWB, along 
with examining their scores can highlight specific areas of vulnerability for 
homeostatic defeat and provides direction for possible intervention in order to 
enhance a person’s quality of life. This means that specific domains can be used 
as diagnostic indicators, as a low mean score in particular domains can indicate a 
potential vulnerability for homeostatic defeat. Such indicated areas can then be 
targeted for intervention. For example, the three domains that contributed 
significant unique variance to SWB, Standard of Living, Personal Relationships, 
Achieving, were also significantly lower among the autism sample compared to 
the general population. This indicates that interventions should focus on 
improving Standard of Living, Personal Relationships and Achieving as they are 
the areas that are most likely to improve overall SWB for a person with autism. 
For instance, it will be important for service providers to (1) foster environments 
were meaningful social relationships can take place, (2) assist people with autism 
towards their life goals that provide them with personal meaning and (3) assist 
people with autism to obtain and maintain meaningful paid employment.  
 Limitations 
 
 This thesis has several limitations. The first is in the way the participants 
were recruited. Participants were recruited through online networking sites and 
through autism associations. Therefore, this is not an accurate representation of 
the autism or general Australian population as a whole, as it only samples people 
who are connected through autism associations or online networking sites. It is 
recommended in future participants are matched on IQ, as well as use a clinical 
interview to determine diagnosis, to strengthen future research. Secondly, to 
ensure adequate power for comparisons between categories of SWB, such as 
people who are experiencing homeostatic defeat, or challenge, a larger sample 
size will be required for both groups in future studies.  
 
Future Research 
 
 The results from this thesis have a highlighted a couple of key areas for 
future research. The first is to replicate this research with a larger sample and to 
recruit a more representative sample of people with autism. A larger sample 
would allow the use of more powerful statistical analysis, especially when 
examining sub-groups, such as those who are experiencing homeostatic defeat or 
challenge. Furthermore, a longitudinal design would also allow the possibility of 
establishing causal variables. This is important as the results indicated that people 
with autism report their lowest level of wellbeing in the age category of 26 to 35 
years before it increases. Additionally, research into the composition of the 
HPMood component of SWB for people with autism is new, and a more 
systematic and rigorous investigation is required to test the relationships reported 
in this thesis. As noted, the importance of HPMood and its relationship with SWB 
homeostasis is that it potentially provides a useful framework to explain the 
normative levels of SWB reported by people with autism.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This thesis has confirmed the important finding that SWB is significantly 
lower in Australian adults with autism compared to the general Australian 
population. This may be explained by the extra difficulties and challenges people 
with autism face in their day-to-day lives relative the general population. 
Nonetheless, the results of this thesis support the use of the Personal Wellbeing 
Index as a valid and reliable assessment tool to measure the quality of life of 
people with autism. The use of this instrument provides additional clinically 
useful information about a person’s overall quality of life. Furthermore, this thesis 
has also highlighted that people with and without autism respond the same way on 
the PWI-3. Thus, valid comparisons between people with and without autism can 
be made using the PWI-3. This means at a population level, future research can 
validly and reliable investigate the SWB of people with and without autism. If it 
is important for all Australians to experience normal levels of SWB, including 
people with autism, then measuring SWB using the PWI-3 is an excellent 
indicator to the degree that is being achieved.  
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